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Abstract
Narrow Representation?
The Impact of Implicitly and Explicitly Racial Issues on Opinion and
Representation
Franchesca V. Nestor
My dissertation combines knowledge from the opinion, racial and ethnic politics, and
representation literatures to examine Black and Latino opinion and representation on
racially salient issues. I theorize that representation of Blacks and Latinos is a “narrow”
representation, much more in line with Black and Latino opinion on issues that are
explicitly, rather than implicitly, racial. To test this theory, I build upon the literature by
considering intersectional identity and multiple methods of representation. In Chapter 2, I
examine two questions: when do income and racial group differences occur on racially
salient issues, and if splits occur between respondents of higher and lower incomes
according to the racialized nature of the issues, on which type of issues do government
outputs respond better to either group? My approach extends Gilens’s (2012) method for
imputing opinion by income to racial groups. I find income can be an important driver of
opinion for not only whites but also Blacks and Latinos. Government outputs on racially
salient issues, however, do not seem to follow either Gilens’s (2012) findings that high
income opinion drives government, or Griffin and Newman’s (2008) findings that
African Americans experience better government representation on racially salient issues.
Rather, Blacks’ and Latinos’ desire for change does not seem to drive government
outputs on implicitly racial issues, and whites’ desire for change does not seem to drive
government outputs on explicitly racial issues. In Chapter 3, I move to consider
descriptive representation and the effects of racially salient issues upon individual
legislator responsiveness. Do African American and Latino legislators do a better job of
representing low-income African Americans and low-income Latinos on two implicitly
racial issues where their opinions are unique? I find that this is largely not the case,
although Latino Republicans show some promise. In addition, a sponsorship analysis on
both implicitly and explicitly racial issues shows that African American and Latino
legislators are more active than other legislators in sponsoring legislation that supports
low-income Black and Latino interests on immigration (an explicitly racial issue), but not
different from other legislators in their sponsorship behavior for Iraq withdrawal (an
implicitly racial issue). Moreover, chapter 3 reveals that large numbers of low-income
Blacks and Latinos in districts have no bearing on the behavior of legislators in these
analyses, including Black and Latino legislators. Finally, chapter 4 considers committee
oversight, examining the influence of Black and Latino committee members, and of early
1990s redistricting, upon explicitly and implicitly racial oversight. Chapter 4 reveals a
distinct difference after redistricting for implicitly racial issues, with the number of
African American members heavily affecting such oversight after the 103rd Congress.
This project builds understanding of racial disadvantage, and how it occurs in
government.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Whites and nonwhites tend to view government policy differently, with Blacks
and Latinos especially tending to be much more liberal and much less aligned with the
direction of government outcomes (e.g., Bowler and Segura 2011). We cannot
understand or solve this potential problem of lacking government responsiveness without
an understanding of the complexities of opinion across and within racial groups, and
across policies. Unfortunately, data limitations and persistently small sample sizes of
nonwhite respondents in surveys have hampered our ability to assess Black and Latino
opinion, and as a result government responsiveness to that opinion, in a comprehensive
way.
This does not mean the effort is not underway; it is simply incomplete. Scholars
studying the role of racial group consciousness in public opinion find that the impact of
racial group membership varies with the nature of the issue (e.g., Kinder and Winter
2001; Sanchez 2006; White 2007). Opinion differences between racial groups occur on
many issues, but especially on racialized issues, which can be envisioned as falling along
a continuum from more explicitly to more implicitly racial. The differences are
especially pronounced on racialized issues that are explicit, which are obviously racial
and include such issues as affirmative action and immigration. Differences are more
nuanced on racialized issues that are implicit, which affect higher proportions of Blacks
and Latinos than whites but are nevertheless not explicitly racial, such as poverty,
welfare, and crime. While racialized issues are often nuanced in their degree of
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racialization, research shows that degree matters (Kinder and Winter 2001; Sanchez
2006; White 2007).
Gilens (2012), meanwhile, points out the influence of income on opinion. Lowincome and high-income survey respondents, as one might expect, tend to see issues
related to economic policy and social programs differently. The interaction of these two
sources of opinion splits, income and race, is not as well understood. Black and Latino
opinion is not “monolithic” (Orey, Craemer, and Price 2013); thus, we should aim to
explore not just racially-driven opinion splits but other sources of dispute, including
income. When does racial group consciousness matter more? When does income matter
more? Generally, samples of nonwhite respondents are too small to permit examination
of both variables at once. This dissertation uses a dataset with large samples of Blacks
and Latinos—the Cooperation Congressional Election Studies (CCES)—and examines
the influence of both race and income upon opinion.
Even less understood is the impact of these potential opinion differences on
representation. What effect do these potential differences have upon meaningful
representation of disadvantaged groups, such as Blacks, Latinos, low-income individuals,
and those who are doubly disadvantaged—those who are both racially and economically
disadvantaged? Gilens (2012) has shown that when low-income and high-income
respondents disagree, the high-income minority wins out. Government is more likely to
respond to the changes desired by the high-income individuals, despite what low- and
middle- income individuals desire. We know Blacks and Latinos are disadvantaged
when it comes to representation in government, but does that hold when government
policy responsiveness is examined? Are low-income members of these groups
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particularly disadvantaged when it comes to government responsiveness? Can Blacks and
Latinos ever “win” the representation game, even when their opinions differ from white
opinion? Is there a difference in representation when one examines explicitly and
implicitly racial issues separately?
These are the questions I explore. I theorize that representation of Blacks and
Latinos is a narrowly constructed representation, focusing more on issues that are
explicitly racial rather than implicitly racial, even if the implicit issues are substantively
important for nonwhite groups. This project yields important insights about the nature of
public opinion and representation in a variety of venues, and their combined effect upon
the policies that aid the most disadvantaged members of our society. Answering these
questions is crucial to uncovering the possible ways our democracy systematically favors
certain groups over others.
THE LITERATURE, AND ITS UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Group Consciousness
Persistent opinion divides between Blacks, Latinos, and whites, especially Blacks
and whites, are a common theme in racial and ethnic politics literature (e.g., Kinder and
Winter 2001; Sanchez 2006; White 2007). Why do Blacks, Latinos, and whites tend to
see political issues differently? Some authors focus primarily on group consciousness
(Dawson 1995), some add other personal factors to group consciousness such as income
and political principles (e.g., Kinder and Winter 2001; Sanchez 2006), and others focus
on how the impact of group consciousness versus other predictors varies depending on
the nature of the issue (e.g., Kinder and Winter 2001; Sanchez 2006; Tate 1993; White
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2007). In addition, other scholars remind us not to assume group opinion is uniform (e.g.,
Orey, Craemer, and Price 2013; Strolovitch 2007).
What is group consciousness? Scholars tend to measure it and define it in
different ways, from feelings of closeness with one’s in-group (Leighley and Vedlitz
1999), to “linked fate” (Dawson 1995), to “social identity” (Kinder and Winter 2001). In
fact, McClain et al (2009) argue that scholars need to be more careful about how the
concept of group consciousness is defined and measured. According to McClain et al
(2009), group consciousness is distinct from both group membership and group identity.
Group membership is self-placement within a group based on certain characteristics
specific to that group, and group identification requires awareness of belonging to a
group and a sense of shared interests with other members of that group. Group
consciousness is a third concept, which is group identification with politicization of that
group identification added in. Group consciousness can be demonstrated by beliefs about
the group’s social rank relative to other groups.
Group Consciousness and Opinion
Regardless of the exact terminology or measurement used, the idea of group
consciousness as it relates to opinion is that group membership may bind individuals in a
group in their opinions across a wide variety of issue areas, even after considering
possible differences between group members, such as income level. For example,
Dawson (1995) argues that socioeconomic differences among Blacks are of little to no
importance in their policy preferences and choices. Rather, what matters is linked fate,
Dawson’s form of group consciousness, whereby Blacks make policy choices based on
what they believe will be best for their racial group as a whole.
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Some posit that work on group consciousness assumes opinions among nonwhite
groups are “monolithic” (Orey, Craemer, and Price 2013). For example, Dawson’s
(1995) findings suggest little to no difference in opinion on issues among Blacks of
different income levels. Other scholars state that other individual characteristics matter
beyond the influence of group consciousness on opinion. Tate (2003) argues that middle
and higher income Blacks are less likely to support social welfare policy than low income
Blacks. Sanchez (2006) explores a complicated finding for Latinos: group consciousness
matters, but so do differences among Latinos, such as their English proficiency,
citizenship status, and nativity. Kinder and Winter (2001) discover that group
consciousness matters, but so do income differences and differences in political
principles.
Related to the idea that group opinion is not as monolithic as the group
consciousness literature sometimes suggests is work on intersectionality. The
intersectionality literature (e.g., Bowleg 2008; Cole 2009; Hawkesworth 2006; Hancock
2007; Weldon 2006; Strolovitch 2007; Wadsworth 2011) posits that identities and
opinions are created at the intersection of differences such as race, ethnicity, class, and
gender, and that scientists tend to do a poor job evaluating these overlapping distinctions,
which can result in different experiences and perspectives.
Finally, some authors point out the role of issue type. Group consciousness
matters more for some issues than for others. According to Kinder and Winter (2001),
the opinion divide between whites and African Americans on issues like federal spending
on affirmative action do not disappear when income differences between the groups are
removed. However, group differences in opinion between Blacks and whites do lessen
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once income differences are removed on social welfare issues such as welfare and health
insurance. For Sanchez (2006), too, group consciousness among Latinos mattered most
on Latino-salient issues and less on general issues. Group consciousness and interest
among working class whites mattered only for race-targeted, not income-targeted,
policies for Bobo and Kluegel (1993) as well (such as scholarships for African American
children versus scholarships for poor children). It seems, as Valentino, Hutchings, and
White (2002) explain, that group consciousness is not as consistent or reliable on nonracial or less clearly racial issues.
What kinds of issue areas are clearly, or explicitly, racial, and which are perhaps
more salient for Blacks and Latinos than they are for whites but nonetheless not explicitly
racial? Using an experiment, White (2007) shows how issues framed differently can lead
to different opinions among whites and Blacks. Explicit frames explicitly mention or
reference Blacks. Implicit frames, on the other hand, only implicate Blacks, rather than
outright naming them, by linking an issue to problems, such as poverty, that affect Blacks
at higher proportions than members of the white racial grouping. White’s experiment and
findings focus on the role of language less than policy, and on how language can
explicitly or implicitly racialize nearly any issue to greater or lesser degrees, but it is still
the case that some issues in themselves are more explicit in their racial context than
others. Other scholars are more direct in the application of these racialized frames to
public policy opinions. For Sanchez (2006), Latino-salient issues include immigration
and bilingual education, which unavoidably include a racial context. He also includes the
death penalty, however, which is only implicitly racial—it may be of salience to Latinos
because of the higher rates of members of these groups in prison and on death row, but it
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is not an explicitly racial policy like immigration. Similarly, Bobo and Kluegel (1993)
distinguish between race-targeted and income-targeted policies and the differential
effects these have on white and Black opinion. Whites are less supportive of explicitly
race-targeted policies than of income-targeted policies, but Blacks were supportive of
both.
What’s missing in these studies is an attempt to examine opinion differences
along race and income lines simultaneously, despite the importance of intersectional
identity (Strolovitch 2007). Many authors examine Black opinion or Latino opinion
versus white opinion (e.g., Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Dawson 1995; Kinder and Winter
2001; Sanchez 2006; White 2007). Some study, or at least briefly examine, high income
versus low income opinion (Dawson 1995; Gilens 2012; Kinder and Winter 2001; Tate
2003). The intersection is often ignored. The reason for this is likely less a lack of
interest and more a lack of data. Finding surveys with representative samples of any
racial group other than whites is very difficult; finding surveys with representative
samples of racial groups large enough to break up racial categories further by income is
even more of a challenge. As a result, these questions about the role of income and race
in racialized issue opinion go unanswered.
A Word About Self-Interest and Symbolic Politics
Uncovering the source of opinion differences is important. Relatedly, when
studying the opinions of groups of individuals, it’s crucial to be careful about the way we
conceive of “self-interest.” It is problematic to assume what opinions should be in the
disadvantaged individuals’ self-interest, and it is equally problematic to assume that
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opinions at any income level, or any racial category, are driven entirely by these
individuals’ conceptions of their categorical self-interest.
The “symbolic politics” strand of research differentiates between short-term,
rational, cost-benefit analysis-driven self-interest as an explanation for public opinion,
and the “symbolic politics” explanation. That is, such research posits that “people
acquire stable preferences through conditioning in their preadult years, with little
calculation of the future costs and benefits of these attitudes. The most important of these
are presumably some rather general predispositions, such as party identification, liberal
or conservative ideology, nationalism, or racial prejudice” (Sears et al 1980, 671).
Sears et al (1980) used measures of self-interest and symbolic politics measures in
four issue areas: unemployment, national health insurance, busing, and crime. They were
unable to find evidence to support self-interest as the driver for opinion in these areas.
For example, whether or not an individual had health insurance, or had a child likely to
be affected by busing, did not have a relationship with individuals’ opinions on these
issues. Instead, party identification, ideology, and racial prejudice explained opinions
better. The impact of racial prejudice on white opposition to busing was especially
pronounced (Sears et al 1979). The same was true for voting in Los Angeles mayoral
elections. Symbolic racism, rather than perceived racial threat from Blacks (such as
Blacks’ proximity to white voters’ neighborhoods, schools, and jobs), determined the
likelihood of voting against the Black candidate (Kinder and Sears 1981).
Sears, Lau, Tyler and Allen (1980) also found no evidence that the interaction of
local conditions, such as living in a state with a high number of uninsured individuals,
with self-interest motivates individual opinion. Sears and Funk wrote, “The effects of
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self-interest usually extend neither to other related policy issues nor to more general
policy or ideological questions. The general public seems to think about most political
issues, most of the time, in a disinterested frame of mind” (1991, 77). Lau and Heldman
(2009) extended the examination into the 2000s, with the same results.
This is not to say self-interest never matters. Wolpert and Gimpel (1998) uncover
ample evidence for the self-interest hypothesis in the area of gun control: those who own
guns are more sensitive to gun control. They link this seemingly unlikely result to Sears
and Funk’s (1980) own suspicion that self-interest may be activated when individuals
“attribute their personal well being to government action in question” (Wolpert and
Gimpel 1998, 255). In addition, Wolpert and Gimpel believe the NRA assists as a selfinterest “trigger” with the argument that gun laws will only restrict “good guys,” leaving
those responsible with guns and respectful of the law less safe (255). Crano (1997),
meanwhile, tries to bridge the two camps by suggesting that vested self-interest does
moderate opinion; respondents’ self-interest does seem to matter for their responses if
they perceive that self-interest and perceive it as important. That perception of
importance is what determines how “vested” a self-interest is, and, moreover, its
connectedness to opinion. This provides a caution that we, as researchers, ought to be
careful in dictating what is, or is not, of differential interest to respondents.
Most relevant to this work, Bobo and Kluegel (1993) agree that individual selfinterest matters little, but state that the role for group self-interest in racialized policy
areas depends upon the activation of “race-targeting” versus “income-targeting” in a
policy, and whether or not the policy aims to equalize opportunity or outcome. Even
though the symbolic politics attitude of racial tolerance remained important in
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determining support for race-targeted equal outcomes policies among whites, group selfinterest mattered too: those who perceived themselves as members of the working class
were particularly opposed to race-targeted policies. This, despite the fact that Kinder and
Kiewit (1979) were unable to discover any relationship between individual economic
circumstances and congressional voting, even when looking for differences among
subgroups such as union members, or those who perceived themselves as being in the
working class. Context may be key in determining the role of group- or self-interest,
which certainly relates to this effort to differentiate between explicitly and implicitly
racial issues. Ideally, then, examinations of opinion differences based in hypotheses
about supposed self-interest, including income, ought to include the possibility of
competing explanations rooted in long-term political beliefs such as party identification,
ideology, and racial tolerance.
Opinion Splits and Government Responsiveness
Why do differences in opinion between and among groups and individuals
matter, though? They matter because, in a representative democracy, we expect that
individuals’ desires are represented by their government. As Griffin and Newman (2008)
write, “If a citizen’s preferred course of action for the government is consistent with what
the government subsequently does, we can conclude that the citizen is well-represented”
(157). If group preferences diverge, and one group is consistently more likely to be
thwarted in its desires for the direction of government, this creates undemocratic
outcomes. How do opinion differences on racial issues matter for representation?
Gilens (2012) provides an example of a one-dimensional look at opinion
differences and their correspondence with representation losses or wins. Gilens
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demonstrates that when preferences between low-income and high-income citizens
diverge, policy tends to follow the preferences of higher income citizens, rather than
lower income citizens. Critically, for the purposes of my dissertation, Gilens does not
focus on racial differences, though, in either opinion or issue area, only income. Gilens
believes that surprising representation wins for low-income groups—such as the
continued lack of privatization on Social Security that higher income individuals
support—are due to significant advocacy group support and activity on this issue. This
implies that disadvantaged individuals can have their opinions represented better when
advocacy groups are fighting for their side.
Griffin and Newman (2008), meanwhile, focus on the role of issue salience. Like
Gilens, they recognize the role of advocacy and opinion intensity in representation,
beyond the impact of opinion itself. Unlike Gilens, Griffin and Newman incorporate the
role of race and racialization—both in opinion and in issue type--and argue it matters
beyond income. They argue surprising representational wins on racial issues, counter to
what the majority of whites would desire, means issues that are especially salient to
Blacks and Latinos can win regardless of majority rule.
Which Blacks and Latinos are having their opinions heard, though? Can we
depend on issue salience to provide the voice for the disadvantaged? Again, the literature
on intersectionality cautions us to recognize differences within groups and the impact
they have on opinion and representation. This continues to be a missing piece.
Strolovitch (2007) might argue that Gilens is right that advocacy means
unexpected wins can occur, though she would point out it certainly does not ensure wins
for everybody who desires representation. Further, though Griffin and Newman (2008)
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might argue salience can win the day for the disadvantaged, Strolovitch might add that
salience only leads to strong representation for the comparatively advantaged of the
disadvantaged. This further privileges the comparatively advantaged and perpetuates the
lack of representation for those citizens with overlapping disadvantaged identities.
Though Strolovitch’s examination of advocacy groups gives us some hints about
what may happen to government responsiveness at the intersection of income and race, so
far, these questions remain unanswered. After imputing opinion by income and race, I
examine three ways government does or does not respond: as a body on roll call votes
(Chapter 2), as individual legislators on roll call votes and sponsorship (Chapter 3), and
as congressional committees on oversight (Chapter 4).
Substantive versus Descriptive Representation and Individual Legislators
So far, I have focused on “government” as a body. How much do differently
racialized issues and opinion differences based on income and race matter for individual
legislators? What determines representative responsiveness at the individual level?
Mayhew (1974) argues the desire to be reelected does, in which case constituency
makeup would determine whether group interests are represented. Miller and Stokes
(1963) point out that representatives act differently, as either trustees or delegates,
depending on the nature of the issue. Racial and ethnic politics scholars recognize that
constituency makeup is a possible determinant of representation for African American
interests (Grose 2011). Districts or states with higher numbers of Blacks and Latinos
might determine group representation, because their votes are potentially important for
reelection. Thus, the size of a group population in a given district may be crucial in
determining responsiveness.
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In racial and ethnic politics, any discussion of representative responsiveness must
include a look at representative race as well. Descriptive representation, often bolstered
by majority-minority districts, aims to improve substantive representation. Again, an
assumption of shared racial group consciousness is the driving force behind such notions:
an African American legislator is more likely to better represent African American
interests than a white legislator because the African American legislator identifies more
clearly with those of his or her own race. The same thinking underlies the creation of
Latino majority-minority districts.
Does descriptive representation fulfill its promise, however? The answer to this is
far from clear, especially at the aggregate level (e.g., Grose 2011; Lublin 1999; Lublin
and Voss 2003; Shickler et al 2010; Swain 1995). At the individual behavior level, too,
there are conflicting findings. Griffin and Flavin (2007) find that African Americans tend
to be less politically knowledgeable and less accurate than whites at identifying the
ideological position—and thus substantive policy direction--of their representatives, and,
correspondingly, less likely to punish their representatives at the polls for diverting from
citizen preferences. Further, Griffin and Newman (2007) say that Lublin’s (1999)
suggestion for African American influence districts might not work for Latinos—in what
they call Latino “threat districts” with between 40-50 percent Latinos, there was a huge
proximity gap between the preferences of Latino citizens and their white representatives.
Griffin and Newman argue that descriptive representation might matter most in such
districts, but in other districts with lower or higher percentages of Latinos, Latino citizens
were sufficiently close to their Democratic representatives, white or Latino, to make the
substantive representation argument more about ensuring similar partisan identification
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rather than descriptive representation in those districts. Finally, Gay (2001), without
examining individuals’ voting calculus, finds that majority-minority districts rarely
increase black turnout much over non-majority-minority districts, and decrease white
turnout.
Still, Gay (2001) says that in the rare cases majority-minority districts improve
black voter turnout, it can do so to the tune of six to 26 percentage points. Other scholars
discover similar positive signs for majority-minority districts at the individual behavior
level. Banducci et al (2004) find that in the US and New Zealand, descriptive
representation can improve evaluations of and contact with representatives, and turnout
and evaluations of the system, respectively. Bobo and Gilliam (1990) argue that blacks
living in districts with black mayors are more empowered and politically engaged,
because they are also more knowledgeable about their local governments—a fact that
would also improve government responsiveness. Barreto et al (2004) believe that
majority-minority districts consistently improve Latino turnout in California, across types
of elections, and do so additively when voters live in more majority-minority districts
(though they do decrease white turnout). Better Black and Latino turnout can lead to a
government that is more substantively responsive to Blacks and Latinos. Grose (2011)
explains how this can work and relates it to substantive representation: black legislators
rely on black voters more than white legislators, so they take care to cultivate those votes
through not just roll call voting but project delivery and constituency service. At the
district level, there are positive signs as well. Gay (2007) uses votes on referenda in
California to measure citizen desires, and says that majority-minority districts are just as
responsive as majority-white districts.
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Where does income factor into all of this, though? When opinions of highincome African Americans or Latinos diverge from low-income African Americans or
Latinos, what happens? Swain (1995) argues that the wealthy African American
representatives who get elected are no more like their African American constituents than
are wealthy white representatives. Tate (2003) disagrees with Swain (1995) that African
American representatives are just as different from their African American constituents
as white representatives. In her mind, the black experience is a similarity that crosses
wealth differences. Who’s right? More specifically for my purposes, does the theme of
narrow representation exist regardless of representative race? In Chapter 3, I examine the
voting and sponsorship behavior of individual members of Congress on implicitly and
explicitly racial issues, considering their party, ideology, district, and race.
Oversight and Racial Representation
Finally, these unanswered questions about race, income, opinion, and
representation extend to the oversight arena as well. As stated previously, Grose (2011),
Minta (2011), Minta and Sinclair-Chapman (2013), and Tate (2003) emphasize the
importance of moving beyond roll call voting to find the influence of legislator race upon
legislator behavior. Minta (2011) takes this approach to the oversight arena, discovering
that nonwhite members of Congress contribute more lines of text (that is, say more) at
oversight hearings than white members of Congress on both racial and social welfare
issues. But to what end? Are there more hearings relating to racialized policy overall on
committees with greater numbers of Black and Latino members?
FILLING IN THE GAPS: A THEORY OF RACIALIZED REPRESENTATION
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My dissertation combines knowledge from opinion and representation literatures
to examine Black and Latino representation on racially salient issues. I theorize that
representation of Blacks and Latinos is a narrowly constructed representation, more likely
on issues that are explicitly, rather than implicitly, racial. My exploration involves
national opinion data of whites, Blacks, and Latinos at different income levels, and
extends into congressional representation, individual legislator responsiveness, and
congressional oversight. If I am correct, this theory suggests representation
systematically does not meet the needs of the most economically disadvantaged Blacks
and Latinos when it comes to issues that are not explicitly racial.
To bring the opinion and representation literatures together and examine public
opinion and government responsiveness more precisely, I adapt Gilens’s (2012)
approach, while incorporating race, not just income, and while incorporating explicitly
and implicitly racial issues. That is, I use survey data to impute preferences by income,
race and race and income together.
Explicit and Implicit: What does it mean?
Explicitly racial issues are clearly related to race or ethnicity. These would
include questions pertaining to affirmative action, racial integration, immigration, and
bilingual education. Implicitly racial issues are issues that affect Blacks and Latinos at
higher rates because of the higher proportions of these populations, relative to whites,
affected by the issue—often due to poverty—but not automatically due to race. They do
not refer explicitly to race. These might include welfare, the minimum wage, healthcare,
troop withdrawal, or even pollution and climate change (large number of Blacks and
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Latinos are affected by allergies and asthma, a problem many scientists believe is
exacerbated by pollution and/or climate change)1.
Though there is certainly some subjectivity inherent in such classifications, this
approach is not dissimilar from Mendelberg’s (2001). Mendelberg is interested in the use
of racially-charged appeals, explicit versus implicit, by candidates in parties in political
campaigns, and how these appeals vary based on changing societal norms with persistent
racial biases underneath. In addition, in her experiments, Mendelberg uses visual cues,
not just words, to create implicit appeals. That is not my purpose here. However, in
coding speeches from the past, Mendelberg uses an explicit versus implicit framework.
Explicit appeals explicitly mention race, words like “whites,” “race,” “racial,” “Negroes,”
“Martin Luther King,” “SCLC.” However, “a word belongs in the implicit category if it
does not directly refer to African Americans or whites but had a racial association at the
time (e.g., ‘activist’ can mean a person active on behalf of any cause, but in the context of
the civil rights bill and the highly salient activities of the civil rights movement, its
primary association is likely to have been a person active on behalf of civil rights)” (77).
Implicit words for Mendelberg are wide-ranging, and include “sit-ins,” “protest,”
“demand,” and “constitutional rights.” Though our approaches and questions are
different, we both rely upon context to define the implicitly racial nature of an issue (me)
or an appeal (Mendelberg). I am particularly interested in the extent to which the
substance of an issue and whom it affects racializes it.

1

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3920741/
http://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/programs/geh/climatechange/health_impacts/asthma/i
ndex.cfm
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Particularly since framing can lead to racialization of just about any issue (White
2007), it is also important to note that I am not attempting to create an artificial
distinction between all those issues for which racialization is important. Rather, I am
noting that these issues fall on a continuum, being more or less explicit in their
racialization, and hypothesizing that this may have some impact on opinion and resulting
representation. I see the continuum as potentially constructed as seen in Figure 1.

This idea is not out of sync with how other authors beyond Mendelberg have
operationalized these concerns. Table 1 provides some examples:
Table 1: Explicitly and Implicitly Racial Issues and Frames in the Literature
Author(s)

Bobo and Kluegel
1993

Name for
explicitly racial
issues
Race-targeted
policies

Explicitly racial
issues examined
Opportunityenhancing
-enterprise zones for
black areas
-special school funds
for black
neighborhoods
-college scholarships
for black children

Outcome-enhancing
-Should government
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Name for
implicitly
racial issues
Incometargeted
policies

Implicitly racial
issues examined
Opportunityenhancing
-enterprise zones
for poor areas
-special school
funds for poor
neighborhoods
-college
scholarships for
economically
disadvantaged
children
Outcomeenhancing

increase the standard
of living for blacks?
-Should government
increase assistance to
blacks?

Mendelberg 2001

Explicit appeals

Campaign appeals
that use explicitly
racial words, like
“whites,” “race,”
“racial”

Implicit
appeals

Sanchez 2006

“Issues salient to
the Latino
community”
Explicitly racial

-Immigration
-Bilingual education
in public schools
-Explicit frame for
Iraq war opinion:
noting that many
causalities may be
members of minority
groups
-Explicit frame for
opinion on food
stamps: noting that
cutting spending for
the program will
disproportionately
hurt African
Americans and
Hispanics

Issues “not
directly tied
to Latinos”
Implicitly
racial

Race

-Should the federal
government ensure
equal opportunity?
-Should the federal
government see to

Social
Welfare
Policy

White 2007

Kinder and
Winter 2001
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-Should
government
increase the
standard of living
for the poor?
-Should
government
increase assistance
to the poor?
Words do “not
directly refer to
African Americans
or whites but had a
racial association at
the time;” e.g., “sitins,” “protest,”
“boycott,”
“march,” “civil
disobedience,”
“constitutional
rights,” “quota”
-Abortion
-Death penalty
-Implicit frame for
Iraq war opinion:
noting that the real
war is the one on
poverty, inadequate
health care, and
lack of affordable
housing
-Implicit frames for
opinion on food
stamps: noting that
cutting
programming will
hurt inner city
families; plunge
poor families
deeper into poverty
-Should we cut
spending or expand
services?
-Should we
increase spending

on…
education/programs
that help the
poor/college
aid/the
unemployed/ the
homeless/health
insurance/the
provision of jobs?

school desegregation?
-Should the federal
government spend
money to assist
blacks?
-Preferential Hiring
-College Quotas

Rabinowitz et al
2009

Policies
-Preferential hiring
“designed to help -Requiring
blacks”
affirmative action of
companies with a
history of
discrimination

Social
programs
with “racially
ambiguous”
beneficiaries

Spending on:
-Welfare
-Food stamps
-Aid to the poor
-Social Security
-The homeless

The work of Gilens (1999) and Hancock (2004) suggest that welfare may occupy
a strange space, seemingly nonracial but, in fact, heavily racialized due to the conflation
of race, poverty, and welfare in the media. Gilens (1999) writes that following the
northern migration and the change in the demographics of individuals on the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children rolls, along with civil rights movements and clashes at
that time, the media consistently overrepresented the level of black welfare dependency.
This image of African Americans as the lazy and undeserving poor stuck, and continues
to drive white Americans’ opposition to welfare, according to Gilens (1999). Hancock
(2004) adds that there is particular “disgust” for poor, black women; the “welfare queen”
identity created by the media and politicians is associated with laziness, hyperfertility,
drug abuse, and inner city residence, and tends to lead to policy choices that appear to
place blame on individuals instead of their situations, such as workfare over free
childcare. These findings urge scholars to proceed with caution in how they classify
racialized issues.
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Nevertheless, though Rabinowitz et al (2009) find support for symbolic racism
driving opposition to welfare, the relationship is not as strong as the relationship between
symbolic racism and more explicitly racial issues such as affirmative action. Thus, the
seeds for a meaningful continuum of racialization exist and might lead us to important
findings. As Rabinowitz et al write,
SR’s [symbolic racism’s] predictive properties became attenuated when
the policy strayed from specifically targeting African Americans. When
attitudes such as ideology and the role of government were controlled,
symbolic racism did not predict attitudes toward assistance to the
homeless, assistance to the poor, or food stamps and predicted attitudes
toward welfare as powerfully as it predicted attitudes toward affirmative
action for Black Americans. This is despite the possibility that the
homeless, the poor, and recipients of food stamps and welfare may be
viewed by many Whites as being disproportionately Black (Gilens
1999)…these studies illustrate the continued importance and
meaningfulness of parsing opinions about racial policies (824-825).
Certainly, implicitly racial issues are not nonracial. But it appears there may be
important differences between explicitly and implicitly racial issues we should
investigate, and I attempt to model these issues in ways supported by the literature.
What effect does issue racialization have on opinion?
Based on the literature, I predict that low-income citizens, regardless of their race,
will be more likely to share opinions with one another, and correspondingly more likely
to diverge from higher-income Americans of any race, on implicitly racial issues. These
issues may affect Blacks and Latinos at higher rates than they affect those who identify as
white, but they are nonetheless not explicitly racial. However, I predict that income
differences will matter less than racial differences on explicitly racial issues. Here, racial
group identification will matter more than income or principle differences. Explicitly
racial issues explicitly pinpoint Blacks and Latinos and will lead these individuals’
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opinions to be more likely to bind together and more likely to diverge from opinions of
whites on these issues, regardless of intergroup differences, such as income.
What effect does this have on representation?
Linking the opinion literature to the representation literature, I further hypothesize
that government outputs are actually closer to Black and Latino respondents’ opinions on
explicitly, rather than implicitly, racial issues. With implicitly racial issues, which tend to
correspond more with low-income opinion, the benefit is less clearly racial. As a result
of this simplification, so my hypothesis goes, representation of low-income Blacks and
Latinos tends to be lacking.
The direction of this hypothesis might seem surprising in light of work such as
William Julius Wilson’s (2012), who in the past encouraged a focus on class rather than
race in public policy, and President Barack Obama’s deliberate avoidance of highlighting
race in political efforts, especially early in his administration (Shapiro 2013).
Meanwhile, President Donald Trump has a history of injecting race into political
conversations, and not in a way that emphasizes support for explicitly racial issues
(O’Connor and Marans 2016). Finally, experiments such as White’s (2007) also show
how racializing statements can decrease support for those statements among whites.
Given this, why would a better match on explicit issues be anticipated?
However, I still believe the status quo on explicitly racial policy better matches
Black and Latino opinion than the status quo on implicitly racial policy. Many explicitly
racial policies remain in place despite significant ire among whites. For example,
seventy-five percent of whites are against affirmative action (Jones 2013) and it remains
government policy (“Affirmative Action” 2015; Fisher v. University of Texas).
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Immigrants, so far, retain birthright citizenship and access to public services (Gusmano
2012; Olivas 2010; Peralta 2015; Plyler v. Doe 1982). This, despite a very white
government (Krogstad 2015) and as much as half to sixty-five percent of the public,
according to polls, against birthright citizenship (Kaplan 2015), and states and localities
taking steps to avoid granting benefits to undocumented immigrants (Olivas 2010). In
addition, though in the days of Trump this may no longer seem to be the case, since the
civil rights era parties and public officials have generally attempted to avoid appearing
racist, particularly on highly racialized issues (Mendelberg 2001).
Therefore, there is an argument to be made that government outputs may match
Black and Latino opinion better on either implicitly or explicitly racial issues. In any
case, the approach taken here will investigate the government’s responsiveness to Black
and Latino opinion on both explicitly and implicitly racial issues. This perspective
represents an effort to expand Griffin and Newman’s (2008) approach. While they
incorporate the role of racialization in part of their book, they study explicit and implicit
issues together, which I believe masks important distinctions. What Griffin and Newman
(2008) see as potential Black and Latino group representation wins on any and all racially
salient issues I believe are a result of explicitly racial issue wins grouped in with and
carrying the weight for implicitly racial issues. Lumping in citizen opinion on racial job
discrimination (an explicitly racial issue) and the view that poverty is a serious problem
(an implicitly racial issue) and calling the result a respondent’s racial issue ideology is a
risky business based on what we know about the differences of white and black opinion
on such distinct issues (White 2007). As a result, I believe Griffin and Newman are right
that unexpected wins occur for Blacks and Latinos on racially salient issues, but I think
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they miss the importance of which type of salience we are witnessing. Narrowly racial
representation is not meeting deeper needs of the most disadvantaged Blacks and Latinos.
Why would a focus on explicitly racial issues occur? Jones (1995; 2001) and
Baumgartner and Jones (2010) emphasize the imperfect nature of government
institutions. Just like the human brain, human organizations emphasize some dimensions
of issues over others. It is simpler to serve Blacks and Latinos by focusing on explicitly
racial issues. Delving into more implicitly racial issues that combine overlapping
disadvantage is more complicated. Mansbridge (1999) points out the importance of
“crystallization” of issues as a determinant for whether descriptive representation is
necessary for a disadvantaged group. Some group interests may be better crystallized, or
more clear, apparent, and/or obvious, to outsiders than others. Increased liberal ideology
among Blacks and Latinos relative whites (Bowler and Segura 2011) may indicate
racialized issues are crystallized completely along the continuum from explicitly to
implicitly racial for Blacks and Latinos. Changes in white opinion when implicit
language such as “urban” is used may indicate implicitly racial issues are at least partially
crystallized for whites as well. However, condemnation for lack of support among white
office holders on explicitly racial issues is much more swift (Mendelberg 2011).
Explicitly racial issues are thus still seemingly more crystallized and clear to outsiders in
their benefit to Blacks and Latinos than are implicitly racial issues. Ignoring
intersectional identities and overlapping disadvantage is easier than focusing on issues
that are clearly racial. Thus, representation becomes narrow. I predict, then, we will be
more likely to see evidence of unexpected wins for Blacks and Latinos on explicitly
racial issues, rather than on implicitly racial issues.
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On explicitly racial issues, where I believe low-income and high-income Black
opinion and Latino opinion will be linked, government outcomes will follow Black and
Latino opinion over white opinion. On implicitly racial issues, where I believe lowincome and high-income Black and Latino opinion will diverge, government outcomes
will follow higher-income citizen opinion. Racial and ethnic representation, then, will
depend in part on comparative disadvantage but upon how explicit racial issues are to
nonmembers.
Evaluating the Theory: Opinion Divides and Government Responsiveness (Chapter 2)
To bring the opinion and representation literatures together and examine public
opinion and government responsiveness more precisely, I adapt Gilens’s approach, while
incorporating race, and while incorporating explicitly and implicitly racial issues.
Though it is true that the questions I use cannot include the entire universe of implicitly
and explicitly racial issues, they represent an improvement over the existing literature.
They represent a considerable improvement over Griffin and Newman (2008), who do
examine both race and income, but examine only spending preferences, and without
differentiating at all between explicitly and implicitly racial issues. The potential
importance of race and income in respondent opinion is recognized here, and the
potential differential impact of these differences across different types of racial issues is
included.
Opinion predictions: Based on the literature, I predict that low-income opinions
will be more likely to be united on implicitly racial issues, regardless of respondent race.
However, race, not income, will be more likely to be the binding force on issues of an
explicitly racial nature.
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Representation predictions: Next, following Gilens’s (2012) lead, I will ascertain
whether the policy changes referred to in the questions occurred. I believe that
government response to both African American and Latino opinion will be more likely
on explicitly racial issues than on implicitly racial issues. This exploration moves beyond
the racial and ethnic politics literature on opinion differences to include responsiveness,
and moves beyond the responsiveness literature to include race and, if I am right,
narrowly construed racial group representation.
There is a potential, and crucial, critique of this approach in my case. Why would
responsiveness to the minority be found or desirable in a government built on majority
rule? Gilens found that, perhaps paradoxically in a government based upon majority rule,
the high-income individuals in the minority were responded to more so than the rest of
the individuals in the country, when opinions diverged by income level. Similarly, I am
predicting and arguing that united Black opinion and Latino opinion will be more likely
to win out, defying majority rule, on explicitly racial issues only. On implicitly racial
issues, where I believe income level’s role will reassert itself, I am predicting low-income
individuals of all races will be more likely to lose the representation game. In essence,
then, I believe majority rule breaks down in both cases, but in different ways on issues
that are explicitly and implicitly racial.
From a measurement standpoint, however, this is an important criticism. A lack
of responsiveness at the national level may miss crucial responsiveness at the individual
representative level. I handle this valid criticism in the next chapter, by examining
responsiveness to low-income Black and Latino opinion at the level of individual
representatives.
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Evaluating the Theory: Racialization and Substantive Versus Descriptive Representation
(Chapter 3)
In my second research chapter, Chapter 3 of the dissertation, I reevaluate opinion
divides on racialized issues at the district level, examining individual behavior, rather
than Congressional institutional responsiveness. When population demographics and
representative race are considered, does the theory of narrowness in racial policy
representation hold? Do we witness increased activism on behalf of Blacks and Latinos
by Black and Latino members of Congress on both explicitly and implicitly racial issues?
Further, where does income come into all of this? When opinions of high-income
African Americans or Latinos diverge from low-income African Americans or Latinos,
what happens? Swain (1995) argues that the wealthy African American representatives
who get elected are no more like their African American constituents than are wealthy
white representatives. Tate (2003) disagrees with Swain (1995) that African American
representatives are just as different from their African American constituents as white
representatives. In her mind, the Black experience is a similarity that crosses wealth
differences.
Extending my theoretical lens to this debate, based on Gilens’s (2012) findings
about the power of income level, I largely side with Swain. To make sure I heed warnings
of Grose (2011), Minta (2011), Minta and Sinclair-Chapman (2013), and Tate (2003),
who argue against using only roll call data in measuring the influence of descriptive
representation, which ignores other important forms of legislative responsiveness, I
examine sponsorship behavior to explore this question. In both voting behavior and
sponsorship behavior, I believe representatives, including Black and Latino
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representatives, exhibit narrow racial representation that does not account for the most
economically disadvantaged citizens of their states.
Evaluating the Theory: Oversight Behavior (Chapter 4)
I approach oversight behavior differently. Specifically, I investigate whether the
presence of African American and Latino members on congressional committees
increases committee oversight of explicitly and implicitly racial issues. Kastellec (2013)
has shown that the presence of African American justices on appellate courts affects
those court’s rulings on affirmative action—an explicitly racial issue. Does the same
hold for congressional committee oversight? What about on implicitly racial issues?
PREVIEW OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
My findings in Chapter 2 show white opinion varies more dramatically by income
than Black and Latino opinion, but income is still a meaningful driver of difference
among Blacks and Latinos, on both implicitly and explicitly racial issues. In addition, the
findings indicate neither explicitly or implicitly racial government outputs occur as they
do because of racial group opinion, at any income level. However, Blacks and Latinos—
particularly low-income Blacks and Latinos—were more desirous of change on implicitly
racial issues relative explicitly racial issues in the dataset, and their opinions had no
relationships with government responding or not responding to the desire for change.
Whites, meanwhile, were more desirous of change on explicitly racial issues versus
implicitly racial issues in the dataset, and their opinions did not seem to drive government
activity or lack of it, either. The lack of activity in Congress over the years covered in the
dataset (2006-2012) means further examination of this finding is necessary, but it is
important to remember that big changes did happen during that time, and that low-income
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Black and/or Latino opinion did not seem to be the reason why, even when change
occurred and was positive for low-income Blacks and Latinos (e.g., health care).
I investigated what did drive a low-income Latino “win” in Congress in Chapter
3. My findings indicated that for individual members voting in Congress, party matters
more than the demographic composition of their district, suggesting that party, rather than
constituent opinion, may drive responsiveness to low-income Black and Latino desires on
implicitly racial issues. This continued to be true for sponsorship behavior; their race
impacted sponsorship behavior for African Americans and Latinos in Congress on an
explicitly racial issue (immigration), but not on the implicitly racial issue (Iraq
withdrawal), support for which was even higher among Blacks and LAtinos. Though
Chapter 3 utilized a small sample, it lends cautious credence to the idea that drivers of
responsiveness are not opinions of low-income Blacks and Latinos or legislator race on
implicitly racial issues, even when policies ultimately serve what low-income Blacks and
Latinos desire, and even when one looks beyond voting.
Chapter 4 shows that African American and Latino membership on committees
influenced the occurrence of explicitly racial hearings held before the 103 rd Congress,
and the volume of implicitly racial hearings held during and after the 103rd Congress.
The size of the African American and Latino coalition in Congress mattered only after
the inauguration of the 103rd Congress, and only for the occurrence of explicit, rather than
implicit, oversight.

This finding supports the notion that descriptive representation

matters when one looks at service beyond roll call voting (Grose 2011), but suggests it
may not matter uniformly across issue types and congressional governance structures.
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Data challenges have limited our ability to understand the ways in which
government fails, or does not fail, disadvantaged Blacks and Latinos. My dissertation
explores racial and ethnic representation and its depth or superficiality from a variety of
different angles, including opinion, collective government responsiveness, individual
legislator responsiveness, and oversight, engaging multiple literatures.

It suggests

representation of and responsiveness to low-income Blacks and Latinos may be more null
than narrow, and that the ability to solve that problem by simply adding more African
American and Latino members to Congress may be limited. In total, this project shows
that racialization of issues is important for opinion, for legislator voting and sponsorship,
and for oversight, and represents the beginning of a better understanding of the dynamics
of representation for our most disadvantaged citizens.
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CHAPTER TWO
INTRODUCTION
Racial group consciousness, and group interests, affect opinion (e.g., Dawson
1995), and affect opinion differently depending upon the nature of issue. This occurs not
only due to language and framing, but also due to issues’ substantive relevance for
individuals (e.g. Kinder and Winter 2001; Sanchez 2006; White 2007). For example,
though many issues are or can be “racialized” through language and framing (White
2007), issues that are substantively and explicitly related to race, such as affirmative
action, tend to elicit stronger responses from members of racial groups than do issues that
are substantively but only implicitly related to race, such as social welfare policy (Bobo
and Kluegel 1993; Kinder and Winter 2001; Sanchez 2006; Valentino, Hutchings, and
White 2002).
Income level also has a strong effect on a variety of policy opinions. As Gilens
(2012) demonstrates, higher income and lower income individuals tend to see policy
options differently. This is true not only in policy areas that would seem obvious, such as
economic and social welfare policy, but also in areas that might be unexpected, such as
religious issues.
Most datasets used to study opinion and opinion differences have very low sample
sizes of Black and Latino respondents, meaning it is difficult to know how much the role
of income matters for opinion within these groups, and when group consciousness is a
stronger driver of opinion. Still, we know Black and Latino opinion is not “monolithic”
(Orey, Craemer, and Price 2013). Intersectional identities, such as identities that exist at
the intersection of racial categorization and income level, affect which policies are most
important to studied groups and individuals (Strolovitch 2007).
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Finally, again largely due to sample size issues, we do not know how the
intersection of race and income might (or might not) affect government responsiveness
specifically on racially-salient issues, though Griffin and Newman (2008) have argued
that government is more responsive to Blacks and Latinos (regardless of income) on
racially-salient issues, despite what majority opinion desires.
In this chapter, I assess racial and intersectional opinion differences on raciallysalient issues, across a continuum from implicitly to explicitly racial. Though the
findings on opinion conform to the expectations in many ways, there are some surprises.
Opinion differences by race are pervasive, but not a given, sometimes not even for
explicitly racial issues. African American opinion is rarely split along income lines, but
Latinos exhibit important differences along income lines, even for explicitly racial issues.
These findings serve as reminder of the importance of better sampling of all racial
groups, and avoiding the assumption that findings about mostly white respondent opinion
apply to all racial groups’ opinions in the same way.
In addition, I examine how policy preferences by income, race, and race and
income affect representation on implicitly and explicitly racial issues. Counter to my
“narrow representation” theory, and also counter to Gilens’s (2012) findings and Griffin
and Newman’s (2008) findings, government responsiveness on racially-salient issues of
all types does not seem to vary due to income-driven, racially-driven, or income- and
racially-driven opinion differences.
RACIAL GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS AND OPINION
Opinion splits between Blacks, Latinos, and whites are pervasive. Explanations
for these differences range from group consciousness (Dawson 1995) to income, political
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principles, or immigrant status (e.g., Kinder and Winter 2001; Sanchez 2006). Others
note how the role of these predictors varies with the nature of the issue (e.g., Kinder and
Winter 2001; Sanchez 2006; Tate 1993; White 2007). The differences between Black,
Latino, and white attitudes are especially pronounced on explicitly racial issues, which
are obviously racial and include such issues as affirmative action and immigration.
Differences are more nuanced on implicitly racial issues, which affect higher proportions
of Blacks and Latinos than whites but are nevertheless not explicitly racial, such as
poverty, welfare, and crime (e.g., Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Kinder and Winter 2001;
Mendelberg 2001; Rabinovitz 2009; Sanchez 2006; White 2007). Gilens (2012),
meanwhile, points out the strong role of income in opinion.
Though intersectional identities affect opinion (Strolovitch 2007); that is,
identities formed at the intersection of race, gender, and income, due to sample size
problems, the differing role of income and race is not fully understood. Neither is the
role of income for Blacks and Latinos understood for issues of varying racialization,
implicit and explicit.
REPRESENTATION AND GROUP OPINION
Gilens (2012) studies opinion splits between individuals of high and low income
using different datasets looking for public opinion questions that offer “support” or
“oppose” response options. Gilens compares income groups across their support or
opposition, and looks to see where the government acts or doesn’t act within four years.
Where high-income and low-income respondents disagree on policy options, Gilen finds
government responds more to the desires of high-income respondents. Gilens does not
separate issues along any racial category, though, or group issues into explicitly or
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implicitly racial categories. Moreover, he does not divide respondents by race. I will
take his approach to assessing opinion and representation wins, but will do so while
making these differentiations.
Griffin and Newman (2008) try to rectify this problem, and they examine both
respondent income and race. Their analysis yields a surprising finding: Black and Latino
respondents “win” representation on racially salient issues of all kinds, perhaps because,
as Griffin and Newman suspect, they are more interested in and focused on such issues
than are others whose opinions may diverge from theirs. Griffin and Newman rely on
respondents’ spending preferences, rather than examining their opinions on specific
policy issues as Gilens does. This makes measuring true opinion and requisite
responsiveness or lack of it difficult. Many people, for example, might say they approve
of an increase in education spending (Murphy 2014; Scott 2012). One could say the
government is responsive to those people if the next year’s budget increases education
spending. But is someone who desires a fifty percent increase in education spending
well-served by a ten percent increase in education spending? Furthermore, most people
are in favor of generalities like “more money for education.” Differences of opinion are
more likely when topics like racial integration, standardized testing, or curricula are
examined—even if those same topics lead to requisite increases in education spending.
Equally problematic is that Griffin and Newman do not distinguish between implicitly
and explicitly racial issues.
Does the power of income in representation success which Gilens uncovers
continue to assert itself in racially salient issues, explicit and implicit? Measuring Black
and Latino preferences more precisely, and taking care to differentiate between different
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types of racial salience, do Griffin and Newman’s findings about the relationships
between opinion and representation on racially salient issues hold?
HYPOTHESES
Extending the literature to my own examination, I make the following predictions.
The literature shows Blacks and Latinos tend to exhibit differences in opinion
from whites on a variety of issue areas, particularly racialized issues (e.g., Bobo and
Kluegel 1993; Dawson 1995; Kinder and Winter 2001; Rabinovitz 2009; Sanchez 2006;
Tate 1993; White 2007). Therefore:
Opinion hypothesis 1: Racial group opinions, without consideration for group
income levels, will exhibit significant differences on substantively racial issues, both
implicit and explicit.
Studies and experiments demonstrate the importance of framing racially
substantive issues in how whites and nonwhites view the issues. Issues with explicitly
racial frames tend to elicit substantially less support from whites (Bobo and Kluegel
1993; Kinder and Winter 2001; White 2007). Therefore, I hypothesize:
Opinion hypothesis 2: Racial group opinions, without consideration for group
income levels, will be farther apart on explicitly racial issues than they are on implicitly
racial issues.
Dawson (1995) believes that income does not matter for linked fate: high-income
African Americans tend to be just as supportive of racially-salient issues as low-income
African Americans. Meanwhile, Gilens (2012), without focusing on race, finds a major
impact of income-level upon opinion on issues related to social welfare. Low-income
respondents are much more supportive of social welfare measures than high-income
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respondents. Social welfare issues are often implicitly racial issues because higher
proportions of Blacks and Latinos, compared to whites, tend to be low-income (e.g.,
Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Kinder and Winter 2001; White 2007). I believe the power of
income versus race on implicitly racial issues may be dynamic. To test the interacting
role of income and race on implicitly and explicitly racial issues, I predict the following:
Opinion hypothesis 3: Opinions of low-income respondents, whether Black,
Latino, or white, will be more likely to be closer together on implicitly than explicitly
racial issues. This means the opinions of low-income Blacks, whites, and Latinos will be
closer to one another on implicitly racial issues than they are for explicitly racial issues.
Thus, I predict that for low-income individuals, income overcomes race on implicitly
racial issues only.
Opinion hypothesis 4: Opinions of low-income respondents, whether Black,
Latino, or white, will be more likely to be closer to one another on implicitly racial issues
than are opinions of high-income respondents, across racial categories, on implicitly
racial issues. This means the opinions of low-income African Americans, whites, and
Latinos will be closer together on implicitly racial issues than the opinions of highincome African Americans, whites, and Latinos on implicitly racial issues. Therefore, I
am testing whether racial considerations reassert their strength when differentiating
between high-income individuals of different racial categories, on implicitly racial issues.
Opinion hypothesis 5: Race, not income, will be more likely to be the binding
force for respondents on issues of an explicitly racial nature. That is, respondents across
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all income levels within racial categories will exhibit more unified opinions on explicitly
racial issues than they do on implicitly racial issues.2
Gilens (2012) demonstrates unexpected cases where low-income and high-income
opinion differs, yet the low-income respondent view wins on policy. This tends to occur
where interest group activity is high, making policies highly salient, such as in the area of
Social Security and the failed proposal to privatize it. Griffin and Newman (2008) argue
that Blacks and Latinos achieve similar levels of responsiveness on policy areas that are
racially salient, without differentiating implicitly and explicitly racial policies. Applying
these findings to more specific racially salient policies, I predict the following:
Representation hypothesis 1: The relationships between Black and Latino imputed
preferences and government responsiveness will be significant for explicitly racial but
not implicitly racial issues. I believe racial salience will matter for responsiveness only
where policies are explicitly racial, because such racial salience is clearer.
Representation hypothesis 2: The relationships between Black and Latino group
preferences differentiated by income group and government responsiveness will be
significant for explicitly racial but not implicitly racial issues. I believe that the
significance between responsiveness and explicitly racial policies only will continue into
any differences by income exhibited by Black and Latino respondents.
DATA AND METHOD
Gathering Questions
2

None of these hypotheses should be read as suggesting variation of opinion among
respondents across issue areas is unexpected. After all, I aim to avoid “monolithic”
assumptions about opinions among minority respondents when research shows this is not
the case (e.g., Orey, Craemer, and Price 2013). Rather, I am simply testing when
opinions might be closer, or farther apart, though still varied, within racial and income
categories.
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Harvard’s Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) (Ansolabehere
2006-2012) is one of the few studies with a sample size that provides large numbers of
Black and Latino respondents. Large numbers of each racial group were a necessity to
enable an examination of opinion difference by income level, within those racial groups.
I used the 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 CCES datasets.
As Gilens (2012) does, I gathered questions which aim to measure opinion based
on favor/oppose responses to policy questions. These questions had to provide
dichotomous choices, be specific enough to enable a reasonable assessment of whether
change occurred, and be within the permissible range of federal government action
(Gilens 1374-1375). For example, a dichotomous question about whether voter ID
should be required at the polls was perfect in its policy substance, but so far, this is a
state-level issue, so the question was excluded. Like Gilens, I permitted multiple
questions on the same issue area. I agree with Gilens that including multiple looks at the
same issue provides a better measure of long-term preferences, and offers a chance to
avoid or capture framing issues. In addition, some issues remain relevant or even become
higher on the policy agenda as the years pass (Gilens 1403-1404). Issues like climate
change, immigration, and healthcare reform remained important throughout the period of
time under study. Beyond Gilens’s arguments for including multiple questions on the
same issue, I add that the time period I am studying represents a change from a white
Republican president to an African American Democratic president, and President
Obama took up many of the issues included here. Tesler (2010) shows us that racial
resentment became conflated with opinions on many issues once President Obama—and
Democrats associated with him—took them up. Therefore, measuring opinions on these
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issues that straddle both presidencies should aim to examine opinion stability for that
reason alone.
Unlike Gilens, for each dataset, I included only those favor/oppose questions on
issues that the literature tells us may be implicitly or explicitly racial. Explicitly racial
questions were easy to select from the dataset, and I used news articles to confirm
whether an issue might plausibly be considered implicitly racial, within the range set by
the literature. This yielded a dataset of 48 questions. With such a small set of questions,
this must be considered an early and cursory examination, but as small sample sizes
currently do not permit a fuller examination, it is a step in the right direction. A full list
of questions, question wording, and the reasoning for why they are arguably and
potentially substantively important to Blacks and Latinos is available in Appendix A.
Imputing Preferences
I followed Gilens’s approach for imputing group preferences, but added in race
instead of just using income variations. Gilens’s approach begins with assigning all
respondents “an income score equal to the percentile midpoint for their income group
based on the income distribution from their survey” (Gilens 2012, 1455). That is, using
different income categories on provided surveys, one calculates the percentage of
respondents that fall within each income category. Then, each group is assigned income
group midpoint scores based on the top and bottom percentiles for each group. For
example, take African American respondents in the lowest income category for African
Americans in 2006. They comprise 14 percent of all African American respondents, or
those falling between the first and fourteenth percentile for income, so the income
midpoint score for the lowest-income African Americans in 2006 is 0.075. This
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procedure was followed to create income midpoints for African Americans, Latinos, and
whites.
After rescoring incomes based on relative percentages, these income midpoint
variables were used as predictors of policy preference to obtain imputed preferences for
each racial-income grouping. Estimating imputed preferences is done with a quadratic
function, using income midpoint values and income midpoint values squared3 as
predictors for logistic regressions for each of the 48 two-option (favor or oppose) survey
questions. In my case, unlike Gilens’s, this is done within racial groups: imputed
preferences by income for African Americans, Latinos, and whites. This approach
imputes preferences by income within racial groups for each of the 48 policy areas. For
example, the income midpoints for African American income groupings in 2006 are
0.075, 0.34, 0.68, and 0.91. These values were used to create an ordered income midpoint
variable for African Americans. Next came a logit analysis for each policy. As an
illustration, I took minimum wage, where the dependent variable is support or opposition
for an increase in the minimum wage, and the income midpoint variables and income
midpoint variables squared as predictors. Predicted probabilities gathered following this
exercise indicates levels of support for increasing the minimum wage among African
Americans at each income level. This procedure was followed for every one of the 48
policy areas, and every income midpoint within each racial category.
In addition, I created imputed preferences by race regardless of income by using
basic racial group dummies as predictors instead of income midpoint variables. The

Gilens (2005) includes the squared income variable to “smooth out some of the noise
inherent in estimating preferences for population subgroups with limited numbers of
responses” (783).
3
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imputed preferences obtained from this exercise provide a measure of policy preference
for respondents at different income percentiles and within different racial groups.
Coding Government Outcomes
Gilens’s government responsiveness measure is also used here, with small
changes. Gilens codes responsiveness rather than inaction as the outcome if activity on
the issue, defined as Congress passing a law in that issue area and the president signing it,
occurs within four years of the survey question (Gilens 2012 1433). In most cases, I use
the four-year responsiveness method, but in a few cases, survey questions specified a
tighter timeline. For example, in 2006 and 2008 respondents were asked if they favored
withdrawing troops from Iraq within a year (2006) or within 180 days (2008). True
responsiveness to such questions seems to demand action within the specified timeframe,
so I respected that when it occurred.4
In addition, I did not use Congress passing a bill and the president signing it as the
only mode of national government responsiveness, as Gilens does. The cry for the
Affordable Care Act to grant religious exemptions from covering birth control in
employee insurance policies was heard. However, it received its response not through
legislation, but through the Courts (Wheaton College v. Burwell, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores Inc.) and rule changes (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services),
exempting some religious employers from covering contraception in their health
insurance plans (Denniston 2015; Sobel et al 2015). Similarly, though ending affirmative
action would likely require a constitutional amendment, when seventy-five percent of
whites and sixty-seven percent of the entire public is against affirmative action in certain
This may raise concerns; however, there is no “time” variable in the analysis itself, only
whether government responded or not (0,1).
4
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surveys (Jones 2013), an amendment does not seem to be an overwhelming hurdle to
cross. In addition, the Supreme Court has sent very mixed signals over the years on this
issue. In the 1990s, the Court tightened affirmative action in set-aside programs (City of
Richmond v. Croson), federal affirmative action programs (Adarand Constructors v.
Pena), and education (Hopwood v. Texas ) (“Affirmative Action”), but some programs
are upheld, as recently as this year (Fisher v. University of Texas). It is not implausible
that Congress might attempt change. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the lack of
change on this issue constitutes nonresponsiveness to those who would like to see
change.
Keeping these adapted parameters in mind, for each issue, as Gilens does, I used
Congressional Quarterly reports and news articles to determine whether or not
responsiveness to desired changes occurred. A full account of this research and coding is
included in Appendix B.
Measuring Government Responsiveness
Finally, I looked for relationships between income level imputed opinion, racial
group imputed opinion, and income level/racial group intersectional imputed opinion and
government outcomes. Again, following Gilens (2012), this is done with logit
regressions, using the government outcome variable for each policy area as the dependent
variable (where 0 is no change and 1 is change), and with the imputed preference
variables by income and race and by race alone as the predictors. To avoid collinearity
problems, these were run separately by predictor: logit regressions using the government
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outcome variable as the dependent variable and imputed preferences at each income level
and each racial grouping were done individually, as recommended by Gilens.5
To ensure this question was examined from every angle, I ran these analyses on
the entire dataset of questions together, without differentiating by level of racialization;
separately with just implicit questions and just explicit questions; and separately for
questions that the imputed opinion analyses revealed to be significantly racialized. I
defined “significantly racialized” as those questions that exhibited at least a two-unit
difference in opinion between racial groups using Gilens’s coding scheme.
RESULTS
Racialization of opinion
Table 1 displays imputed preferences by race, and the size of the difference, using
Gilens’s coding scheme. Table 1 displays the differences between opinions, and figures 1
and 2 use the absolute values of these differences. The values in the table and the
continuum are derived from the imputed preference percentage coding scheme Gilens
(2012) uses:
Between 45% and 55%=0
Over 55% or under 45%=+1/-1
Over 60% or under 40%=+/-2
Over 65% or under 35%=+/-3
Over 75% or under 25%=+/-4
Over 85% or under 15%=+/-5
For example, 14 percent of African Americans favored ending public school and
emergency room access for immigrants in the country illegally. Using Gilens’s coding
scheme, this percentage of support is coded as -5 (as it is under 15 percent). 37 percent
whites favored this policy proposal; this percentage is coded as -2 (as it is below 40
5

I discussed this via email with Gilens himself.
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percent support but above 35 percent support). Therefore, the difference between African
Americans’ opinions on this issue minus whites’ opinions on this issue is -3 (recorded in
Table 1), and the absolute value of the difference between these groups’ opinions is 3
(recorded in Figure 1). The use of this coding permits easier comparisons and helps
quickly demonstrate not only significant differences but the magnitude of that
significance. This procedure is followed to compare across racial groups, across income
groups, and across racial and income groups.
As seen in Table 1, there is racialization in opinion by racial group throughout
this dataset. The opinions on questions in this dataset indeed display a continuum
quality. Most issues I included as potentially racial are racialized in actuality, but to
differing degrees. Figures 1 and 2 below summarize the findings in Table 1, displaying
results on a continuum to demonstrate the varying sizes of opinion difference.
Opinion hypothesis 1 predicted that racial group opinions, without consideration
for group income levels, would exhibit significant differences on substantively racial
issues, both implicit and explicit. This is largely the case, although for both African
Americans and Latinos there are a few issues where opinions do not differ dramatically.
For African Americans, this includes only CAFTA. Overall, Latino and white opinion
exhibits more nonracialized issues, including bailing out the banks, TARP, the Ryan
budget bill, and the Tax Hike Prevention Act.
These surprises, and the results that went as expected, confirm the idea of a
continuum of racialization, the diversity of opinion, and the fact that substantively
important policies are perceived as substantively important at varying rates.
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Table 1: Racialization of Opinion

Racial Category
Policy

Difference
African AmericanWhite

LatinoWhite

African American

Latino

White

Partial Birth Abortion Ban
CAFTA
Housing
Bank Bailout
Carbon Tax
TARP
Financial Reform
American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act
American Clean Energy
and Security Act
Exemption for birth
control
Affordable Care Act
Affordable Care Act
Repeal
Ryan Bill
Simpson Bowles
Middle Class Tax Cut Act
Tax Hike Prevention Act

0
-3
4
-2
-3
-1
5

0
0
2
-3
-3
-3
4

1
-3
0
-3
-4
-3
2

-1***
0
4***
1***
1***
2***
3***

-1***
3***
2***
0***
1***
0***
2***

4

2

-1

5***

3***

4

3

0

4***

3***

-4
5

-3
3

-1
0

-3***
5***

-2***
3***

-3
-5
0
1
-4

-2
-4
0
1
-3

0
-4
0
2
-3

-3***
-1***
0***
-1***
-1***

-2***
0**
0
-1***
0***

Climate Change

3

3

0

3***

3***

Gun Control
CHIP
Comprehensive Health
Care

3
5

1
4

-1
3

4***
2***

2***
1***

5

2

0

5***

2***

Minimum Wage
Social Security
Privatization

5

5

3

2***

2***

-1

0

1

-2***

-1**

Iraq Withdrawal

5

3

0

5***

3***

Implicit Issues

Explicit Issues
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Ending automatic
birthright citizenship
Banning illegal
immigrants from using
ER
Affirmative Action
Grant legal status to
illegal immigrants
Fine businesses who hire
illegal immigrants
Increase border patrols
Allow police to question
suspected "illegals"
Note:

-5

-4

-1

-4***

-3***

-5
5

-4
1

-2
-3

-3***
8***

-2***
4***

1

2

-2

3***

4***

0
0

-2
-2

3
2

-3***
-2***

-5***
-4***

-4

-4

0

-4***

-4***

Table shows imputed level of support for policies by race.
Coding values for imputed preferences:
Between 45% and 55%=0
Over 55% or under 45%=+1/-1
Over 60% or under 40%=+/-2
Over 65% or under 35%=+/-3
Over 75% or under 25%=+/-4
Over 85% or under 15%=+/-5
*=indicates significance in two-sample tests of proportion; African American vs. White, and Latino vs.
White
***=proportion differed significantly by race, p<0.001
**=proportion differed significantly by race, p<0.01
*=proportion differed significantly by race, p<0.05
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Figure 1: The Continuum of Racialized Issues--African American and White Opinion

Figure 2: The Continuum of Racialized Issues: Latino and White Opinion

Note: The figures display where issues fall on a number line displaying the size of the difference in imputed preferences, AA-White and Latino-White.
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Opinion hypothesis 2 predicted that racial group opinions would be farther apart
on explicitly racial issues than they are on implicitly racial issues. This is generally the
case. African American opinion and white opinion is farthest apart, by far, on affirmative
action, and Latino and white opinion is farthest apart on affirmative action, and
immigration-relevant issues such as fining businesses who hire illegal immigrants,
granting legal status to illegal immigrants, increasing border patrols, and allowing the
police to question anyone suspected of being here illegally.
There are two surprises here. One is, while ending automatic birthright
citizenship and banning illegal immigrants from using the ER and public schools elicit
very different responses in Latinos and whites, issues like CAFTA, the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the American Clean Energy and Security Act, the
Affordable Care Act, climate change, Iraq withdrawal, housing assistance, financial
reform, exempting companies from birth control, repealing the Affordable Care act,
increasing gun control measures, and increasing the minimum wage elicit just as different
a response from members of these groups. Another is that, though affirmative action is
the biggest opinion divider between African Americans and whites by far, many
immigration issues still cause greater differences in opinion between African Americans
and whites than do issues like partial birth abortion, the bank bailout, a carbon tax, the
Tax Hike Prevention Act, and the Middle Class Tax Cut Act. One would not necessarily
expect African Americans to be more supportive of, for example, amnesty, than whites
are, but this is the case.
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Overall, a wide variety of issues are racialized, but in differing degrees, and explicitly
racial issues do tend to elicit the biggest differences in responses by Blacks, Latinos, and
whites, suggesting that a racialization continuum is a useful concept.
Income and Opinion
Opinion hypothesis 3 predicted that opinions of low-income respondents, whether
Black, Latino, or white, would be more likely to be closer together on implicitly than
explicitly racial issues. Opinion hypothesis 4 predicted that opinions of low-income
respondents, whether Black, Latino, or white, would be more likely to be closer to one
another on implicitly racial issues than are opinions of high-income respondents, whether
Black, Latino, or white, on implicitly racial issues. Table 2 supports both these
hypotheses.
Table 2: Differences in Mean Opinion between Groups by Income Level

Implicitly Racial Explicitly Racial Explicitly Racial
Issues
Issues
Issues
(Affirmative
(Immigration)
Action)
Low-Income African Americans
and Low-Income Whites
High-Income African
Americans and High-Income
Whites
Low-Income Latinos and LowIncome Whites
High-Income Latinos and HighIncome Whites

1.41

6.75

2.91

3.03

8.00

2.36

1.16

5.25

4.45

1.47

3.75

2.73

Note: Table shows the mean difference of opinion between groups, by income level, in different
policy areas, using Gilen’s coding scheme for imputed preferences:
Between 45% and 55%=0
Over 55% or under 45%=+1/-1
Over 60% or under 40%=+/-2
Over 65% or under 35%=+/-3
Over 75% or under 25%=+/-4
Over 85% or under 15%=+/-5
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Again using Gilens’s (2012) coding scheme for imputed preference percentages,
and this time examining the average absolute values of differences, it’s plain that lowincome African Americans and low-income whites are much closer to one another on
implicitly racial issues than explicitly racial issues. The same is true for low-income
Latinos and low-income whites. The finding holds not only for racial issues that are
especially relevant for the racial group being examined, but also if one is examining
explicitly racial issues related to immigration and low-income African American versus
low-income white opinion, or affirmative action and low-income Latino versus lowincome white opinion.
In addition, low-income opinions are closer together on implicitly racial issues
than are high-income opinions on implicitly racial issues, particularly when comparing
the average difference between low-income whites and African Americans and the
average difference between high-income whites and African Americans. The difference
is less pronounced for low-income Latino/white opinion and high-income Latino/white
opinion, but still there and in the expected direction.6
Opinion hypothesis 5 predicted that respondents across all income levels within
racial categories would exhibit more unified opinions on explicitly racial issues than they
do on implicitly racial issues. The findings here are more mixed, as shown in Tables 3
and 4, and Figures 3 and 4. Table 3 shows that for African Americans, there are few
issues where income midpoint variables are significant. For African Americans, of the 48
6

Obviously, averages mask heterogeneity in difference across issues in the dataset, and
this table is not meant to suggest opinion differences will always conform to this trend on
every single implicitly/explicitly racial issue comparison. As averages can be particularly
blunt for comparing differences where outliers might be possible, Appendix C provides a
comparison of medians. The findings in support of opinion hypotheses 3 and 4 hold.
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questions examined, there are just a handful of issues where income levels create a
significant difference in opinion. And, as can be seen in Figure 3, using Gilens’s coding
scheme for imputed opinions, where significant differences exist, in African American
opinion according to income level, they tend to be small in magnitude. The biggest areas
of difference were support for a repeal of the Affordable Care Act, and support for the
Middle Class Tax Cut Act. This level of agreement across all issues, implicit or no, was
not expected. Moreover, African American opinion on explicitly racial issues, including
affirmative action in two of the four datasets, demonstrated differences according to
income in some cases, also counter to expectations.
As Table 4 shows, differences in opinion according to income level among
Latinos were more common, and, as can be seen in Figure 4, they were more likely to be
of a higher magnitude. That said, differences in opinion according to income level were
far from universal on implicitly racial issues, and more importantly, differences in
opinion according to income level happened repeatedly on explicitly racial issues.
Latinos are divided on policies related to immigration based on their income level.
This is quite different from the patterns demonstrated in white opinion (see
Appendix D). Income levels yield significant differences in opinion for all issues in the
dataset except for the Tax Hike Prevention Act. Further, white opinion across income
levels is indeed closer on explicitly racial issues than it is on implicitly racial issues.
Table 3: African American Opinion by Lowest and Highest Income Percentiles
African American--Income
Year

Policy
2006 Minimum Wage1
2008 Minimum Wage
2006 Minimum Wage 2

Lowest
5
5
5
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Highest
5
5
5

Difference
HighestLowest
0
0
0

2006
2010
2012
2006
2012
2006
2008
2006
2008
2006
2008
2010
2008
2010
2010
2010
2008
2010
2012
2012
2008
2010
2010
2012
2010
2012
2012
2012
2012
2006
2008
2010
2012
2006
2010
2012
2010
2012
2010
2012

Climate Change
Climate Change
Climate change
PartialBirth
BirthControlEx
Social Security
Social Security
Iraq
Iraq
CAFTA**
CHIP
CHIP**
Housing*
BankBail
TARP
Financial Reform***
Comprehensive
Healthcare
Comprehensive
Healthcare
ACA
ACARepeal**
CarbonTax
ACESA*
Gun Control
Gun Control
ARRA
RyanBill
SimpBowles
MidTax**
TaxHike*
AffrmAct
AffrmAct*
AffrmAct*
AffrmAct*
Immigration
FineBusinesses
FineBusinesses
GrantStatus
GrantStatus
BorderPatrols**
BorderPatrols
52

4
3
3
1
-4
-1
0
5
5
-3
5
5
4
-1
-1
5

4
4
4
0
-4
-2
-1
4
5
-2
5
5
4
-1
0
5

0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0

5

5

0

5
4
-2
-2
4
3
4
4
-5
-2
0
-4
5
4
4
4
1
0
-2
0
2
0
-1

4
5
-4
-3
4
3
4
4
-5
0
2
-5
5
5
4
5
0
4
0
1
3
0
0

1
1
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
1
0
1
0
1
1
4
2
1
1
0
1

2010
2012
2012
2012

PoliceQuestion
PoliceQuestion
ER/Schools**
AutoCitizenship

-4
-4
-5
-5

-4
-5
-4
-4

Note:
Table shows differences in opinion among African Americans, using coding levels for imputed preferences
devised by Gilens.:
Between 45% and 55%=0
Over 55% or under 45%=+1/-1
Over 60% or under 40%=+/-2
Over 65% or under 35%=+/-3
Over 75% or under 25%=+/-4
Over 85% or under 15%=+/-5
P-values indicate where differences in opinion among African Americans, by income, are significant in
logit regressions, where the dependent variable is support or opposition for a policy among African
Americans, and income levels among African Americans are the predictors.
***=p<0.001
**=p<0.01
*=p<0.05
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0
1
1
1

Figure 3: African American Opinion: Magnitude of Significant Differences

Note: Figure 3 displays the size of all significant differences in opinion between high-income and
low-income African Americans. The values are derived from Gilens’s coding scheme.
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Table 4: Latino Opinion by Lowest and Highest Income Percentiles
Latino--Income
Percentile
Year
2006
2008
2006
2006
2010
2012
2006
2012
2006
2008
2006
2008
2006
2008
2010
2008
2008
2010
2010
2008
2010
2012
2012
2008
2010
2010
2012
2010
2012
2012
2012
2012
2006
2008

Policy
Minimum Wage1**
Minimum Wage
Minimum Wage 2*
Climate Change
Climate Change
Climate change
PartialBirth
BirthControlEx
Social Security
Social Security
Iraq
Iraq*
CAFTA*
CHIP*
CHIP
Housing
BankBail
TARP***
Financial Reform
Comprehensive
Healthcare
Comprehensive
Healthcare*
ACA
ACARepeal
CarbonTax
ACESA
Gun Control
Gun Control
ARRA
RyanBill
SimpBowles
MidTax
TaxHike
AffrmAct
AffrmAct

Lowest
5
5
5
4
3
3
0
-3
0
0
4
4
-3
5
5
4
-3
0
4

Highest
4
4
4
3
2
3
-1
-3
0
0
2
1
-2
4
5
0
-3
-3
3

Difference
HighestLowest
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
2
3
1
1
0
4
0
3
1

3

1

2

3
3
-2
-3
4
3
3
3
-4
-1
0
-3
2
3

1
2
-2
-3
2
2
3
0
-4
1
3
-4
1
0

2
1
0
0
2
1
0
3
0
2
3
1
1
3
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2010
2012
2006
2010
2012
2010
2012
2010
2012
2010
2012
2012
2012

AffrmAct
AffrmAct
Immigration***
FineBusinesses
FineBusinesses
GrantStatus*
GrantStatus
BorderPatrols***
BorderPatrols*
PoliceQuestion***
PoliceQuestion
ER/Schools
AutoCitizenship

3
3
4
-3
-3
3
3
-3
-3
-5
-5
-5
-5

0
1
3
1
0
1
2
0
-1
-3
-4
-4
-4

3
2
1
4
3
2
1
3
2
2
1
1
1

Note:
Table shows differences in opinion among Latinos, using coding levels for imputed preferences devised by
Gilens.:
Between 45% and 55%=0
Over 55% or under 45%=+1/-1
Over 60% or under 40%=+/-2
Over 65% or under 35%=+/-3
Over 75% or under 25%=+/-4
Over 85% or under 15%=+/-5
P-values indicate where differences in opinion among Latinos, by income, are significant in logit
regressions, where the dependent variable is support or opposition for a policy among Latinos, and income
levels among Latinos are the predictors.
***=p<0.001
**=p<0.01
*=p<0.05
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Figure 4: Latino Opinion: Magnitude of Significant Differences

Note: Figure displays the size of all significant differences in opinion between high-income and
low-income Latinos. The values are derived from Gilens’s coding scheme.

Representation and Racialized Issues
Representation hypothesis 1 predicted that the relationships between Black and
Latino group imputed preferences and government responsiveness would be significant
for explicitly racial but not implicitly racial issues, and representation hypothesis 2
predicted that the relationships between combined racial and income imputed preferences
and government responsiveness would be significant for explicitly racial but not
implicitly racial issues. The findings do not support either of these conclusions, as seen
in Tables 5 and 6.
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Table 5: Responsiveness and Income
Income Percentile
All Observations
Predictor
Income, 10th
Coefficient
2.15
(Standard Error)
(1.74)
P-Value
0.11

Implicit Variables

Explicit Variables

2.19
(2.01)
0.14

3.16
(5.64)
0.29

Income, 30th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

2.44
(2.01)
0.11

2.06
(2.31)
0.19

4.40
(4.94)
0.19

Income, 70th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

1.76
(2.28)
0.22

0.96
(2.71)
0.36

3.44
(4.31)
0.21

Income, 90th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

0.72
(2.57)
0.39

-0.17
(3.16
0.48

2.28
(4.57)
0.31

African American, 10th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

1.58
(1.17)
0.089

2.31
(1.61)
0.08

0.51
(2.99)
0.43
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African American, 30th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

1.66
(1.15)
0.08

2.37
(1.60)
0.07

0.8
(3.00)
0.4

African American, 70th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

1.72
(1.17)
0.07

2.55
(1.67)
0.07

0.75
(3.07)
0.40

African American, 90th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

0.27
(1.40)
0.4

1.35
(2.07)
0.26

-0.01
(3.15)
0.5

Latino, 10th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

0.24
(1.3)
0.43

2.46
(1.87)
0.09

-7.86
(5.53)
0.08

Latino, 30th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

0.31
(1.5)
0.42

2.24
(2.09)
0.14

-6.00
(4.25)
0.08

Latino, 70th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

0.14
(1.77)
0.47

1.72
(2.27)
0.22

-5.67
(4.307)
0.09
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Latino, 90th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

-1.88
(2.39)
0.22

1.05
(3.35)
0.38

-6.08
(4.6)
0.09

White, 10th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

2.27
(1.82)
0.11

1.79
(2.07)
0.19

4.12
(4.16)
0.16

White, 30th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

2.02
(1.98)
0.15

1.27
(2.41)
0.3

3.39
(3.45)
0.16

White, 70th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

1.34
(2.15)
0.27

0.16
(2.83)
0.48

2.87
(3.33)
0.19

White, 90th
Coefficient
(standard error)
P-Value

0.51
(2.46)
0.42

-0.86
(3.33)
0.4

2.05
(3.67)
0.29

Note: The table displays coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for logistic regressions with government response (0,1) as the dependent variable, where
income and income*race variables are predictors. The first column displays regression results with all policies included, the second displays regression results
with just implicit policies included, and the third displays regression results with just explicit policies included.
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Table 6: Responsiveness and Race

Racialization Type

African AmericanWhite

Opinion Predictor
African American
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
P-Value
White
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
P-Value

Latino-White

Latino
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
P-Value
White
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
P-Value

Implicit & Explicit
Issues

Implicit Only

Explicit Only

1.67
(1.26)
0.09

3.49
(2.39)
0.07

0.74
(3.10)
0.41

1.70
(2.59)
0.26

-0.64
(4.26)
0.44

3.26
(3.52)
0.18

-0.95
(1.88)
0.31

1.41
(3.21)
0.33

-6.63
(4.52)
0.07

0.925
(2.64)
0.36

-4.00
(5.22)
0.22

3.26
(3.52)
0.18

Note: The table displays coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for logistic regressions with government response (0,1) as the dependent variable, where race
variables are predictors. These tests were performed on policy areas that displayed different opinions by race, at least 2 or more apart in Figures 1 and 2. Where
African American and white opinion differed, I checked for a relationship between government outcomes and group opinion for both African Americans and
whites. I then did the same for Latinos and whites.
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Despite running the representation analysis in a variety of ways7, in no case is
racial group opinion or racial group*income level opinion significantly related to
government outcomes on either implicitly or explicitly racial issues. Griffin and
Newman (2008) found that Blacks and Latinos “win” on issues substantively important to
them, which would include both implicitly and explicitly racial issues, but when opinion
is measured by support or opposition for specific policies, rather than by preferred
spending levels as Griffin and Newman do, there is no relationship between racial group
opinion and the questions included in this dataset. Counter to what I expected, there is
also no relationship between Black and Latino group opinion and government
responsiveness on explicitly racial issues only. The same is true even when one isolates
those issues with “significant” opinion differences by race (where white opinion vs.
Black or Latino opinion differs by 2 or more using the Gilens coding scheme).
It’s important to note that the maintenance of the status quo, rather than change,
may sometimes reflect preferences. For example, African Americans and Latinos prefer
keeping affirmative action to getting rid of it, and affirmative action remains policy
despite threats to it. However, on other explicitly racial issues and implicitly racial issues
where change is desired by Blacks and Latinos, no relationship between opinion and
responsiveness is found within the studied timeframe.
This theme continues when examining opinion by income level. Whether one
looks at the entire dataset, just implicitly racial issues, or just explicitly racial issues,
there is no relationship between imputed preferences among Blacks and Latinos and
government outcomes on racialized issues. Without differentiating by race, Gilens (2012)

7

Including zero-inflated negative binomial models.
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found income level opinions mattered for a wide variety of issues. Differences in opinion
according to income level within racial groups do not seem to have such force in
government outcomes, at least not for racialized issues.
Another piece of news, though I made no predictions in this area, is that there also
appears to be no relationship between white opinion or white income group opinions and
government outcomes on racialized issues. I considered this possibility particularly
because of the inclusion of affirmative action in the dataset. African Americans and
Latinos prefer the status quo, and the status quo, despite threats and white opinion on the
issue, has been maintained in the area of affirmative action. However, I still found no
relationship between African American and Latino opinion on explicitly racial issues
overall. Though whites prefer change in this policy area, change has not occurred, and
white opinion and government output do not have a relationship. This continued
throughout the dataset. Whatever drives government output on these issues, it is not
racial group opinion or income. Not even majority opinion appears to matter.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This examination must be considered the start of this discussion rather than the
end of it, because the number of issues included in the dataset is small. Nevertheless, it is
intriguing that variables that seem to exhibit surprising force in other studies (income
differences in Gilens 2012, and racial group opinion in Griffin and Newman 2008) do not
here. In addition, the findings on opinion differences confirm Black and Latino opinion
behaves differently than white opinion. Income differences appear to matter much less
for Latinos and Blacks than it does for whites, which is important to keep in mind while
considering findings about income and government responsiveness. When government
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responds to high-income white opinion, these findings show, it is being particularly
unresponsive to African Americans and Latinos of many income levels, not just lowincome whites. However, neither is Black or Latino opinion wholly unified by income,
even on those issues where strong group consciousness would seem most indicated.
Four potential conclusions are of note. First, research to date tends to examine
trends based on white opinion only. Income is a powerful force upon white opinion, but
less so for Black and Latino opinion, at least within the area of racialized policy. Second,
much research comes to conclusions about Black and Latino opinion with small sample
sizes, with unknown variations in income, gender, age, or other possibly important
components of identity. This examination indicates the danger of doing this. Lowincome Latinos and high-income Latinos, for example, view some issues very differently.
Third, while African Americans and Latinos tend more liberal than whites, this is not
always the case. Most interestingly, this is not always the case on issues where it would
seem most indicated, such as immigration policy and high-income Latinos. Finally, we
often expect that intensity of opinion can make up for disadvantage. For example, gun
rights supporters win on debates over gun control, not because they hold the majority
opinion, but because they are the most vocal. Pro-lifers retain a strong hold on abortion
policy for the same reason. More relevant to this chapter, Griffin and Newman (2008)
argue that Blacks and Latinos have unexpected representational wins on racially salient
issues, even though their opinions do not represent the majority opinion. Though I
expected this finding only on explicitly racial issues, I do not find it. The government
does not seem predictably responsive to any group on racialized issues, not to whom
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those the issues would ostensibly seem to matter most, nor to the white majority. This is
a perplexing finding indeed for a democracy.
In the next chapter, I will move to consider the behavior of individual legislators.
Where income differences are indicated, do individual legislators exhibit different voting
patterns based on the number of low-income Blacks and Latinos in their district? By
race? What about sponsorship behavior?
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CHAPTER THREE
INTRODUCTION
Focusing on “government” as a body, particularly when African Americans and
Latinos remain underrepresented in government as a whole (Krogstad 2015), is very
different from looking at the responsiveness of individual legislators to opinion.
Certainly members of Congress wish to be reelected (Mayhew 1974), so constituent
opinion matters to them. Whose opinions matter, though? On which issues? Miller and
Stokes (1963) argued that the nature of the issue determines whether members of
Congress act as majority-following delegates or more independent-minded trustees. The
members of Congress Fenno (1978) studied focused on their electoral supporters over
and above their entire districts. Similarly, Kingdon (1977) argued that legislators may or
may not worry about constituent opinion, depending on how salient and/or contentious
issues are within districts.
Scholars studying descriptive representation and its effects on substantive
representation add another layer: members of Congress do a better job substantively
representing those who share some of their characteristics, such as race or gender, than do
those who are unlike their constituents (e.g., Grose 2011; Mansbridge 1999; Tate 2003).
One might assume these individuals follow a slightly different decision-making calculus,
and do a better job matching the desires of disadvantaged constituents. Whether this
happens, though, is far from settled, with many arguing that majority-minority districts
designed to improve descriptive representation lead to “perverse effects” in the
substantive policy outcomes of Congress as a whole (e.g. Lublin 1999; Lublin and Voss
2003; Schickler et al 2010), and others arguing generally well-to-do African American
and Latino members of Congress are no more like their constituents than are white
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Democrats (e.g., Swain 1995). Any exploration of representation at the level of the
individual legislator ought to consider the role of descriptive representation. In addition,
there should be a recognition that voting on bills is not the only way to represent one’s
constituency (e.g., Grose 2011).
In this chapter, I bring these ideas together, examining not only the role of
descriptive representation, party, and district characteristics like race and income, but also
the role of varying issue types: explicitly and implicitly racial issues. I examine what
drives individual member of Congress voting behavior on two implicitly racial issues.
My theory of “narrow representation” anticipates narrow, or limited, responsiveness on
implicitly racial issues, and that African American and Latino members of Congress may
not be different from other members in this respect. They may not do better representing
their likely less politically active low-income constituents than Fenno (1978) would
expect of the white legislators he studied. I examine this possibility by considering
voting on implicitly racial issues where low-income African American and Latino
opinion differs from the opinions of majorities of low-income whites, high-income
whites, and high-income African Americans and Latinos. I also consider sponsorship on
explicitly and implicitly racial issues. I find evidence that Latino and African American
members are differently active on explicitly racial issue sponsorships, but that implicitly
racial votes and sponsorships are largely driven by party and ideology rather than race.
DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION ≠ SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION?
Members of Congress respond to their constituents if they want to stay in
Congress (Mayhew 1974), or respond to their constituents on issues where it is absolutely
necessary (Miller and Stokes 1963; Kingdon 1977), or respond on issues that are critical
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to their re-election constituencies (Fenno 1978). Some argue there is also a need to
represent nonwhite and female constituents descriptively to do a better job representing
them substantively. Electing legislators that look like the members of the public
improves descriptive representation, which requires that citizens be represented by people
who resemble them and presumably have shared many of their life experiences (e.g.,
Mansbridge 1999).
If your representative looks like you, there is an assumption that the
representative will share many of your perspectives and will look out for your interests in
his or her legislative actions. Thus, there is some presumption that better descriptive
representation will lead to better substantive representation—or better policy outcomes—
for disadvantaged interests. Whether this is actually the case is strongly debated.
This debate centers on the creation of majority-minority districts as the method
for achieving better descriptive representation. A majority-minority district exists where
the majority of the represented in a district are Blacks or Latinos. Prior to the 1990
census, majority-minority districts were happenstance to the extent they existed at all;
large numbers of African Americans in a district could theoretically improve the chances
of a African American candidate. Deliberate efforts to create majority-minority districts,
however, began after the 1990 census (Reeves 1997). At that time, concerns turned to
avoiding intentional efforts to dilute the African American vote while drawing
congressional districts. For example, previously, gerrymanderers might “crack” a racial
bloc into multiple districts to reduce its influence. To avoid such efforts, the 1990
redistricting created majority-minority districts, which deliberately drew districts to
increase the influence of the majority vote in that district. Later, Supreme Court cases
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(Shaw v. Reno and Miller v. Johnson) placed limitations on how majority-minority
districts should be drawn, but they still exist and undeniably have led to increased
numbers of African Americans and Latinos holding political office, and thus increased
descriptive representation.
There is concern, however, that descriptive representation does not ensure
substantive representation. This is because there are signs that, in the aggregate,
majority-minority districts may potentially reduce the number of Democrats elected,
leading to fewer substantive governmental outcomes Blacks and Latinos desire (e.g.,
Lublin 1997; Lublin and Voss 2003). At the same time, as Swain (1995) points out,
Black and Latino members of Congress may look like their constituents more than white
Democrats do, but they are no more like them in reality than white Democrats are. This
is because they tend to be much wealthier than their constituents and have had very
different life and professional experiences.
Others point out that looking at only aggregate governmental outcomes or only
roll call voting is a problem, because representation can include, for example, constituent
services and project delivery (e.g., Grose 2011; Tate 2003), contact with representatives
(Banducci et al 2004), or agenda setting (e.g., Minta and Sinclair-Chapman 2013; Tate
2003). Finally, Tate (2003) argues that wealth does not matter: the experience of life as
an African American in the U.S. crosses wealth boundaries. Problematically, taking
away majority-minority or influence districts (Lublin 1997) would be tantamount to
taking away descriptive representation entirely, because African Americans and Latinos
still struggle to be elected in majority-white districts (Bowler and Segura 2011).
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The question of whether the promise of descriptive representation is fulfilled
substantively is far from answered, and not really addressed when it comes to the
differences we know exist in white, Black, and Latino opinion on implicitly versus
explicitly racial issues. This chapter aims to fill this gap, and further extend my
examination of this overall question. Because of the differences between descriptive and
substantive representation, the relevance of both kinds of representation, the possible
tradeoff between the two when the method of delivery is majority-minority districts, and
the struggles still faced by African American and Latino candidates, any examination of
opinion and representation is incomplete without considering legislator race, constituency
characteristics, and party influences. It is also essential to consider different modes of
representation. In the previous chapter, I considered only government outputs in the
aggregate, without attention to individual legislator race or behavior, or to district makeup. Furthermore, I considered only action as defined by passing laws or rules, rather than
constituent service, sponsorship, or oversight as Grose (2011) recommends. Here, I
consider the roles of constituency, legislator characteristics, and type of legislative
representation. Do these things matter for representation on racially-salient issues?
DATA AND METHOD
Legislator Voting Behavior
In this chapter, responsiveness is voting in a certain way; specifically,
responsiveness is voting according to the majority opinion of low-income African
Americans and Latinos.8

Measuring responsiveness in this way requires an issue to

8

In the 2010 dataset (TARP), “low-income” African Americans and Latinos are those making less than
$25,000. This is 23 percent of the sample of African Americans & 18 percent of the sample of Latinos. In
the 2012 dataset (Middle Class Tax Cut Act), “low-income” African Americans and Latinos are those
making less than $20,000. This is 21 percent of African Americans & 16 percent of Latinos in the sample.
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come to a vote. Congress has not voted on the explicit issues in the CCES in the years
for which the data is available. Thus, I will be examining roll call behavior on implicit
issues only, and, critically, on the only two issues where Congress has taken an implicitly
racial issue to a vote in the CCES dataset that elicits different responses from low-income
and high-income Black and Latino respondents. While one might argue that not much
information can be gained from examining two policies, this is the entire universe of
implicitly racial policies in the dataset that allows me to examine individual-level voting
behavior, where 1) low-income African American and Latino opinion are unique from
other group majority opinions, as discussed below, and 2) Congress took action by voting
on the implicitly racial issue in question.
A logit analysis is used, where the dependent variable is voting “yea” or “nay” on
the votes in question. I include two votes that exhibit different characteristics in
respondent opinion, for the purpose of comparison: The American Taxpayer Relief Act
and the vote on the Troubled Asset Relief Program. As noted in the appendix of Chapter
2, though the Middle Class Tax Cut Act did not succeed, the American Taxpayer Relief
Act, which also aimed to keep Bush-era tax cuts for middle-income families, did. On this
issue, based on imputed opinions gathered in the last chapter, low-income African
Americans and high-income African Americans disagreed. 64 percent of high income
African Americans favored the Middle Class Tax Cut Act, while only 47 percent of lowincome African Americans favored it. In addition, low-income African American and
low-income white opinion differed on this issue, with 56 percent of low-income whites in
favor. High-income African Americans and whites exhibited much closer opinions, with
64 percent of high-income African Americans and 63 percent of high-income whites in

71

favor of the Middle Class Tax Cut Act. 51 percent of low-income Latinos and 67 percent
of high-income Latinos favored it, making low-income African Americans the only group
without a majority in favor. Next, I examine the 2008 Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act, which created the Troubled Asset Relief Program. The only group
with a majority opinion in support of TARP in the CCES survey was low-income
Latinos, with 51 percent support among these respondents. This isolation of low-income
African American or Latino preferences aims to determine how the decision-making
calculus does, or does not, differ for African American and Latino representatives relative
to white representatives. We know representatives and activists do a poor job focusing
on the desires of disadvantaged constituents who are also generally not politically active
(e.g., Kingdon 1977; Fenno 1978; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Strolovitch 2007).
Do African American and Latino representatives do a better job, considering we assume
their shared perspective will ensure better representation (e.g., Mansbridge 1999; Tate
2003)?
For the American Taxpayer Relief Act, there are 427 observations: 171 no and
256 aye. For TARP, there are 416 observations: 148 nay and 268 yea. Though I could
include another category for non-voting and use a multinomial logit model, generally
those who did not vote were those who passed away, were injured (e.g., Gabrielle
Giffords), or left for some other reason during the session (e.g., Anthony Weiner). For
those reasons, including a non-voting category is not especially meaningful. Those who
did not vote are simply dropped from the analysis, leaving only two possible values for
the dependent variable.
Independent Variables
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To provide measures of district characteristics, I use the U.S. Census’s American
Community Study, with data by congressional district for the 112th (for the American
Taxpayer Relief Act vote) and 110th Congresses (for the TARP vote). I include the
relevant district population and the median income of the relevant population in the
district. I examine African American population and income for the American Taxpayer
Relief Act vote, and Latino population and income for the TARP vote. In addition to
including median income for African Americans and Latinos, I include white median
income, because low-income areas are often low-income for everyone. This way, I do
not miss what might be responsiveness to white constituents.
In addition, I include legislator party (1=Democrat; 0=Republican) and legislator
race. For the legislator race variables, which evaluate descriptive representation, I utilize
an African American=1 and other=0 dummy for the American Taxpayer Relief Act
analysis, and a Latino=1 and other=0 dummy for the TARP analysis. I also include both
dimensions of Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores from the VoteView
database to measure ideology.
The dependent variable, legislator vote, is aligned with low-income opinion in the
following ways. The direction of the vote, “yea” or “nay,” determines whether or not the
vote aligned with low-income opinion imputed in chapter 2 (“no” among low-income
African Americans for the vote on the American Taxpayer Relief Act; “yes” among lowincome Latinos for the vote on TARP). Unfortunately, though the CCES does a better
job than most datasets with including respondents, it does not sample enough Black and
Latino respondents to allow examination of their opinions at the state or district level,
especially when those demographic divides are further split by income. Due to these data
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limitations, I must assume that these national-level opinion tendencies among lowincome Latinos and African Americans, imputed in chapter 2 and key to the
interpretation of these analyses, hold at the district level.
Such assumptions can be problematic. Undoubtedly, region is a potentially
meaningful determinant for opinion differences. Whether or not an issue is salient to
individuals in a district is key to the decisions representatives will make (e.g., Kingdon
1978). Still, the assumption I am making is weak for the following reasons. Bowler and
Segura (2011) demonstrate that Black and Latino opinion is more bound together than is
white opinion. This finding is especially true for African Americans. Among Latinos,
though their opinions are not as aligned as those of African Americans, many of the
stronger determinants for commonality in Latino opinion, such as English proficiency,
citizenship status, and nativity (Sanchez 2006) align with a major factor I am accounting
for—low-income status. Assuming similarity among all African Americans and all
Latinos is a common research problem I am deliberately trying to avoid. I am, rather,
assuming that there will be some meaningful similarity among low-income African
Americans and low-income Latinos across districts. This is not unreasonable.
Moreover, scholars make similar assumptions in other meaningful research.
Gilens (2012) did not account for race, or gender, or district, or state when he examined
opinions of low-income, middle-income, and high-income Americans. His findings are
still important and enlightening. As discussed below, I will provide some meaningful
measures for district differences, such as district-level population size and population
income. Finally, Mansbridge (2003) writes that “surrogate” descriptive representation
exists when a black or female representative represents Blacks and women who live
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nowhere near their districts, because Blacks and women feel represented by them. Even
if there is some variation among low-income African Americans and Latinos by district,
one would hope that the national-level opinion of these groups would find, if nothing
else, surrogate representation among some members of Congress. This is, in part, what
descriptive representation expects. While imperfect, this is a good starting place for
evaluating individual legislator responsiveness to opinion.
Sponsorship Behavior
To include explicitly racial issues, and to move beyond roll call behavior, I
examine legislative sponsorship activity. I use the Congressional Bills Project to gather
data from the 110th Congress and 112th Congress related to certain explicitly and
implicitly racial subjects in the CCES. I use Iraq withdrawal as an implicitly racial topic.
91 percent of low-income African Americans compared to 85 percent of high-income
African Americans in 2008 favored withdrawing from Iraq that year. Though, clearly, a
strong majority of both income groups favored withdrawal, low-income African
Americans were especially strong on this issue. Similarly, 79 percent of Latinos at the
lowest income level in 2008 supported Iraq withdrawal, compared to only 58 percent of
Latinos in the highest income group that year. Thus, those lawmakers sponsoring bills for
Iraq withdrawal in 2008 would be particularly responsive to their low-income
constituents, both Latino and African American. 66 percent of low-income whites and
just 43 percent of high-income whites favored withdrawal from Iraq that year.
I use immigration as the explicitly racial topic. Though granting legal status to
illegal immigrants is more popular among all Latinos than it is among whites, in 2012, it
was favored by 72 percent of low-income Latinos compared to 64 percent of high-income
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Latinos. Among African Americans at different income levels, opinions are close
together, and in favor of granting legal status to illegal immigrants: 64 percent of lowincome African Americans favored this policy in 2012, and 66 percent of high income
African Americans did. All of these preferences are significantly higher than support for
this policy among whites. 44 percent of low-income whites and 46 percent of highincome whites were in favor of granting legal status. Those legislators sponsoring bills
for granting legal status to illegal immigrants are representing their low-income
constituents, particularly Latinos, over and above the opinions of most white constituents.
Due to the overall low rate of member sponsorship on these issues, I approach this
analysis using t-tests and two-way tests of proportion to avoid small-sample bias of a
maximum likelihood estimation model. I gather sponsorships by limiting the major topic
codes from the Congressional Bills Project to defense for Iraq, and immigration and labor
for immigration. For Iraq withdrawal, to capture relevant bills, I simply searched for
“Iraq;” for immigration, I searched for the following terms: “amnesty,” “illegal
immigration,” “immigration reform,” “legal status,” “citizenship,” “alien,” and “dream”
(because of the DREAM Act). Sponsorship behavior in these areas is included if it aligns
with dominant low-income Black and Latino group opinion on these subjects, using the
bill description. Each legislator is coded for the number of times he or she sponsored a
bill in line with low-income Black and Latino interests on these issues, as well as whether
he or she sponsored any such bills or not. Independent variables, again, include district
Black and Latino size, the groups’ median income, legislator race, and legislator party.
For Iraq, I include bills that explicitly discuss withdrawal, decreasing troop time
there or increasing troop leave, overturning authorizations for Iraq, or limiting funds for
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the effort. I also include bills that represent an effort by a legislator to exert
congressional control over executive branch activities in Iraq (e.g., “To require the
President to develop a plan containing dates certain for the commencement and
completion of a phased redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq, and for
other purposes,” “To enhance congressional oversight of Operation Iraqi Freedom by
requiring the President to transmit periodically to Congress a consolidated,
comprehensive report to detail the terms of completion for Operation Iraqi Freedom and
by requiring the President to seek to enter into a multilateral agreement to help provide
for the completion of Operation Iraqi Freedom.”).
For immigration, I used a coding scheme of “openness to immigration.” Again,
this includes more bills than just those providing amnesty. Bills included evince a desire
to assist legal immigrants and illegal immigrants in some way (excluding those
specifically targeting refugees from conflicts such as Iraq and Syria, which arguably
occupy a different policy space). Examples include immigration reform bills with a path
to citizenship; bills that permit immigration judges to allow noncitizen parents of citizen
children to stay in the U.S.; bills that allow states to cancel removal of alien students who
came to the U.S. as children; bills that grant special status to certain nonimmigrants for
scientific or educational achievement, or because of their parents’ status (for example, as
9/11 survivors or victims, or as veterans); bills that reject keeping services from
immigrants or requiring additional paperwork from them (for example, bills against
requiring new Permanent Resident Cards for lawful residents, or authorizing payment
from Medicare for emergency services provided to undocumented aliens, or allowing
access to public schools, or helping alien children access child welfare services).
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For the sake of comparison, I also include a “closed to immigration” category;
these bills work against the desires of low-income Black and Latino respondents in the
CCES. It is important to control for not only policy type but the direction of
responsiveness. Bill descriptions in this category tend to be more blunt. Some examples
include “ending the cycle of illegal immigration in the United States,” “to require those
applying for…SCHIP…benefits to present documentation proving citizenship…,” “to
deny certain Federal funds to any institution of higher education that admits as students
aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States,” “to amend the Immigration and
Nationality Act to deny citizenship at birth to children born in the United States of
parents who are not citizens…,” bills that punish crimes more severely when committed
by aliens or illegal immigrants, and bills authorizing the construction of a fence or wall.
Given that those legislators with large immigrant populations might be particularly likely
to act either for or against immigrant interests, including both sides helps disentangle the
role of legislator race and district population characteristics.
Though this coding casts a wide net, I believe even a sponsored bill that seeks
slightly less than outright withdrawal for Iraq or total amnesty for illegal immigrants
provides a legislator the opportunity to tell constituents who believe in both of these
things that he or she is working in line with their goals. It permits me to capture
responsiveness that, while perhaps not extreme enough, may represent an effort to
respond to certain constituencies. Certainly, there are few enough of these bills (over the
two Congresses examined, 54 Iraq bills, 33 “openness to immigration” bills, and 50
“closed to immigration” bills), to suggest there is something unusual about those who
sponsor them, something beyond party, and this examination provides a look at what that
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might be. All descriptions of bill sponsorships utilized in the analysis, captured from the
Congressional Bills Project dataset, are included in Appendix E for review. Appendix F
lists representatives sponsoring bills, and Appendix G contains maps highlighting what
states sponsoring legislators hail from.
HYPOTHESES
Section 1: Roll call behavior on implicitly racial issues
Hypotheses 1 and 2
Authors urging caution about the promise of descriptive representation for
substantively important outcomes for African Americans and Latinos believe that
Democrats of any race, and liberals, will better represent these groups than Republicans
and conservatives (e.g., Lublin 1999; Lublin and Voss 2003). Therefore, I predict
Democrats will be more responsive to the desires of low-income Black and Latino CCES
respondents than Republicans. That is, Democrats will be less likely to vote “yes” on the
American Taxpayer Relief Act (aligning them with the majority opinion among lowincome African Americans) and more likely to vote “yes” on the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (aligning them with the majority opinion among low-income Latinos).
Correspondingly, I predict liberals will be less likely to vote “yes” on the American
Taxpayer Relief Act, and more likely to vote “yes” on the Troubled Asset Relief
Program.
Hypothesis 3
Other scholars note that descriptive representation is often important for effective
representation (e.g., Grose 2011; Mansbridge 1999; Tate 2003). If this is the case here,
one would expect that African American legislators will be less likely to vote “yes” on
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the American Taxpayer Relief Act, and Latino legislators will be more likely to vote
“yes” on the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
Hypothesis 4
If members want to be re-elected, one would assume that they would vote as
constituents in their districts desire (e.g., Mayhew 1974). If this is true across members
of Congress, legislators with large low-income Black or Latino populations should show
no significant differences in their responsiveness to the desires of these respondents. As
the district African American population increases and African American median income
decreases, voting “yes” on the American Taxpayer Relief Act will become less likely. As
the district Latino population increases and Latino median income decreases, voting
“yes” on TARP will become more likely.
Section 2: Sponsorship behavior on explicitly and implicitly racial issues
Hypothesis 5
If authors who find substantive support for the role of descriptive representation
are correct (e.g., Grose 2011; Mansbridge 1999; Tate 2003), African American and
Latino legislators will be more likely to sponsor explicitly racial bills (openness to
immigration bills), and more likely than white legislators to sponsor implicitly racial bills
(Iraq withdrawal).
Hypothesis 6
If representation is really just about party and ideology (e.g., Lublin 1999; Lublin
and Voss 2003), legislators who are Democrats should be more likely to sponsor
explicitly (openness to immigration bills) and implicitly racial bills (Iraq withdrawal)
than legislators who are Republicans.
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Hypotheses 7 and 8
If representation is based on responding to who lives in one’s district (e.g.
Mayhew 1974), those with larger mean African American and Latino populations in their
districts, and those with lower mean median incomes in their districts, should be more
likely to sponsor explicitly and implicitly racial bills.
RESULTS
Voting Behavior
Tables 1 and 2 display the results of logistic regressions for the American
Taxpayer Relief Act Vote (Table 1) and the TARP vote (Table 2). The entries are log
odds. Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicted that Democrats and liberals respond better to lowincome group opinion. As seen in Table 1, even after controlling for legislator race and
district characteristics, it is clear that party and ideology are dominant explanations in the
model for legislator vote. Democrats were significantly less likely to vote “yes” on the
American Taxpayer Relief Act. In Model 3, for example, when party=Democrat/1, the
log odds of voting “yes” (versus “no”) correspond to a nearly 100 percent decrease in the
likelihood of voting yes when an legislator is a Democrat. Model 4 shows the similarly
strong impact for ideology, regardless of dimension: more conservative representatives
are far more likely (99 percent more likely) to vote “yes” on the American Taxpayer
Relief Act.
This finding regarding the relevance of party and ideology holds for the Troubled
Asset Relief Program vote. Again, regardless of legislator race or district characteristics,
the magnitude of the relationship is strong. In Model 3, when party=Democrat/1, the log
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odds of voting “yes” on TARP increase by 5.83. Correspondingly, the relationship with
ideology is negative: as ideology becomes more conservative, the likelihood of voting
“yes” on TARP drops to nearly 0, regardless of dimension.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that African American and Latino legislators would be
more responsive to low-income group opinion. In the American Taxpayer Relief Act
vote, as shown in Model 2 and Model 4 in Table 1, legislator race is not significant after
controlling for party or ideology, nor is the relationship in the expected direction. The
same is true for the Troubled Asset Relief Program Vote, as shown in Table 2. Below, I
discuss some possible reasons for this.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that legislators with more African Americans or more
Latinos in their districts, and more low-income African Americans and more low-income
Latinos in their districts, would behave differently than other legislators. Tacit in this
prediction is the belief that effective substantive representation will not be based on
legislator race, or at least not just on legislator race, but district composition. Legislators
with larger African American populations, or larger low-income African American
populations in their districts, showed no significant signs of being less likely to vote
“yes” on the American Taxpayer Relief Act, after controlling for party. In the ideology
model, the only relevant district variable is white median income (as it increases,
likelihood of voting yes on a tax cut increases, which is not surprising). On this vote, it
looks like party and ideology carried the day.
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Table 1: American Taxpayer Relief Act Vote
Variable

Model 1

Party (Democrat=1)

-7.65***
(1.03)

Model 2
-7.51***
(1.03)

Model 3

Model 4

-7.77***
(1.09)

-------

Ideology
DWNom1
DWNom2

------

-------

--------

12.43***
(2.15)
6.84***
(1.50)

MC Race
African
American

-------

-1.51
(1.01)

-1.35
(1.12)

1.53
(1.66)

AA Population

--------

--------

-0.19
(0.24)

-0.34
(0.41)

AA Median
Income

---------

District
Characteristics

White Median
Income

Constant

--------5.46***
(1.00)

--------

-0.015
(0.03)

---------

-0.04
(0.02)

5.50***
(1.00)

11.07**
(3.20)

0.01
(0.04)

0.06*
(0.03)
-2.60
(4.19)

Note: N=426. The dependent variables are legislator votes, where 1= yes and 0=no. Entries are log odds;
standard errors are in parentheses. Population variables are log-transformed; income is scaled to thousands.
There were 41 African Americans in the 112th Congress.
***=p<0.001 **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05
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Table 2: TARP Vote

Party (Democrat=1)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

5.42***
(0.61)

5.39***
(0.61)

5.83***
(0.65)

--------

Ideology
DWNom1

-9.04***
(1.08)
-------

------

------

DWNom2

-4.24***
(0.82)

MC RACE
Latino
------

1.24
(0.98)

2.70*
(1.09)

1.49
(1.22)

Latino Population

------

------

-0.85***
(0.22)

-0.55*
(0.26)

Latino Median
Income

---------

-------

-0.013
(0.02)

0.00
(0.02)

--------

------

0.05***
(0.01)

0.02
(0.02)

-1.13***
(0.168)

-1.16***
(0.171)

4.70*
(2.13)

8.99***
(2.56)

District
Characteristics

White Median
Income

Constant

Note: N=415. The dependent variables are legislator votes, where 1= yes and 0=no. Entries are log odds; standard errors are in
parentheses. Population variables are log-transformed; income is scaled to thousands. There were 25 Latinos in the 110 th Congress.
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The findings for the Troubled Asset Relief Program vote are a bit different.
While party remains a very strong predictor, legislator race (Latino compared to other
legislators) becomes significant, as do district Latino population and white median
income. The scatterplot in Figure 1 shows that Latinos are certainly not the only ones
voting for TARP, but they have a higher likelihood of doing so than many non-Latinos.
However, the Latino population variable and the white median income variable do not
behave as expected: larger Latino populations reduce the likelihood of voting yes, while
white median income has a positive relationship with legislator vote on TARP (strange
since high-income whites were against TARP). What is happening here?
Figure 1
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I believe Latino Republicans explain these perplexing findings. Based on Model
3, I simulated 1,000 votes for TARP.9 Holding Latino median income and white median
income at their means, and holding Latino population first at its mean and then its
maximum, while varying party and legislator race, provides some interesting illustrations.
For TARP, where low-income Latino opinion is unique, one might expect Democrats
who are Latino to be especially responsive, relative other Democrats. In these
simulations, while Latinos are slightly more likely than other Democratic legislators to
vote “yes” on TARP, the difference based on legislator race among Democrats is
miniscule. Democrats are simply very likely to vote “yes,” regardless of race (see Figure
2). As Figure 3 shows, however, Latino Republicans behave very differently from other
Republicans in these simulations. In simulations holding Latino district population at its
mean, Republicans who are Latino have a 74 percent probability of voting “yes” on
TARP, while other Republicans have only a 20 percent probability of voting “yes” on
TARP.
What about district characteristics? After all, the “Latino legislator” and “Latino
population” variables are highly correlated, as majority-minority districts tend to be
required to elect nonwhite legislators (Bowler and Segura 2011). Again, based on
simulations, Figures 4 and 5 show the differing impact of large Latino populations among
Latino Democrats and Republicans. Latino Democrats and other Democrats with large
Latino populations do not behave substantially differently (Figure 4). Latino Republicans
and other Republicans with large Latino populations do, however (Figure 5). Having a
large Latino population far from ensured a Latino Republican vote of “yes” on TARP;

9

Using Stata’s Clarify program.
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only 36 percent of Latino Republicans with large Latino populations in these simulations
did so. However, Latino Republicans were far more responsive to district characteristics
than were other Republican legislators with large Latino populations, who have a less
than five percent likelihood of voting “yes.” The different impact of legislator race and
district characteristics among Republicans may explain the perplexing findings seen in
Table 2, Model 3.
Figure 2 Simulated Votes on TARP; Democrats

Probability of Voting "Yes" on
TARP, Among Democrats
100%
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60%
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20%
10%
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Other Race
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Figure 3 Simulated Votes on TARP; Republicans
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Figure 4 Simulated Votes on TARP; Democrats with Large Latino Populations
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TARP, Among Democrats with
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Figure 5 Simulated Votes on TARP; Republicans with Large Latino Populations

Probability of Voting "Yes" on
TARP, Among Republicans with
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The overwhelming likelihood of voting yes among Democrats, and the fact that
Latino legislators are more likely to be Democrats (80 percent of Latinos in the 110th
Congress were Democrats), may explain why legislator race is not significant in Table 2,
Model 2, when only those two variables are included. In Model 3, when district
characteristics are included, the differential behavior among Republicans matters again.
Party remains significant because Democrats are far more likely to vote “yes” on TARP,
regardless of race or district characteristics. The influence of legislator race becomes
clearer, though, because majority-Latino districts are likely to have a Latino legislator,
and Latino Republicans are much more likely than other Republicans to vote “yes” when
they have large Latino populations. Finally, the Latino population variable has a negative
impact upon legislator vote, because after controlling for legislator race and party, the
remaining high-volume Latino districts have Republican, non-Latino legislators, who are
very unlikely to vote “yes” on TARP.
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These illustrations do not explain the direction of the relationship between white
median income and legislator vote. As Figure 6 shows, the probability of voting “yes” on
TARP is less then 0.5 at the lowest income levels, and increases to just under 1 at the
highest income levels. We know from Gilens (2012) that high-income opinions receive a
lot of responsiveness; however, high-income whites in the CCES were against TARP. In
any case, it is clear that the low-income Black and Latino populations did not drive
legislator behavior, which aligns with my theory.
In Model 4, it is evident that, unlike party, including both dimensions of Poole
and Rosenthal’s ideology scores wipes out the role of Latino legislator for TARP vote.
Both the first dimension ideology score and the second dimension ideology score have
strong relationships with vote choice10: more conservative legislators are much less likely
to vote yes. Latino population continues its negative relationship with a TARP “yes”
vote, and district Latino median income remains insignificant. These findings might
suggest it is ideology, not legislator race, determining vote choice, and that, rather, Latino
legislators are just less conservative than other Republicans. If this is true, this is still an
important finding for legislator race if Latino legislators are consistently more liberal.
Simulations of the TARP vote again suggest that legislator race matters. Among the
most conservative Republicans in the simulation (DW-NOM 1 and 2=1), the difference is
not very stark. The likelihood of a “yes” vote among very conservative Latino
Republicans is 3 percent, while the likelihood of a “yes” vote among very conservative
white Republicans is 0.3 percent. Among mid-range conservatives, however (DW-NOM
1 and 2=0.5), the vote choice simulation shows a bigger difference for Latino
10

Log likelihoods and AIC/BIC tests confirm that the model performs best when both
dimensions are included.
90

conservatives versus white conservatives (see Figure 7). While Latino conservatives are
more likely to vote “no” than “yes,” they’re far more likely to vote “yes” than other
conservatives, to the tune of 40 percent versus 13 percent.
Figure 6: White Median Income and TARP Vote

Figures 8 and 9 confirm that it is largely DW-NOM 1 scores driving this
difference. When DW-NOM 2 scores are held at 0 in the simulation, and DW-NOM 1
scores held at 0.5, the probability of voting yes on TARP among Latino mid-range
conservatives is 78 percent (Figure 8). When DW-NOM 1 scores are held at 0, and DWNOM 2 scores held at 0.5, there is very little difference between Latino legislators and
other legislators (Figure 9). Figures 10 and 11 confirm that, as with party, in the vote
simulation, whether one examines both dimensions of ideology (Figure 10) or DW-NOM
1 only (Figure 11), conservative Latino legislators with large Latino populations behave
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differently than other Latino legislators. While conservative Latino legislators will
probably not vote “yes” on TARP, they are more likely than other conservative
legislators to vote “yes” in the simulation.
This finding is not strong enough to show up in Model 4, however. The likely
reason is that there were not many Republican or conservative Latinos in the 110th
Congress, and the simulation strengthens their influence by essentially running more
“votes.” There were 25 Latinos in the 110th Congress, and 84 percent of them were
Democrats. This means there were only four Latino Republicans in the 110th Congress.
However, in 111th Congress there were five Latino Republicans, and in the 112th
Congress, there were eight Latino Republicans. Their different approach will be felt
more if this number continues to grow.
Further, there were just nine white Republicans with district Latino populations at
least one standard deviation above the mean (greater than 240,000 Latinos; districts
located in California, New Mexico, and Texas), and 22 white Republicans with district
Latino populations at least 1 standard deviation above the mean. These smaller numbers
make comparisons between Latino-populated districts with Republican or conservative
Latino legislators versus Republican or conservative white legislators, who appear to
behave very differently, more reasonable and meaningful, especially as these numbers
seem to be growing as well.
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Figure 7 Simulated Probability of Voting “Yes” on TARP, Among Conservatives
(ideology=0.5)
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Figure 8 Simulated Probability of Voting “Yes” on TARP, Among Conservatives
(DW-NOM 1=0.5)
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Figure 9 Simulated Probability of Voting “Yes” on TARP, Among Conservatives
(DW-NOM 2=0.5)
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Figure 10 Simulated Probability of Voting Yes on TARP, Among Conservatives
(ideology=0.5)
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Figure 11 Simulated Probability of Voting Yes on TARP, Among Conservatives
(DW-NOM 1=0.5)
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Therefore, I view the differential behavior among conservative Latinos in the
simulations demonstrate to be interesting and potentially even more meaningful in the
future. However, it is clear that the strongest relationships highlighted in the two vote
choice models are not legislator race, or even district characteristics. My theory of
narrow representation predicts that on implicitly racial issues, Blacks and Latinos,
especially low-income Blacks and Latinos, are not heard as well as whites. Importantly, I
do not argue the opinions of low-income individuals ordinarily determine the behaviors
of members of Congress. We know political activity is decreased among low-income
individuals (e.g., Bowler and Segura 2011), and that representatives pay attention to their
“re-election constituency” the most (e.g., Fenno 1978). Still, even though Democrats
sided with low-income Blacks and Latinos on these two issues—despite all other groups
being against that position on these issues, including high-income Blacks and Latinos we
might expect to be more politically active—district demography and median income did
not factor in as having a significant relationship with vote. It is not clear that “re-election
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constituencies” (Fenno 1978), or at least high-income voters, drove Democrats’ behavior,
either.
Sponsorships
Hypotheses 5, 6, 7, and 8 dealt with legislator sponsorship behavior based on race
and party. Two-way tests of proportion compare the behavior of Democratic and
Republican legislators, and white, African American, and Latino legislators. As shown in
Table 3, 18 of 265 Democrats (7 percent of Democrats), and 3 of 300 Republicans (1
percent of Republicans) sponsored Open Immigration legislation. This is a significant
difference in sponsorship behavior by party (p=0.0002). Republicans sponsored
significantly more Closed to Immigration bills (p=0.0031): 27 of 300 Republicans (9
percent) compared to 8 of 265 Democrats (3 percent). Finally, Democrats were also
more active on the selected implicitly racial issue, Iraq withdrawal (p=0.000). 32 of 265
Democrats (12 percent) and 7 of 300 Republicans (2 percent) sponsored Iraq withdrawal
legislation (some of these sponsored multiple bills; see Appendix F). This conforms to
the expectations in Hypothesis 6: Democrats are more active than Republicans on both,
Iraq withdrawal sponsorships (implicit) and openness to immigration (explicit).
Table 3: Comparing Parties on Explicitly and Implicitly Racial Issues
Issue
Democrats Republicans Difference
and
Significance
Openness to
7%
1%
6%***
Immigration
(Explicit)
Closed to
3%
9%
-6%**
Immigration
(Explicit)
Iraq
12%
2%
10%**
Withdrawal
(Implicit)
***=proportion differed significantly by party, p<.001, **=proportion differed significantly by party, p<.01, *=proportion differed
significantly by party, p<.05
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Hypothesis 5 predicts that African American and Latino legislators will be more
active than white legislators on explicitly racial and implicitly racial bills. As Table 4
shows, however, it appears the theory of narrow representation largely holds up here.
There is no significant difference in the proportion of white, Latino, and African
American legislators sponsoring Iraq withdrawal bills (p=0.1404 for white-Latino,
p=0.7915 for white-African American, and p=0.1179 for African American-Latino).
Despite the liberal opinions of African Americans on immigration, African American
legislators are no more likely than white legislators to sponsor “openness to immigration”
bills (p=0.6860). However, Latino legislators are much more active in sponsoring
openness to immigration bills than are either white or African American legislators. 7 of
29 Latino legislators sponsored “openness to immigration” legislation, compared to 13 of
477 whites (p=0.000) and 1 of 51 African Americans (p=0.0016). On “closed to
immigration” legislation, there is no significant difference in sponsorship behavior based
on race (p=0.1404 for white-Latino, p=0.1691 for white-African American, and p=0.4434
for African American-Latino).
Table 4: Comparing Legislators by Race
Issue
Whites Latinos
African
Difference, Difference, Difference,
Americans Whites vs. Whites vs. Latinos vs.
Latinos
African
African
Americans Americans
Openness to
3%
24%
2%
-21%***
1%
22%**
Immigration
(Explicit)
Closed to
Immigration
(Explicit)

7%

0%

2%

7%

5%

-2%

Iraq
Withdrawal
(Implicit)

7%

0%

8%

7%

-1%

-8%
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To extricate the role of party and race, I also compared just Democrats of all
races, white Democrats to white Republicans, and Latino Democrats to Latino
Republicans. Tables 5 and 6 display the results. Latino Democrats are more likely to
sponsor open immigration legislation than white Democrats or African American
Democrats. 6 of 20 Latino Democrats (30%) sponsored such legislation, compared to 11
of 190 white Democrats (6%, p=0.0000), and 1 of 49 African American Democrats (2%,
p=0.0005). White Democrats and African American Democrats show no significant
difference in their sponsorship behavior here (p=0.2600). Interestingly, though white
Democrats and white Republicans display very different sponsorship likelihoods on this
issue (p=0.0017), Latino Democrats and Republicans do not (p=0.2684). This conforms
to the differential behavior of Latinos on an explicitly racial issue; for whites, party
makes more of a difference.
White, Latino, and African American Democrats display no significant
differences in their sponsorship behavior on closed to immigration bills. Democrats
simply are not very active in this issue area. Neither Latino Democrats nor Latino
Republicans sponsored closed immigration legislation, but there is a significant
difference for white Democrats and white Republicans. 27 of 287 white Republicans
sponsored closed to immigration legislation, while only 7 of 190 Democrats did
(p=0.0363). White Republicans, rather than Democrats of any race, are clearly more
likely to be doing the work on this issue, and, as with the earlier analysis, Latino
Republicans differ from other Republicans in their behavior here.
For Iraq withdrawal sponsorships, there is a strong role for party over race. There
are no significant racial differences in sponsorship behavior among Democrats, but white
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Republicans and Democrats differ a great deal: 28 of 190 white Democrats sponsored
such bills, while only 7 of 287 white Republicans did (p=0.000). For this implicitly
racial issue, party matters more than race.
Democrats are more active on implicitly and explicitly racial issues, but Latino
Democrats are particularly strong on the “openness” dimension of an explicitly racial
issue, immigration. Clearly, then, descriptive representation has some relevance for
substantive representation on the explicitly racial issue examined here, but not for the
implicitly racial issue, Iraq withdrawal. Party rather than race plays the dominant role on
implicitly racial issues, despite much stronger Black and Latino opinion on Iraq
withdrawal. Narrow representation also shows itself in African American legislators’
lack of activity on this issue; despite African Americans’ comparatively liberal take on
immigration, African American legislators are not significantly more active on this issue
than white legislators.
Table 5: Comparing Legislators at the Intersection of Race and Party:
Democrats of Different Races
Issue

Openness to
Immigration
(Explicit)

White
Latino
Democrats Democrats

6%

30%

African
Difference, Difference, Difference,
American White vs.
White vs.
African
Democrats
Latino
African
American
Dems
American vs. Latino
Dems
Dems
2%
-24%**
4%
28%**

Closed to
Immigration
(Explicit)

4%

0%

2%

4%

2%

-2%

Iraq
Withdrawal
(Implicit)

15%

0%

8%

15%

7%

-8%

***=proportion differed significantly by race, p<.001,**=proportion differed significantly by race, p<.01.*=proportion differed
significantly by race, p<.05.
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Table 6: Comparing Legislators at the Intersection of Race and Party:
Democrats and Republicans
Issue

White
White
Latino
Latino
Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans

Difference,
Difference,
White
Latino
Democrats
Democrats
vs.
vs.
Republicans Republicans
6%**
19%

Openness to
Immigration
(Explicit)

7%

1%

30%

11%

Closed to
Immigration
(Explicit)

4%

9%

0%

0%

-5%*

0%

Iraq
Withdrawal
(Implicit)

15%

2%

0%

0%

13%***

0%

***=proportion differed significantly by race, p<.001,**=proportion differed significantly by race, p<.01.*=proportion differed
significantly by race, p<.05.

What about district characteristics? T-tests compare the mean district racial group
populations and mean district median incomes for those legislators who did and did not
sponsor open immigration bills, closed immigration bills, and Iraq withdrawal bills.
Hypothesis 7 predicts that larger mean Black and Latino populations will be likely among
those who sponsored openness to immigration bills. As Table 7 shows, those with larger
mean Latino populations were more likely to sponsor open immigration legislation
(p=0.000), and those with lower mean white populations were more likely to sponsor
open immigration legislation (p=0.0001). There is no significant difference in mean
African American population among those who did and did not sponsor openness to
immigration legislation (p=0.6009). There was also no significant difference in mean
African American (p=0.3137) or Latino population (p=0.7088) among those who did and
did not sponsor closed to immigration legislation. However, the mean district white
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population was significantly higher among those who sponsored closed to immigration
legislation (p=0.0307). For the implicitly racial issue, Iraq withdrawal sponsorship, there
was no significant difference in mean district African American (p=0.1933), Latino
(0.2757) or white population size (0.6217) among those who did and did not sponsor such
legislation. Appendix G displays which states had legislators who sponsored each type of
legislation, and one can see that openness to immigration sponsorship behavior is more
concentrated than sponsorships in the other two areas, particularly Iraq withdrawal,
which fits with these findings. That is, this dimension of the explicitly racial issue is
affected most by legislator race, and Latino legislators tend to be located in states with
larger Latino populations.
The test of hypothesis 8 provides some surprises, though is not entirely surprising
for the theory of narrow representation. Lower-income African Americans and Latinos
were especially likely to support amnesty for illegal immigrants. Despite this, neither
mean district African American median income (p=0.1992) nor Latino median income
(p=0.5084) was significantly lower among those who sponsored openness to immigration
legislation. However, there was a difference among those who did and did not sponsor
closed to immigration legislation: those who did tended to be from districts with higher
mean African American median incomes (p=0.0086) and Latino median incomes
(p=0.03). The same issue arises for sponsorship on the implicitly racial issue, Iraq
withdrawal. Those who sponsored such legislation were from districts with higher mean
median incomes among whites (p=0.0302) and African Americans (0.0124), even though
withdrawing from Iraq was more popular among low-income individuals. Narrow
representation expects a lack of responsiveness to low-income interests on implicitly
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racial issues in particular. In keeping with the theory of narrow representation and with
Gilens (2012), sponsorship activity on Iraq withdrawal did not appear to be influenced by
low-income populations.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
For legislator vote on two implicitly racial issues, party and ideology largely
carried the day. These analyses confirm that party and ideology were the dominant
forces in determining vote choice on a substantively important issue to Blacks and
Latinos. However, I show that this is also true for issues that are differently supported by
Blacks and Latinos of different income levels. Democrats and liberals were far more
likely than Republicans and conservatives to vote in the direction low-income groups
desired. Legislator race does not exhibit a significant role apart from party for Democrats
and liberals, but for the small number of Latino Republicans voting on TARP, it did.
Similarly, district characteristics did not determine Democrats’ votes on TARP, but they
did affect Latino Republicans differently than other Republicans.
Based on these findings, those who embrace the idea that party and ideology, not
descriptive representation, determine substantive representation are partly correct when it
comes to issues that elicit different responses among respondents at different income
levels. However, this may be too blunt an assessment: Latino Republicans do seem to be
more liberal than other Republicans on these two racialized issues. Therefore, the impact
of legislator race and district may be more nuanced than an argument for simply electing
Democrats conveys, and not entirely unimportant for implicitly racial
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Table 7: District Racial Population and Median Income and Bill Sponsorship
Issue

Mean
African
American
Population

Mean Latino
Population

Mean White
Population

Open to
0: 86,432
Immigration 1: 96,282
(explicit)

0: 108,538
1: 266,036***

Closed to
0: 87,478
Immigration 1: 72,136
(explicit)
Iraq
Withdrawal
(implicit)

0: 87,669
1: 67,395

Mean White
Median
Income

Mean
Latino
Median
Income

0: 530,299
0: $75,718
1: 424,239*** 1: $80,632

Mean
African
American
Median
Income
0: $42,437
1: $45,889

0: 113,035
1: 120,499

0: 524,755
1: 572,187*

0: $75,922
1: $74,856

0: $42,253
1: $48,273**

0: $44,337
1: $48,180*

0: 114,410
1: 92,114

0: 527,536
1: 516,436

0: $75,555
1: $82,418*

0: $42,274
1: $48,140*

0: $44,509
1: $44,826

0: $44,567
1: $43,163

Note: The results of t-tests for population and income variables for those who did (1) and did not (0) sponsor such legislation.
***=mean differed significantly, p<.001,**=mean differed significantly, p<.01.*=mean differed significantly, p<.05.
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issues, though party is dominant. This impact may become more meaningful as the
number of conservative Latinos in Congress grows.
The sponsorship behavior analysis examined both implicitly and explicitly racial
issues and showed some differences. Party is a major determinant of sponsorship
behavior on both explicitly and implicitly racial issues. However, Latino Democrats are
especially active in sponsoring openness to immigration legislation, and unlike white
Democrats and Republicans, Latino Democrats and Republicans did not differ
significantly in their sponsorship behavior for closed to immigration legislation. Racial
differences were not important for Iraq withdrawal legislation. District characteristics
mattered: those who sponsored openness to immigration legislation had higher mean
Latino populations and lower mean white populations than those who did not, and those
who sponsored closed to immigration legislation had higher mean white populations than
those who did not. District median income did not behave as a pure theory of
responsiveness would predict. This may represent support of the idea that representation
is narrow, based more on race and explicitly racial issues than income and implicitly
racial issues. While this shows that Grose (2011) is right to urge looking at other forms
of congressional behavior beyond voting, it suggests that once substantively important
issues are examined by policy dimension, the promise of descriptive representation may
not hold the same way for explicitly and implicitly racial issues. It seems that Latino
legislators did a better job representing Latinos through sponsorship on explicitly racial
issues alone, as the theory of narrow representation predicts.
Another important finding in this chapter is the importance of not only policy
type, but direction. “Immigration” was the explicitly racial policy area examined here,

104

but only openness to immigration goes in the direction African Americans and Latinos
desire. In addition, legislators exhibit very different behavior depending on the direction,
with white legislators much more active on closed to immigration policies and Latino
legislators extremely important for openness to immigration policy sponsorship. Those
who sponsored openness to immigration bills were from districts with more Latinos and
fewer whites than those who did not, and those who sponsored closed to immigration
bills were from districts with more whites than those who did not. This demonstrates
further the importance of policy area, in addition to racialization.
That Democrats are so reliably aligned with Blacks and Latinos in these analyses
aligns with the work of King and Smith (2005; 2008). They argue that opposing racial
“orders,” made up of state institutions and other political actors clustered predictably
along either “color blind” or “race-conscious” sides of policy debates (King and Smith
2008) explain much more of politics and history than most scholars anticipate. Indeed,
they argue these racial orders explain much of the party polarization we see on a majority
of political issues. My project represents an attempt to heed their warning that racial
politics matters even where one would least expect it (King and Smith 2005). While they
demonstrate the importance of racial orders for party politics on two explicitly racial
issues, affirmative action and majority-minority districts (King and Smith 2008), the
voting and sponsorship behavior analysis here indicates the polarization of these orders
may be alive and well for implicitly racial issues too, and in a variety of representational
forms.
There are some shortcomings in this analysis that can be improved upon. First,
and most obviously, only two implicitly racial issues are examined here for legislator
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voting behavior. The lack of recent opinion data that provides large enough samples of
racial populations to examine these group’s opinions within income categories, and the
lack of action in Congress on any issues, let alone implicitly racial ones, makes it hard to
move beyond a few issues. Relatedly, there is no explicitly racial issue more obviously
connected to African Americans examined here. To fully understand legislator behavior
on implicitly and explicitly racial issues, a wider set of cases is needed. More votes also
means more Congresses, and more African American and Latino members in each party,
data that would also enable a more thorough interactive examination of party and race in
the multivariate analyses.
Second, and also relatedly, there are undoubtedly other explanations beyond those
examined here for legislator vote choice on these two bills. For example, the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act, which created TARP, has a complicated legislative history;
the bank bailout was coupled with everything from genetics research (in the House) to
mental health policy (in the Senate) to make the package more attractive, or perhaps give
excuses to representatives worried about the opinions of their constituents (Arnold 1990).
This is another reason why an examination of more votes is necessary, when data permit
it. I also do not examine opinions at the district level, or low-income voting rates in
districts, which are key factors for determining how salient constituent opinion is for a
given member of Congress (e.g. Kingdon 1977; Fenno 1978). A simpler explanation
may simply be that low-income constituents continue to be ignored—though my analyses
suggest that is true not just for white legislators, but African American and Latino
legislators as well, which may be interesting for supporters of ensuring descriptive
representation.
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Despite these limitations and possible extensions, given the dearth of data that
permits examination of low-income Black and Latino opinion, and the inactivity of
Congress, this analysis represents a step forward. The consideration of income-group
opinions within racial groups is unusual. Examining how members of Congress respond
or do not respond to unique desires of the most disadvantaged members of racial groups
is even more unusual. This research shows that even though majorities of white, African
American, and Latino populations were for the American Taxpayer Relief Act, lowincome African Americans were not, and Democrats voted “no.” Similarly, though
majorities of white, African American, and Latino populations were against the Troubled
Asset Relief Program, low-income Latinos were for it, and Democrats voted “yes.” The
impact of party was powerful even after considering legislator race and district
characteristics, but the hope for descriptive representation may not be not altogether lost:
Latino Republicans behaved differently than other Republicans. In addition, Latino
Democrats and white Democrats behaved differently in their sponsorship activity on an
explicitly racial issue. These are interesting findings that raise new questions for the
literature.
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CHAPTER FOUR
INTRODUCTION
Descriptive representation seems to yield more concrete dividends when one
looks beyond roll call voting (e.g., Grose 2011; Minta 2011; Ellis and Wilson 2013;
Minta and Sinclair-Chapman 2013; Minta and Brown 2014). This is especially true for
congressional oversight. The positive impact of descriptive representation for substantive
oversight activity holds for all racially salient issues, both implicit and explicit (Minta
2011; Ellis and Wilson 2013; Minta and Sinclair-Chapman 2013; Minta and Brown
2014). Minta and Sinclair-Chapman (2013) show that larger numbers of nonwhite
legislators in the House coincide with more oversight activity on racially salient issues.
Minta (2011) and Ellis and Wilson (2013) turn their attention to committees. Minta
(2011) finds that nonwhite committee members participate more actively in racially
salient oversight than do white committee members, and Ellis and Wilson (2013) argue
that African American and Latino chairs positively impact the volume of racially salient
oversight.
However, the effect of the number of African American and Latino committee
members upon committee oversight is unexamined. This chapter considers how
congressional committee member demographics, and not just the race of committee
chairs, may impact racially salient oversight. Kastellec (2013) shows that African
American members on appellate benches impact rulings on explicitly racial issues; it
stands to reason African American and Latino members on committees might affect
oversight on racially salient issues. To explore this question, I create a variable for the
count of African Americans and Latinos on standing committees from the 80th through
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the 110th Congresses, and using Policy Agendas Project data, examine how the
composition of committees shapes oversight activity on explicitly and implicitly racial
issues. I am interested in answering three questions. Do committees with more African
American and Latino members engage in higher levels of implicitly and explicitly racial
oversight? Are there differences when one differentiates between implicitly and
explicitly racial issues? Importantly, how did the increase in majority-minority and the
commensurate increase in African American and Latino legislators in the early 1990s
affect the oversight behavior of committees? More African Americans and Latinos on
committees and in the House might lead to increases in racially salient oversight by
committees. Conversely, having fewer Black and Latino constituents might lead white
legislators and committee chairs to focus less than before on racially salient issues.
I find that, prior to the 103rd Congress, African American members on committees
exerted influence only over whether or not committees held hearings on explicitly racial
issues occurred, but not whether they held implicitly racial issues. However, after the
103rd Congress, African Americans on committees greatly influenced the number of
implicitly racial hearings committees held, even when only Democratically-led Houses
are included. However, there was no concomitant change in the relationship between
African American members on committees and committees’ explicitly racial oversight.
This may reflect changes in focus by mostly white chairs. In any case, approaches to
racially salient oversight changed after redistricting. Further, the findings suggest that in
the case of oversight, the expectations of narrow representation are swapped over time:
African American committee members affected explicitly racial oversight occurrence in
the past, but more recently influenced the volume of implicitly racial hearings. Given the
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lack of attention to committee members’ races and their effect on oversight activity, this
approach constitutes a needed step forward for the literature.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY BUILDING
An exploration of the influences of legislator race on congressional
responsiveness to Blacks and Latinos is incomplete without an examination of activities
beyond roll call voting (e.g., Grose 2011; Minta 2011; Minta and Sinclair-Chapman
2013; Minta and Brown 2014). Grose (2011) emphasizes the importance of constituency
service and project delivery, along with roll call voting, as forms of substantive
representation. Where members of Congress have more control over activity, descriptive
representation will be more meaningful. African American members may not have much
control over the roll call agenda, but they do have control over their constituency service,
and as such the relevance of legislator race shows itself there, according to Grose. Minta
and Sinclair-Chapman (2013) also step away from voting but focus on oversight, and find
that increased racial diversity in the House as a whole, relative to the Senate, has
increased the number of hearings on explicitly and implicitly racial issues over time.
Minta (2011) delves even further into the oversight arena, finding that nonwhite
members of Congress contribute longer and more frequent comments at oversight
hearings than white members of Congress on both explicitly racial and social welfare
issues. In this work, Minta explores the content of a sample of 55 hearings supporting
racially salient interests during the 103rd, 104th, and 107th Congresses. Ellis and Wilson
(2013) cast a wider net for hearings addressing racially salient interests, examining
27,000 hearings over 30 years. They, like Minta and Sinclair-Chapman (2013), use the
Policy Agendas Project, examining civil rights issues, social welfare issues, and housing
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issues. Their focus is on whether behavior by committees on these issues varies
depending on the race of the committee chair, and they find that, indeed, committees with
African American and Latino chairs are more active on civil, social welfare, and housing
issues.
I approach oversight behavior differently. Specifically, I want to know whether
the presence of African American and Latino members on congressional committees
increases committee oversight of explicitly and implicitly racial issues. This approach
dives into committee demography over a longer time span than previous studies.
Kastellec (2013) shows that the presence of African American justices on appellate courts
affects those courts’ rulings on affirmative action—an explicitly racial issue. I examine
whether the same holds for congressional committee oversight, on not just explicitly
racial but also implicitly racial issues. It is reasonable to expect committee membership
demography to matter over and above demography of the entire Congress, and the race of
the chair. Since 1970s reforms, more authority has been granted to committees and
subcommittees, and chairs rely upon their members to continue their chairmanships (e.g.,
Smith and Deering 1984; Rohde 1991; Schickler, McGhee, and Sides 2003). More
generally, Karpowitz, Mendelberg, and Shaker (2012) show that participation by women
in group discussions—and their influence on outcomes devised by groups—is influenced
not just by the number of women but by the decision rule the group has to follow. This
suggests institutional contexts are important.
Secondly, I also attempt to isolate the influence of majority-minority districts on
racially salient oversight. The African American and Latino coalitions were much
smaller prior to redistricting plans to create more majority-minority districts following
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the 1990 census. This process was sparked by the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights
Act (Lublin 1997), which “require[d] the Department of Justice and the judiciary to
examine the effect of electoral laws, including redistricting plans, on minority vote
dilution” (Lublin 1997, 6). With the creation of “fifteen new black majority districts and
ten new Latino majority districts between 1990 and 1992” (Lublin 1997, 7), the number
of African American Members of Congress jumped from 27 in the 102nd Congress to 40
in the 103rd Congress (Lublin 1997, 24-25; Congressional Research Service 2013). The
change for Latinos was less dramatic, from 15 Latino members in the 102nd Congress to
20 in the 103rd Congress, but it still represents a larger jump in membership than the
steady increase that came in the years prior (Lublin 1999, 24-25; Wasniewski 2008).
The advent of more majority-minority districts constitutes a shock to Congress
and its committee system that can be used to assess how the influx of larger numbers of
African Americans and Latinos affected congressional oversight. This shock could lead
to more racially salient oversight activity. Minta and Sinclair-Chapman (2013) show that
more racially diverse membership in the House—without consideration for committee
members—meant more racially salient oversight. However, the opposite outcome is also
possible once one considers the role of committees rather than the entire House. The
committee system, even now but certainly in the 103rd Congress, was headed up by
mostly white committee chairs who largely no longer relied upon Black and Latino
voters. This could create insulation of white committee chairs from potential voter
pressure.
These possible positive or negative effects lead me to differentiate between
committee oversight activity before and after the 103rd Congress. Does having more
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African Americans and/or Latinos on committees impact both types of racially salient
oversight? Or does the effect of African American and Latino legislators on committees
differ when the calculus of white legislators is altered after redistricting? Lublin (1997)
worries majority-minority districts negatively impact congressional outputs. One cannot
fully understand how redistricting affected congressional outputs without also examining
committees. In total, my approach adds a new consideration for descriptive representation
and oversight by considering the race of committee members, continues the focus on both
explicitly and implicitly racial issues, and considers how committee oversight may have
changed after redistricting.
HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1
Ellis and Wilson (2013) find that committees with Latino and African American
chairs engage in more racially salient oversight. I predict this effect will remain even
after controlling for the number of African Americans and Latinos on committees.
Chairs rely upon members for their seats (e.g., Smith and Deering 1984; Rohde 1991;
Schickler, McGhee, and Sides 2003).
Hypothesis 2
Minta and Sinclair-Chapman (2013) find that higher percentages of minority
membership in the House led to concomitant increases in racially salient oversight in the
House. Therefore, higher percentages of Latinos and African Americans in Congress will
mean more explicitly and implicitly racial oversight by committees.
Hypothesis 3
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Relatedly, I predict more African American and Latino individuals in Congress,
due to increases in the number of majority-minority districts between the 102nd and 103rd
Congress, will shift racially salient oversight activity. That is, I believe oversight activity
will differ before and after the inauguration of the 103rd Congress. This test will help
confirm whether the change led to increased racially salient oversight (similar to
Hypothesis 1’s predictions), or decreased racially salient oversight due to reduced interest
in racial issues on the part of white legislators. As Black and Latino voters were removed
from white legislators’ districts, they may have had less incentive to be responsive to
racially salient interests.
Hypothesis 4
Finally, I predict that increased African American and Latino membership on
committees will show a significant, positive relationship with the number of committee
hearings held on explicitly and implicitly racial topics, and whether such oversight occurs
at all. This is based on the scholarship that descriptive representation matters for
substantive representation generally (e.g., Grose 2011; Minta 2011; Minta and SinclairChapman 2013; Minta and Brown 2014), and in oversight (e.g., Ellis and Wilson 2013;
Minta and Sinclair-Chapman 2013). However, Hypothesis 4 applies this idea to the
question of committee membership specifically.
DATA AND METHOD
Coding Race of Committee Members and Tabulating Racial Composition of Committees
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The key independent variable of interest is the number of African Americans and
Latinos on committees. I added member race to a dataset11 created from Charles
Stewart’s Congressional Data Page,12 using the Congressional Research Service’s
“African American Members of the United States Congress: 1870-2008” (2008) and
Wasniewski’s “Hispanic Americans in Congress 1822-2012” (2013). I looked up African
American and Latino members in those documents, and then created African American
and Latino dummy variables, using member identification numbers, to add to the dataset.
Then, I captured which committee memberships African American and Latino legislators
possessed, by creating indicator variables for each committee assignment held by African
American and Latino members. Tabulating these variables by Congress told me which
committees had African American and Latino members. From there, I was able to
calculate and record the number of African Americans and Latinos, by committee, by
Congress, for the 80th-110th Congresses. I stopped at the 110th Congress only because
that is where the authoritative Congressional Research Service document on African
American members of Congress ended.
Up to the 102nd Congress, the median number of African Americans on a
committee was 2, with a maximum of 7, and the median number of Latinos on a
committee was 1, with a maximum of 6. Including and after the 103rd Congress, the
median number of African Americans was 7, with a maximum of 11, and the median
number of Latinos was just 2, with a maximum of 9. Figures 1 and 2 track the percentage

Jason MacDonald’s committee member dataset takes congressional data from Charles Stewart’s
Congressional Data Page and adds committee number variables for members’ first, second, third, etc.
committee assignments, by member.
12 Garrison Nelson, Committees in the U.S. Congress, 1947-1992, [House/80-102]; Charles Stewart III and
Jonathan Woon. Congressional Committee Assignments, 103rd to 114th Congresses, 1993-2017: [House], [2/08/17]
11
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of committees with African American and Latino members over time. Figure 1 shows
that 100 percent of committees had at least one African American member by the 108th
Congress, and over 90 percent of committees had at least one African American member
by the 105th Congress. Latino membership on committees lagged behind that progress a
bit. Latinos were not on 100 percent of committees by the 110th Congress as African
Americans were, and did not reach membership on 90 percent of committees until the
108th Congress. This followed a major jump; before then, the highest percentage of
committees with Latino members was just over 80 percent in the 104th Congress. This
may affect the influence of Latinos on committees, relative African Americans.
Figure 1

Unit of Analysis and Committees Included
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The unit of analysis is the congressional-committee pair (e.g. 80th CongressAgriculture; 81st Congress-Armed Services), and there are 707 total observations. I
included standing committees, and select or special committees that later became
standing committees, unless a committee not fitting those parameters was chaired by an
African American or Latino. These additional committees beyond the list of standing
committees included Hunger, Aging, Intelligence, Narcotics, Assassinations, and Ethics.
I made this exception for committees chaired by African Americans and Latinos because
Figure 2

of Ellis and Wilson’s (2013) findings. One of my key questions is whether the racial
composition of the entire committee, rather than just the race of the chair, matters. By
adding more committees chaired by African Americans and Latinos to the sample, I am
giving the chair race variables a stronger chance to compete with committee membership.
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I did not code hearings by subcommittees or other committees. Table 1 lists the names of
committees included in the analysis.
Explicitly and Implicitly Racial Hearing Topics
Separate regressions are run for hearings on implicitly racial topics and for
hearings on explicitly racial topics. These topics and hearings were selected from the
Policy Agendas Project.13 Explicitly racial issues include general civil rights, racial
discrimination, voting rights, migrant policy, and immigration. Implicitly racial issues
include unemployment, unemployment insurance, health reform, health insurance,
children’s health insurance, labor unions, minimum wage, education for the
underprivileged, air pollution, indoor air pollution, infrastructure employment, prisons,
general social welfare, low-income assistance, community development, urban
development, rural housing, rural development, low-income housing, homelessness,
mortgages, small business, and disaster relief. This process left me with 77 explicitly
racial hearings and 460 implicitly racial hearings up through the 102nd Congress, and 67
explicitly racial hearings and 428 implicitly racial hearings after the 103rd Congress. The
overall oversight activity on racially salient issues is quite small, only 10 percent of all
oversight (9,967 hearings) conducted by the included committees. Importantly, I code
only for the topic area, to gather just the volume of such hearings. I do not code the
details of a given hearing or its policy direction, though this is an important area for
future research.

13

"The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D.
Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and
0111611, and are distributed through the Department of Government at the University of
Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any
responsibility for the analysis reported here."
118

Eighty-three Congress-committee pairs held hearings on explicitly racial issues,
with the number of hearings by committee on such issues ranging from 1 to a maximum
of 9. Two hundred and thirty-three Congress-committee pairs held hearings on implicitly
racial issues, with the number of hearings by committee on such issues ranging from 1 to
a maximum of 54.
Table 1: List of Committee Names Included in the Analysis
Agriculture

Government
Operations

Public Works

Appropriations

Government Reform

Public Works and
Transportation

Armed Services

Government Reform
and Oversight

Resources

Assassinations

Homeland Security

Rules

Astronautics and
Space Exploration

House Administration

Science

Banking and Currency House Oversight

Science and
Astronautics

Banking and Financial Hunger
Services

Science and
Technology

Banking, Finance, and Insular Affairs
Urban Affairs

Science, Space, and
Technology

Budget

Intelligence

Small Business

Commerce

Interior and Insular
Affairs

Standards of Official
Conduct

Congressional
Operations

Internal Security

Transportation and
Infrastructure

District of Columbia

International
Relations

Un-American
Activities
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Economic and
Educational
Opportunities

Interstate and Foreign
Commerce

Veterans’ Affairs

Education and Labor

Judiciary

Ways and Means

Education and the
Workforce

Merchant Marine and
Fisheries

Education and
Workforce

Narcotics Abuse and
Control

Energy and
Commerce

National Security

Ethics

Natural Resources

Expenditures in the
Executive
Departments

Oversight and
Government Reform

Financial Services

Post Office and Civil
Service

Foreign Affairs

Public Lands

Isolating Redistricting
I run separate regressions for explicitly and implicitly racial oversight, and,
importantly, within those issue areas, I run a full model for the 80th through 110th
Congresses, as well as models for the 80th through the 102nd Congresses, and the 103rd
through the 110th Congresses. This way, I can examine the influence of the predictors
before and after widespread creation of majority-minority districts, which significantly
increased numbers of African Americans and Latinos in Congress from the 103rd
Congress on. Chow tests confirm whether or not this separation is valid.
I run both logit and negative binomial analyses, to account for the impacts of
variables on some versus no racially salient oversight activity, and then the cumulative
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amount of such activity. The negative binomial model is better than poisson due to
overdispersion in the data, and Vuong tests indicated zero-inflated negative binomial
models are not preferred over negative binomial models in these analyses.
Other Independent Variables and Controls
I include African American and Latino chairmanship, obtained from “African
American Members of the United States Congress: 1870-2008” (Congressional Research
Service 2008) and “Hispanic Americans in Congress 1822-2012” (Wasniewski 2013) to
discover whether chairmanship or committee demographic composition is more
influential. I also include the percentage of combined Latino and African American
membership in the House. This variable is multiplied by 100. The largest number of
Latinos in a Congress from the 80th through 110th Congresses is 27, while the highest
number of African Americans in the House at any point in the dataset is 42. Because
Democrats might be anticipated to be more responsive on racially salient issues, I include
whether the House and presidency were controlled by Democrats, and also run the
models for Democratically-led Houses only.
Finally, I include the mean chamber ideology for each Congress, from Poole and
Rosenthal’s VoteView database. This is a House-level variable, included in Minta and
Sinclair-Chapman’s (2013) analysis. There is a possibility the House became more
liberal or conservative toward issues over time, which could affect oversight topics.
Committee-level ideology is also highly relevant and will be included in future research.
RESULTS
The results indicate that there are different factors at play for explicitly and
implicitly racial oversight, and before and after the 103rd Congress, especially for

121

implicitly racial issues. Tables 1a and 1b examine oversight of explicitly racial issues,
while tables 2a and 2b examine oversight of implicitly racial issues.
Consider explicitly racial oversight. Table 1a displays analyses for logit models
where the dependent variable is 0 for no hearings by a committee, and 1 for one or more
hearings. Column 2 considers the full models for each oversight type, while Columns 3
and 4 differentiate between the 80th through 102nd Congresses (Column 3) and the 103rd
through 110th Congresses (Column 4), to examine the potential influence of new
majority-minority districts after early 1990s redistricting. The full model shows that only
the number of African Americans on a committee, the presence of a Latino chair on a
committee, and a Democratically-controlled House are significant. As the second and
third models show, this is true only up to the 102nd Congress. Up to the 102nd Congress,
the addition of an African American member to a committee increases the log odds of a
committee’s engaging in explicitly racial oversight by 0.3152. That means with each
additional African American member on a committee, there is a 37 percent increase in
the likelihood of engaging in some explicitly racial oversight versus none. The effect of
having a Latino chair (but not an African American chair once African American
members are accounted for) is strong, with the log odds of committees engaging in
explicitly racial oversight increasing by 2.4787 when a chair is Latino.
However, this changes after the 103rd Congress, when only the percent African
American and Latino membership in the House is (marginally) significant, p=0.054.
When the transformation of the percentage African American and Latino membership
variable is accounted for, the results show that each 1 percent increase in their
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membership in the House creates a 0.92 percent increase in the likelihood of committees
engaging in explicitly racial oversight.
Table 1a: Oversight on Explicitly Racial Issues—Logit Analysis
Variables

# African
Americans on
Committee
# Latinos on
Committee
% Minority
Members in
Congress
African American
Chair
Latino
Chair
Democratic House
Democratic
President
Constant
Number of
observations
Log-Likelihood

Full Model; 80th110th Congresses

80th-102nd Congress
Model

0.1407*
(0.069)

0.3152*
(0.139)

103rd-110th
Congress
Model
0.1034
(0.085)

0.0759
(0.095)
0.0317
(0.032)

0.1484
(0.172)
0.0716
(0.118)

0.0035
(0.122)
0.6529^
(0.338)

0.6456
(0.395)
1.8371**
(0.536)
-0.6076*
(0.269)
-0.3332
(0.264)
-2.30***
(0.3)
707

0.3238
(0.502)
2.4787***
(0.672)
-1.3715*
(0.624)
0.0548
(0.391)
-2.37***
(0.370)
535

0.5095
(0.898)
0.1153
(1.262)
-0.1173
(0.5256)
0.2270
(0.6538)
-11.37*
(5.119)
172

-236.77***

-149.93**

-80.08

Note: The dependent variables are explicit hearings by committees (unit of analysis is the
committee-Congress pair), where 0=no hearings and 1=1 or more hearings. Entries are
log odds; standard errors are in parentheses.
***=p<0.001 **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05 ^=p<0.054
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Table 1b: Oversight on Explicitly Racial Issues—Negative Binomial Analysis
Variables

Full Model; 80th110th Congresses

103rd-110th
Congress
Model
0.1207
(0.088)

0.1185
(0.079)

0.2599
(0.159)

0.0027
(0.108)
0.0507
(0.032)

0.0656
(0.220)
-0.0476
(0.121)

-0.0924
(0.117)
0.9972**
(0.339)

0.7221
(0.425)
1.3875*
(0.693)
-0.6067
(0.274)
0.0126
(0.285)
-2.08***
(0.317)
707

0.5338
(0.563)
2.2421**
(0.868)
-0.4648
(0.561)
0.4577
(0.424)
-2.15***
(0.416)
535

0.3669
(0.871)
-0.7709
(1.444)
-0.1945
(0.531)
0.4387
(0.673)
-16.05**
(5.19)
172

-339.37**

-206.60

-121.88**

# African
Americans on
Committee
# Latinos on
Committee
% Minority
Members in
Congress
African American
Chair
Latino
Chair
Democratic House
Democratic
President
Constant
Number of
observations
Log-Likelihood

80th-102nd Congress
Model

Note: The dependent variables are explicit hearing counts by committees (unit of analysis
is the committee-Congress pair). Entries are logs of expected counts; standard errors are
in parentheses.
***=p<0.001 **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05

However, as Figure 3 demonstrates, the relationship between African American
committee members and explicitly racial oversight before redistricting is not very
noticeably different from that relationship after. A Chow test comparing the effect of the
number of African Americans on a committee upon the likelihood of explicitly racial
oversight for the two samples, before and after redistricting, has a p-value of 0.6997.
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Correspondingly, a difference of slope test for the effects of the variable in the two sets of
regressions, before and after redistricting, is 1.3, which is not significant for 703 degrees
of freedom (p=0.9030). This indicates there is no significant difference in the way the
number of African Americans on the committee affected explicitly racial oversight before
and after the 103rd Congress. The lack of significance of the log likelihood in the third
model also suggests the model for explicitly racial oversight after redistricting may be
missing other key influences upon explicitly racial oversight.
As a precaution, Appendix H examines whether having at least one African
American on a committee is what matters for explicitly racial oversight, rather than
increasing numbers of African Americans on committees. In no case, though, was a
dummy variable for the presence of an African American on a committee (or a dummy
variable for the presence of a Latino on a committee), rather than a count variable,
significant for whether committees held explicitly racial hearings.
Figure 3
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Another possible consideration for explicitly racial oversight occurrence is that
Republicans controlled Congress for much of the time after the 103rd Congress (all but
two sessions). Perhaps that explains the lack of influence by African American
committee members upon explicitly racial oversight after the 103rd Congress. Table 3a
shows that considering only Democratically-controlled Houses does not dramatically
change the findings for explicitly racial oversight, however. In addition, a difference of
slope test for the influence of African American committee members upon the occurrence
of explicitly racial oversight is 0.54, which is not significant at 534 degrees of freedom
(p=0.7053). Again, the log-likelihood suffers in the third model in table 3a, as does the
number of observations; a larger sample of Democratic Houses after redistricting is
needed to fully explore this question. In any case, while there is a relationship between
the number of African Americans on committees and the occurrence of explicitly racial
oversight in the pooled model, there is no significant difference in the influence of that
variable before and after the 103rd Congress.
Table 1b, containing negative binomial coefficients, shows that when considering
the count of explicitly racial oversight hearings, rather than whether or not some versus
no oversight happened, the findings are different: up through the 102nd Congress, only
Latino chairmanship, and not the number of African Americans on committees, has an
impact this time. After the 103rd Congress, the percentage African American and Latino
membership in the House remains influential and no longer marginal. With each 1
percent increase in the percentage African American and Latino membership in the
House, the expected number of explicitly racial hearings engaged in by committees goes
up 1.71 percent. After controlling for the number of African Americans on committees,
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African American chairmanship is still not significant, nor is the number of Latinos on
the committee, or whether the House and presidency are in Democratic control. It is
important to note, however, that the log-likelihood in the second model misses
significance. Clearly, there is still much to discover about what drives explicitly racial
oversight by committees; it is likely more committee-level variables are needed. The
difference between the binary logit and negative binomial findings may also be partially
due to the low count of explicitly racial hearings discussed earlier: the highest number of
explicitly racial hearings held by committees, by Congress, is just 9 for the whole dataset.
As for why an influx of new African American and Latino committee members
does not seem to have a large impact upon explicitly racial oversight, it is possible that
organization and focus on explicitly racial issues moved to a more chamber-wide
perspective, rather than committee-based. This may explain the influence of the percent
African American and Latino membership variable after redistricting. Moreover, it may
also be the case that committee chairs—still mostly white even now in the 115th
Congress—felt no reason to give explicitly racial issues special concern after their district
compositions changed. The lack of impact for Latino members on committees,
meanwhile, and continued influence of Latino chairs rather than African American
chairs, may be due to their lower numbers on committees, relative African Americans,
throughout the dataset (see Figures 1 and 2). Larger numbers of African Americans and
Latinos on committees may coincide with African American and Latino chairmanship.
Correspondingly, given the smaller numbers of Latinos, this may mean the influence of
African American members reduces the significance of African American chairs for
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racially salient oversight, but that there are not yet enough Latinos to reduce the
significance of Latino chairs.
What about implicitly racial oversight? First, consider the logit models in Table
2a. Here, there is a major difference after the 103rd Congress. Up to the 102nd Congress,
unlike explicitly racial oversight in the logit model, there is no impact for either the
number of African Americans or Latinos on committees—only Latino chairmanship has
an effect. However, after the 103rd Congress, in direct contrast to what happened with the
explicit model, there is now an impact for the number of African Americans on
committees and whether committees engage in implicitly racial oversight: as the number
of African Americans on committees increases, the likelihood of a committee engaging in
implicitly racial oversight increases by 48 percent.
The negative binomial model in Table 2b is more meaningful for implicitly than
explicitly racial hearings, because the highest count for implicitly racial oversight
hearings by a committee in the dataset is 54 (rather than 9 for explicitly racial oversight).
When hearing count is considered in Table 2b, there is still only an influence for the
number of African Americans on committees including and after the 103rd Congress.
This difference is much more striking than the difference redistricting causes for
explicitly racial issues (Chow test p<0.001; difference of slope test p=0.0036). Figures 4
and 5 show the dramatic difference the number of African American committee members
had upon the amount of implicitly racial hearings by committees before and after 1990s
redistricting. For the model that examines the 80th-102nd Congresses, increasing the
number of African American committee members has a very flat effect upon the number
of implicitly racial oversight hearings. For the 103rd through 110th Congresses, the effect
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of adding African American committee members increases the amount of implicitly
racial oversight by committees drastically. In addition, in table 2b, the log likelihood is
significant for all three models.
Table 2a: Oversight on Implicitly Racial Issues—Logit Analysis
Variables

# African
Americans on
Committee
# Latinos on
Committee
% Minority
Members in
Congress
African American
Chair
Latino Chair
Democratic House
Democratic
President
Constant
Number of
observations
Log-Likelihood

Full Model; 80th110th Congresses

80th-102nd Congress
Model

103rd-110th
Congress
Model
0.3941***
(0.087)

0.2353***
(0.056)

0.0871
(0.092)

-0.0411
(0.076)
-0.0235
(0.023)

-0.2037
(0.134)
-0.0329
(0.064)

0.0185
(0.104)
0.3147
(0.281)

0.1501
(0.296)
1.191*
(0.503)
-0.2334
(0.172)
-0.096
(0.172)
-0.78***
(0.193)
707

0.380
(0.329)
1.2038*
(0.585)
-0.0289
(0.316)
0.0133
(0.228)
-0.75**
(0.228)
535

-0.7094
(0.931)
0.8114
(1.265)
0.2131
(0.462)
-0.4772
(0.511)
-6.15
(4.3)
172

-433.38**

-324.36

-97.95***

Note: The dependent variables are implicit hearings by committees (unit of analysis is the
committee-Congress pair), where 0=no hearings and 1=1 or more hearings. Entries are
log odds; standard errors are in parentheses. ***=p<0.001 **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05 ^=p<0.054
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Table 2b: Oversight on Implicitly Racial Issues—Negative Binomial Analysis
Variables

# African
Americans on
Committee
# Latinos on
Committee
% Minority
Members in
Congress
African American
Chair
Latino Chair

Full Model; 80th110th Congresses

80th-102nd Congress
Model

103rd-110th
Congress
Model
0.4443***
(0.086)

0.2498***
(0.059)

0.0825
(0.103)

0.0634
(0.089)
-0.0144
(0.025)

-0.0326
(0.159)
-0.0152
(0.062)

0.1215
(0.114)
-0.0179
(0.244)

-0.0378
(0.312)
1.692**
(0.506)
-0.1711
(0.182)
-0.2899
(0.189)
-0.20
(0.214)
706

0.2104
(0.348)
1.5757**
(0.601)
0.0139
(0.318)
-0.2577
(0.252)
-0.19
(0.255)
535

-1.222
(0.855)
0.9466
(1.011)
0.0468
(0.415)
-0.8736
(0.481)
-0.72
(3.65)
171

Democratic House
Democratic
President
Constant

Number of
observations
Log-Likelihood
-892.30***
-611.59*
-271.46***
Note: The dependent variables are implicit hearing counts by committees (unit of analysis
is the committee-Congress pair). Entries are logs of expected counts; standard errors are
in parentheses.
***=p<0.001 **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05
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Figure 4

Figure 5
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Undoubtedly, however, there are other drivers of committee oversight. Appendix
I considers one possible such factor, chamber ideology, and shows that while there is a
role for ideology, its inclusion in the model does not change the previous findings. It is
important to note that ideology does not go in the negative direction one might expect
where it is significant (just as having a Democratic House did not go in the positive
direction one might expect in the earlier models). This might be due to other controls, or
the lack of coding on hearing topics as opposed to volume—conservatives can engage in
racial oversight, too, just in ways liberals might find problematic. Perhaps conservativedominated Houses after redistricting held a lot of implicitly racial oversight to tear down
liberal programs, and this just happened to coincide with larger numbers of African
Americans on committees. Table 3b, however, shows that the influence of African
Americans on committees on the volume of implicitly racial oversight remains even
when only Democratic Houses are included in the analysis—the relationship is not just
there because only volume, rather than substance, was considered. All this said,
committee-level variables need to be considered in future research. Because members
aim for committee placements based on the work committees do, other models should
isolate the role of committee type, with clustered standard errors, and with committeelevel ideology.
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Table 3a. Democratic Majorities Only: Oversight on Explicitly Racial Issues—Logit
Analysis
Variables

# African
Americans on
Committee
# Latinos on
Committee
% Minority
Members in
Congress
African American
Chair
Latino Chair
Constant

Full Model; 80th110th Congresses

80th-102nd Congress
Model

0.1787^
(0.092)

0.2713^
(0.139)

103rd-110th
Congress
Model
0.1667
(0.134)

0.2066
(0.133)
0.0239
(0.050)

0.1951
(0.169)
-0.0358
(0.079)

0.2131
(0.247)
0.2356
(0.346)

0.6136
(0.416)
1.7526**
(0.559)
-3.06***
(0.297)
538

0.4924
(0.503)
2.5046***
(0.667)
-2.92***
(0.361)
493

0.6744
(0.931)
-0.0467
(1.282)
-5.92
(5.071)
45

Number of
observations
Log-Likelihood
-154.30***
-129.25**
-22.77
Note: The dependent variables are explicit and implicit hearings by committees (unit of
analysis is the committee-Congress pair), where 0=no hearings and 1=1 or more hearings.
Entries are log odds; standard errors are in parentheses.
***=p<0.001 **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05 ^=p<0.054
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Table 3b. Democratic Majorities Only: Oversight on Implicitly Racial Issues—Negative
Binomial Analysis
Variables

# African
Americans on
Committee
# Latinos on
Committee
% Minority
Members in
Congress
African American
Chair
Latino Chair
Constant
Number of
observations
Log-Likelihood

Full Model; 80th110th Congresses

80th-102nd Congress
Model

0.1345^
(0.070)

-0.0006
(0.102)

103rd-110th
Congress
Model
0.3964**
(0.118)

-0.0017
(0.125)
0.0472
(0.034)

0.0315
(0.159)
0.0552
(0.044)

0.0703
(0.209)
0.5086^^
(0.279)

0.0617
(0.307)
1.6251**
(0.507)
-0.69***
(0.170)
538

0.2876
(0.345)
1.444*
(0.595)
-0.64**
(0.198)
493

-1.2699
(0.792)
0.9491
(0.905)
-8.56*
(4.156)
45

-632.72***

-545.78*

-80.52*

Note: The dependent variables are explicit and implicit hearing counts by committees
(unit of analysis is the committee-Congress pair). Entries are logs of expected counts;
standard errors are in parentheses.
***=p<0.001 **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05 ^=p<0.06 ^^=p<0.07

Certainly, these findings complicate things for the theory of narrow
representation. The theory appears to hold as described up to the 103rd Congress only.
African American membership on committees did not affect implicitly racial oversight up
to that point. However, with the growth of African American and Latino members in
Congress as a whole after the 103rd Congress, increasing numbers of African Americans
on committees greatly influenced implicitly racial oversight. African American
committee membership has no such striking change in influence on explicitly racial
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oversight after the 103rd Congress, but overall African American and Latino membership
in the House does become significant for explicitly racial oversight after redistricting. As
Karpowitz, Mendelberg, and Shaker (2012) argue is true for women, institutional context
and rules matter for the way African American participation affects outcomes. There is
evidence here that the influx of African Americans at the committee level benefitted the
volume of committee-level oversight for implicitly racial issues much more than it did for
explicitly racial oversight.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The following statements about oversight are bolstered by the findings above:
committee membership, not just chairmanship, matters. Committee composition, not just
House composition, matters. Whether issues are implicitly or explicitly racial matters.
Increased numbers of African Americans on committees and African Americans and
Latinos in the House mattered differently after the 103rd Congress, meaning redistricting
mattered. At least for oversight, there seems to remain some role for descriptive
representation, but its influence and impact varies.
Future research can further isolate the impact of redistricting. First, the influence
of redistricting also requires an examination of Senate oversight. Senate redistricting
obviously did not occur, and even now the Senate is much more white than the House.
As such, an examination of whether or not Senate oversight and its drivers changed
before and after the 103rd Congress may provide insight. Second, the approach taken
here ought to be taken with subcommittee oversight as well, as a great deal of oversight
occurs outside standing committees. Third, I do not consider the effect of committee
type. Given legislators deliberately choose committees based on their legislative goals

135

(Fenno 1973), it is plain some committees will engage in more racially salient oversight
than others, and that prospective committee members know this going in and request
certain committee assignments accordingly. Therefore, this is a key factor this analysis
ignores. Finally, while this chapter focuses on the volume of explicitly and implicitly
racial oversight, content of these hearings should be coded as well, in future projects.
However, this chapter has moved beyond the impact of African Americans and
Latinos in the House and serving as chairs for oversight, to consider the impact of
committee composition. Increased numbers of African Americans on committees
appeared to be advantageous for whether or not committees conducted explicitly racial
oversight, particularly up to the 103rd Congress. After the 103rd Congress, increased
numbers of African Americans on committees dramatically increased the amount of
implicitly racial oversight that committees conducted. There was no concomitant
increase in the effect of the numbers of African Americans on committees for the
occurrence of explicitly racial oversight, however. African Americans and Latinos
working within House leadership structures can make a difference. What that difference
looks like will vary over time, and the change may be limited by changing goals of other
members, but is still important for racially salient oversight.
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CHAPTER FIVE—CONCLUSION
This project explored representation from many angles, with the goal of better
understanding the dynamics of Black and Latino disadvantage in representation. If
representational disadvantage is uneven, worse in some areas than in others, it is
important to identify this problem so that it can be better understood and resolved. Is
representation “narrow?” Does the government better match Black and Latino interests
on explicitly over implicitly racial issues? The findings here suggest the answer to this
question is not a simple “yes” or “no,” at least not in every possible representational
context. However, there are signs that the level of racialization is very important for
representation.
Chapter 3 indicated narrowness in legislator voting and sponsorship, and Chapter
4 suggested its possible relevance for committee oversight, especially before the 103rd
Congress. Chapter 2 showed government stasis when Blacks and Latinos desired change
on implicitly racial issues, and when whites desired change on explicitly racial issues.
Stasis in government is no big surprise (e.g., Baumgartner and Jones 1993). However,
considering Gilens’s (2012) findings for the driving role of high-income opinion for
government responsiveness on a wide variety issues, and Griffin and Newman’s (2008)
findings for the similar role of race for responsiveness on racially salient issues, it is
somewhat surprising that neither of these seems to matter when the type of racialized
representation is brought into better focus. Moreover, one of the underlying concerns
here is that narrowness might help lead to particularly poor representation of low-income
Blacks and Latinos, and the opinion research presented here indicates this may be the
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case. Income may matter less as an opinion driver among Latinos and especially Blacks
compared to whites, but it still matters.
This project explored opinion by race and income, multiple policy dimensions,
and four kinds of representation—aggregate government outputs, legislator voting,
legislator sponsorship, and committee oversight. This broadness gives the findings
implications in multiple subfields. What follows is a summary of the contributions and
limitations of each chapter, and potential next steps. “Narrow representation” is far from
settled, but there is ample evidence the question is relevant and worth more exploration.
CHAPTER 2
Contributions to the Literature—Approach and Findings
In Chapter 2, my approach contributes to the racial and ethnic politics and
representation literatures in two main ways. First, I investigated the intersectional
contributions of racial identity and income level and their impacts upon opinions on
implicitly versus explicitly racial issues. Though opinion differences due to race (e.g.
Dawson 1995), race and issue nature (e.g. Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Kinder and Winter
2001; Sanchez 2006; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2007; White 2007), and income
(e.g., Gilens) are well-documented, sample size issues plague attempts to examine Black
and Latino opinion at the intersection of income, despite recognition that intersectional
identity is important (e.g., Strolovitch 2007).
Second, I examined how well government responds to opinions of Blacks and
Latinos at different income levels, as evidenced by its implicitly and explicitly racial
outputs. Though Griffin and Newman (2008) studied how well government responds to
Blacks and Latinos, they do not differentiate opinion by income, or between different
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types of racially salient issues. Finally, their approach to measuring opinion and
responsiveness focuses on desired spending levels in existing policy areas, while I
examine opinion and responsiveness on policy action or inaction.
The findings in Chapter 2 contribute to the literature as well, both in terms of
opinion and representation. When it comes to opinion, as I argued, racialization of
opinion—the opinion differences between African Americans and whites, and Latinos
and whites—can be conceived as falling along a continuum, from nonracial to slightly
racialized on implicitly racial issues to highly racialized on certain explicitly racial issues.
Opinion among Blacks and Latinos, and among whites, is nuanced and varied, even when
all issues are arguably racially salient. While generally explicitly racial issues cause the
biggest differences, as expected, there are some cases where opinion differences by race
on implicitly racial issues are just as large as those on explicitly racial issues. For
example, while Latinos and whites see the idea of ending automatic birthright citizenship
very differently, they are just as split on keeping or repealing the Affordable Care Act. In
addition, the splits between Latinos and whites tend to be different than those among
African Americans and whites, with more issues having little to no difference between
Latinos and whites than for African Americans compared to whites.
When it comes to income, low-income individuals of any race tended to view
implicitly racial issues more similarly than they did explicitly racial issues, which aligns
with what a reader of Gilens (2012) would expect, and to be closer to one another on
implicitly racial issues than high-income individuals of different races were, which aligns
with what a reader of Dawson (1995) would expect. Further, as Dawson (1995) argued,
income matters less among African Americans and Latinos than it does among whites.
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For whites, on implicitly racial issues, income causes significant differences in opinion
among low-income and high-income individuals on almost every issue examined. For
African Americans and Latinos, there are many fewer significant differences by income.
However, and this is important, there actually are significant opinion differences
by income among both African Americans and Latinos, and unlike opinions among
whites, they are less predictable by level of racial salience. Whites tend to be united in
race, over income, on explicitly racial issues, and united by income, over race, on
implicitly racial issues. Income differences among African Americans, on the other
hand, caused opinion splits on implicitly racial issues like trade policy, health care policy,
and tax policy, but also explicitly racial issues like affirmative action and permitting
undocumented immigrants in the U.S. to use public schools and emergency rooms.
Latinos exhibited still more differences by income compared to African Americans
(though still less than whites), on implicitly racial issues (minimum wage, Iraq
withdrawal, CAFTA, CHIP, TARP), but also explicitly racial issues (amnesty, border
patrols, and permitting police to question anyone they suspect of being in the U.S.
illegally).
These findings underline the importance of more in-depth surveys and studies on
racial group opinion to better investigate and understand these nuances. Much of what we
know about income and its relationship to opinion applies largely to white opinion. For
example, when Gilens (2012) finds dramatic difference by income, he finds those
differences among whites. With this, and my findings, it follows that when he finds that
government responds better to high-income citizens, it means that government responds
better to high-income white citizens, not all high-income citizens.
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The lack of significant findings in the representation analysis does not support my
theory, but it goes against other findings in the literature. “Narrow representation”
expected more similarity between Black and Latino opinion and government outputs on
explicitly versus implicitly racial issues. While the representation results in chapter 2 do
not conform to the expectations of narrow representation, neither do they conform to the
expectations of Gilens (2012) or Griffin and Newman (2008). On racially salient issues,
opinions of high-income individuals did not seem to drive government outputs, as they
did for many issues examined by Gilens (2012). Further, opinions of Black and Latino
individuals did not drive government outputs on any racially salient issues in the dataset,
counter to what Griffin and Newman (2008) found. That said, white opinion also did not
have a relationship with government outputs. Theories of representation might rightly
expect some form of majoritarianism or pluralism, but neither seemed to be on display in
these policy areas.
The maintenance of the status quo may be the real story here. While Blacks and
Latinos desired change more on implicitly racial issues than whites did, and whites
desired change more on explicitly racial issues than Blacks and Latinos did, desires for
change were rarely met with action. Congress has not been very active on any issues
during the timeline examined here. However, even where desired change did occur, on
health care, for example, or TARP, the relationship with racial group preferences or racial
group/income preferences was not strong enough to emerge significant. Is representation
on racially salient issues due to something else? Is it happenstance?
Limitations/Avenues for Future Research
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The findings in the representation section, in particular, are heavily limited by the
timeframe. Opinions are examined only from 2006 (when the CCES dataset became
available) through 2012 (to allow time for government response), while responses are
examined only from 2006 to 2016. Datasets do not permit an exploration before 2006,
but future CCES datasets, as well as others that provide large enough samples by race to
examine intersectional identities, can provide material for studying government
responsiveness beyond 2016. In addition, and relatedly, the examination of racially
salient issues is highly limited, to only 48 total in the dataset. Again, this is unavoidable
at this time due to the availability of data, but it means any findings cannot be taken as
sweeping or wholly conclusive. A survey with many more racially salient issues over
longer periods would be particularly helpful for investigating these questions more
thoroughly.
In addition, when examining opinions, this chapter considers only African
Americans and Latinos, and only income as a second form of potential opinion difference
beyond race. Other racial groups ought to be considered, though examining them is still
further limited by the availability of data. Other intersectional identities, however, could
be examined with the data used in this chapter. For example, are there differences
between African American men and women? High-income and low-income men? How
does the level of education among Latinos complicate the influence of income? What
about the type of job? Marital status? The same approach used to impute opinion by
income and race descended from Gilens (2012) and used here can also be applied to these
very interesting questions. Lastly, the chapter focused mainly on congressional behavior.
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Deeper focus on executive branch outputs and court opinions, and qualitative work in the
manner of Kingdon (1973) are other promising areas for exploration with this lens.
CHAPTER 3
Contributions to the Literature—Approach and Findings
Chapter 2 considers aggregate government outputs. Chapter 3 moves on to
explore what drives individual legislator behavior on explicitly and implicitly racial
issues, considering both roll call voting and sponsorship. In addition, it attempts to apply
the debate over the either positive (e.g. Tate 2003; Banducci et al 2004; Grose 2011;
Minta and Sinclair Chapman 2013) or “perverse” (e.g. Swain 1995; Lublin 1997; Lublin
and Voss 2003) effects of ensured descriptive representation for substantive
representation on implicitly and explicitly racial issues.
In the past, in studying this question, scholars have tended to focus on racially
salient (e.g., Minta and Sinclair Chapman 2013) or simply liberal-leaning issues as a
whole (e.g., Lublin 1997), rather than looking for any differentiation between explicitly
and implicitly racial issues. In addition, they have not focused on low-income African
Americans and Latinos, though one of Swain’s (1995) central concerns is that even
African American and Latino members of Congress represent the economically affluent
more than the economically disadvantaged. Therefore, broaching these questions in not
just one but two ways, roll call voting and sponsorship, constitutes a step forward.
Beyond the question asked in the chapter, the findings also contribute to the
literature. I examined the only two implicitly racial issues in the dataset where 1) the
majority of low-income African Americans’ and Latinos’ opinions differed from other
majority opinions and 2) Congress took the issue all the way to a vote. Overwhelmingly,
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the explanation for legislator vote was not legislator race, or the number of African
Americans and Latinos in a district, or the median income of African Americans and
Latinos in a district. Instead, the strongest significant relationships were legislator
ideology and party. Democrats and liberals were much more likely to support both lowincome African Americans’ and Latinos’ views than were Republicans and
conservatives. This certainly supports the narrow representation idea that legislator race
may not be as meaningful an explanation for behavior on implicitly racial issues.
Interestingly, there was some evidence that the exception to the rule might be
conservative/Republican Latinos. Republican Latinos were much more likely to support
TARP, a policy favored by low-income Latinos, than white Republicans. Republican
Latinos were a tiny subset of the 108th Congress, but as their numbers continue to grow,
the possible differential activation of race for conservative members of Congress on
implicitly racial issues may be important to look for.
Narrow representation also held in the sponsorship analysis. Party, not legislator
race, determined whether members of Congress were differently active in sponsoring Iraq
withdrawal legislation, the implicitly racial issue. However, on the explicitly racial issue,
immigration, though party still mattered, race played an important role in determining
whether members sponsored legislation. Latino Democrats were more active in
sponsoring “openness to immigration” legislation than other Democrats, and Latino
Republicans were less active in sponsoring “closed to immigration” legislation than white
Republicans. Interestingly, though amnesty was favored at much higher rates among
African Americans than whites, African American Democrats did not exhibit differently
active behavior in sponsorship on “openness to immigration” legislation than white
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Democrats. This set of findings supports the idea that representation may be narrow even
among African American and Latino members of Congress, focused on explicitly racial
issues that affect their groups, more than explicitly racial issues that affect other groups,
and more than implicitly racial issues.
Just as district African American and Latino median income did not seem to
impact legislator vote in the first analysis, district median income did not seem to impact
legislator sponsorship. In fact, legislators active on both of these issues came from more,
not less, affluent districts. While this certainly holds with the idea of narrow
representation, and that low-income African Americans and Latinos are particularly
disadvantaged, even where representation is intended (e.g., Strolovitch 2007), the
explanation for this finding may lie in the symbolic politics literature (e.g., Sears et al
1979).
In total, the findings in this chapter do not mean majority-minority districts or
descriptive representation are unimportant for substantive representation. On the
contrary, the sponsorship analysis shows that for explicitly racial issues, at least, the race
of the member of Congress may be powerful for determining substantive representation.
In addition, there is some evidence that conservative Latinos may behave differently than
other Republicans, both in how they voted and their lack of behavior in sponsorship of
certain legislation, compared to other Republicans. However, there are indications that
legislator race matters differently for explicitly and implicitly racial issues, and voting
and sponsorship behavior. This suggests scholars are right to hunt for positive impacts of
descriptive representation beyond voting (e.g. Grose 2011) but that the natures of
potentially substantive issues deserve exploration as well.

145

Limitations/Avenues for Future Research
Chapter 3 has a number of limitations. First, it assumes Black and Latino
opinions at the national level hold at the district level. This may or may not be true. Data
limitations required this assumption, and it is weak in the ways discussed in chapter 3.
However, a dataset that sampled enough Blacks and Latinos at the state and/or district
level to impute opinions by race and income would constitute a significant improvement
for measuring opinion.
Second, chapter 3 examines only two implicitly racial issues in the voting analysis
(and no explicitly racial issues in the voting analysis), and just one implicitly racial and
one explicitly racial issue in the sponsorship analysis. Again, this was partly due to data
limitations, and partly due to congressional inactivity. Using the CCES was necessary,
and on the CCES there were truly only two implicitly racial issues where low-income
African American and low-income Latino opinion met a majority threshold where other
opinions did not, and where Congress took a vote. Given the uniqueness of these two
votes, I believe it is fair to say they may tell us more about representation of low-income
Blacks and Latinos than first glance suggests. However, I do not believe that voting
“yes” on TARP is the best or only way to support low-income Latinos, or that those two
votes tell us everything we need to know about responsiveness to low-income opinion.
Also problematically, the CCES did not provide a “don’t know” option to respondents on
these two roll call vote issues, and thus responses may not tell us much about what lowincome Blacks and Latinos really desired.
Similarly, a complete exploration of descriptive representation’s impacts on
implicitly and explicitly racial issues would require comparing more than sponsorship
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behavior on Iraq withdrawal and immigration. These were weighty and important issues
for the time frame examined, and particularly supported by low-income individuals
compared to other issues in the dataset. However, they could not possibly tell us
everything we need to know about sponsorship behavior as it applies to racially salient
issues.
These limitations, however, also suggest how to move forward. To better
investigate the possibility of narrow representation, a survey that permits imputation of
Black, Latino, and low-income opinion at the district and state level is required. More
votes and more issues need to be examined. Longer term, much of this requires new
data, but in the shorter term, sponsorship behavior at least seems rife for more in depth
exploration across a number of issues.
CHAPTER 4
Contributions to the Literature—Approach and Findings
Chapter 4 moves to another form of representation, committee oversight. The
consideration of oversight further extends the work’s response to scholars like Grose
(2011) who recommend examining more than roll call votes to understand the influence
of descriptive representation upon substantive representation. I examine the impact of
committee members’ race upon committee racially salient oversight. Importantly, this
has not been done. Minta and Sinclair-Chapman (2013) consider the influence of overall
nonwhite membership in the House. Minta (2011) examined participation frequency of
nonwhite committee members and length of nonwhite committee members’ comments at
hearings, for a sample of hearings during three Congresses. Ellis and Wilson (2013)
study the impact of African American and Latino committee chairs upon racially salient
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oversight. The findings for all three of these works suggest a positive relationship
between nonwhite members and racially salient oversight. However, they do not
consider diversity of committee membership. Given Kastellac’s (2013) finding—that
African American justice membership on appellate benches influences rulings on
affirmative action—it seems plausible that the race of committee members, not just the
race of the chair, may be important. Chairs depend upon other members to keep their
positions (e.g., Smith and Deering 1984; Rohde 1991; Schickler, McGhee, and Sides
2003). To my knowledge, no other dataset is available that tracks the number of African
Americans and Latinos on committees, by committee. My work makes this information
available for standing committees from the 80th through 110th Congresses.
In addition, while other scholars consider different types of racial salience (Minta
2011; Ellis and Wilson 2013; Minta and Sinclair Chapman 2013), both implicit and
explicit, this potential distinction is not a central focus. Relatedly, while Minta and
Sinclair-Chapman (2013) examine the influence of increased House diversity over time,
they and the other antecedents to my work do not focus upon changes that may have
occurred after the members of the 103rd Congress were sworn in. The 103rd Congress
was more diverse than the 102nd, thanks to the advent of many more majority-minority
districts (e.g., Lublin 1997). My approach also contributes to the literature in these ways.
When it comes to findings in Chapter 4, there is much left to consider. However,
it appears committee membership—not just chairmanships or House diversity—impact
racially salient oversight. In addition, the advent of majority-minority districts impacted
how these factors affected racially salient oversight. Before the 103rd Congress, narrow
representation held: increasing African American membership on committees affected

148

whether committees engaged in explicitly racial oversight, but not implicitly racial
oversight. After the 103rd Congress, however, increased numbers of African Americans
on committees greatly increased committees’ volume of implicitly racial oversight, and
no such increase followed for explicitly racial oversight. The implicit/explicit distinction
remains important in the oversight arena, though not exactly as expected.
Limitations/Avenues for Future Research
Committee composition beyond the 110th Congress must be considered. I relied
upon Congressional Research Service and historical reports to note member race, and
these concluded at the 110th Congress. While noting member race beyond that
information might be more time-consuming, it is certainly needed and doable to examine
this question more fully. Another reason investigating beyond the 110th Congress is
crucial is because the presence of an African American president might have affected
racially salient committee oversight in positive or negative ways (Tesler 2010).
I also considered only full committees, and much oversight is conducted at the
subcommittee level. Studying this question beyond full committees would, again, mean a
significant amount of work with data to note racial membership by subcommittee, but it
is necessary. Similarly, I looked only for the volume of racially salient oversight, not the
content of hearings. Diving into the nature of each hearing would, again, take much more
work, but Chapter 3’s sponsorship analysis shows the importance of considering what
kind of racially salient representation is happening, not just whether it occurs at all. This
approach might explain the odd finding that the likelihood of racially salient oversight’s
occurrence and volume tended to decrease when the House was Democratic/liberal.
Relatedly, we know members of Congress pursue committee assignments based in part
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on their policy goals (Fenno 1973). Undoubtedly, then, African American and Latino
members select committees they believe are likely to pursue racially salient oversight. I
do not consider the influence of committee type, but more work to do so is sorely needed.
Finally, to better ascertain the influence of majority-minority districts, diversity in
lawmaking bodies, and how both or either may have affected the behavior of mostly
white committee chairs, this same approach should be taken with the Senate. If, for
example, explicitly racial oversight increased at the committee level past the 102nd
Congress in the Senate, it suggests that majority-minority districts were actually not
helpful for this type of oversight in the House. Therefore, to better understand the
positive negative impacts of majority-minority districts and their application to oversight,
the Senate requires examination.
CONCLUSION
This project considers representational disadvantage through the lenses of
implicitly and explicitly racial issues and intersectional identity. In doing so, it improves
upon findings in the inequality, racial and ethnic politics, public policy, and
representation literatures. I considered the simultaneous influence of intersectional
identities such as income and race upon opinion, the levels of racialization for racially
salient issues, opinion racialization and its influence upon government outputs, the role of
low-income opinion for legislator voting and sponsorship, racialization and oversight,
and redistricting and oversight. My findings demonstrate the importance of intersectional
identity and racialization for representation and policy outcomes.
Better data is required to cross many hurdles central to a full answer to the
question of narrow representation. However, there are several steps possible in the short
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term—imputing opinion by other intersectional identities, considering other racial
groups’ opinions and how they differ by income (or not), examining more sponsorship on
implicitly and explicitly racial issues, and comparing Senate oversight on racially salient
issues to House oversight. Longer term, with additional surveys of larger samples of all
racial groups, and qualitative work with staff and representatives to understand their
perspective on these issues, the research possibilities are even more promising.
Beyond its promise for future research, this project stands on its own as a
contribution to multiple literatures. It demonstrates that opinions among our most
disadvantaged citizens differ from others’ opinions, and provides evidence of reduced
government representation on implicitly and explicitly racial issues in multiple contexts.
Representational disadvantage is not new, but deriving some of its underlying causes in a
systematic way has the potential to bring us to a better understanding of it, and how we
can change it.
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APPENDIX A
These policy areas were included as candidates for implicitly racial issues. This section
explains why these policy areas are substantively important for Blacks and Latinos and,
as such, were included in the dataset.
Gun control—African Americans are at increased risk of gun deaths compared to
whites.14
Climate change and related bills—Studies show a link between climate change and
increased air pollution, which affects respiratory issues like asthma. African Americans
have the highest rates of asthma among racial and ethnic groups.15
Abortion—Abortion rates are higher among Black and Latino women, so threats to
abortion access are potentially substantively important.16
Ryan Bill—cuts to Medicare/Medicaid—The Ryan Bill included cuts to Medicare and
Medicaid. Medicare is available to all members of the population at age 65 regardless of
race; however, as access to insurance and health care generally continues to be reduced
for Blacks and Latinos, Medicare is particularly important for nonwhite Americans 65
and older.17 As for Medicaid, 1 in 4 minorities use Medicaid, and fewer than 1 in 8
whites do.18
Simpson Bowles Budget Plan—cuts to Social Security—The Simpson Bowles budget
plan included cuts to Social Security. Although Americans of all races receive Social
Security at retirement age, nonwhite retirees are more likely to have Social Security as
their only source of retirement income.19

14

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-memos/posts/2015/12/15-guns-racedifferent-worlds-reeves;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/19/the-racial-divide-inamericas-gun-deaths/
15 http://www.cdc.gov/VitalSigns/Asthma/index.html
16 https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/11/3/gpr110302.html
17 http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/24/2/365.full
18 http://khn.org/news/minorities-would-be-hard-hit-by-medicaid-cuts-study-warns/
19 http://www.aarp.org/work/social-security/info-11-2012/social-security-a-keyretirement-income-source-for-older-minorities-AARP-ppi-econ-sec.html
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Birth control insurance exemptions—Black and Latino women lack access to birth
control at higher rates than whites.20 Therefore, providing exemptions to companies that
do not wish to cover birth control can impact Black and Latino women.
ACA, comprehensive health care—The ACA aims to improve access to health
insurance.21 Attempts to repeal it, then, are potentially substantively important to Blacks
and Latinos.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act—While this legislation attempted to alleviate a
variety of economic problems, some provisions were potentially particularly important to
Blacks and Latinos These include job training programs and business loans.22
Renewal of CHIP—CHIP provides health coverage for more than half of Latino and
African American children, compared to one quarter of white children.23
Troubled Asset Relief Program/federal assistance for housing crisis/financial reform—
the subprime mortgage crisis which triggered TARP had special concern for African
Americans and Latinos. Banks may see them as a bad risk, meaning that these
individuals are more likely to have high cost loans as their only option.24
Privatization of Social Security—privatization of Social Security could be seen as
endangering the most important source of income for Black and Latino elderly.25
Minimum wage—Blacks and Latinos are overrepresented at lowest wage levels.26
Central American Free Trade Agreement—Unions tend to oppose free trade agreements,
and Blacks and Latinos are disproportionately represented in unions.27
Tax policy—Tax breaks and cuts do not tend to benefit Blacks and Latinos to the degree
that they do whites.28 However, the two tax cut laws presented here differ dramatically in
20

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2835625/
http://ldihealtheconomist.com/he0000107.shtml
22 http://www.cbcfinc.org/old-site/images/pdf/CBCF-ARRA_report09-PDF2.pdf
23 http://kff.org/report-section/the-impact-of-the-childrens-health-insurance-programchip-issue-brief/
24 http://www.citylab.com/housing/2013/08/blacks-really-were-targeted-bogus-loansduring-housing-boom/6559/
25 http://www.aarp.org/work/social-security/info-11-2012/social-security-a-keyretirement-income-source-for-older-minorities-AARP-ppi-econ-sec.html
26 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/upshot/minimum-wage.html
27 http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm;
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/nyregion/new-york-citys-unionized-workers-aremostly-minorities-a-study-shows.html
28 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/18/how-the-u-s-taxsystem-disadvantages-racial-minorities/
21
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that the Tax Hike Prevention Act prevents tax hikes for the very wealthy and the Middle
Class Tax Cut Act preserves tax cuts for, obviously, the middle class. These distinctions
could cause dramatic differences in opinion, but tax policy is highly relevant.
Iraq withdrawal—Rep. Charles Rangel argued the Iraq War was a “death tax” on African
Americans and the poor. Though there is evidence against there being higher proportions
of Blacks and Latinos than whites dying in Iraq or serving on the front lines, the raising
of this issue and its truth in other wars, such as Vietnam, means this issue may continue
to be of importance to Blacks and Latinos.
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APPENDIX B
The sample of CCES questions included the following questions below (Ansolabehere).
Following Gilens (2012), generally, if policy change occurred within 4 years, outcome=1,
and if not, outcome=0. However, if the question specified a tighter timeline than four
years, I noted this, and if the change did not occur within that timeframe, outcome=0.
I also adopted Gilens’s use of “switcher” variables (quote from Representational
Inequality Data Coding sheet available on the Russell Sage Foundation website):
For most survey questions, “support” or “favor” means support for a proposed
change in the status quo. For these questions, switcher=0. But if the question
asks about support (or “favor”) for current policy or support for a change that has
already occurred, switcher=1.
The critical thing is that the survey answer of “favor” or support must mean favor
a change if switcher=0 and must mean favor the status quo if switcher=1.
This coding scheme was helpful for use with questions about policies that had already
been passed, and differentiating between not just support and opposition but rather policy
change and the status quo.
Implicitly racial
Minimum wage 1:
“As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently $5.15 an hour. Do you favor
or oppose raising the minimum wage to $7.25 an hour over the next two years, or not?”
(2006)
Respondents indicated whether they favored or opposed raising the minimum wage from
$5.15 an hour to $7.25 an hour, with no timeline indicated (2008).
Minimum wage 2:
“Congress considered a proposal to increase the federal minimum wage from $5.15 to
$6.25 within the next year and a half. Some politicians argue that the wage should be
increased because it hasn’t changed since 1997 and many workers still live in poverty.
Other politicians argue that raising the wage might force small businesses to cut jobs and
would hurt the economy. What do you think? If you were faced with this decision, would
you vote for or against increasing the minimum wage?” (2006).
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Government response: The federal minimum wage was increased to $6.55 in 2008, and
$7.25 in 2009 (“Minimum Wage,” US Department of Labor). This is within the fouryear timespan Gilens uses for both 2006 and 2008; however, in 2006 respondents were
asked, first, if they would like an increase to $7.25 within the next two years, and then if
they would like an increase to $6.25 within the next year and a half. These thresholds are
not quite met, as the increase to $6.55 was within two years (rather than a year and a
half), and the increase to $7.25 was within three years (rather than two). However, there
is no timeline set for the question in 2008, so “responsiveness” equals 1 in that case.
Climate change:
“From what you know about global climate change or global warming, which one of the
following statements comes closest to your opinion? 1) Global climate change has been
established as a serious problem, and immediate action is necessary. 2) There is enough
evidence that climate change is taking place and some action should be taken. 3) We
don’t know enough about global climate change, and more research is necessary before
we take any actions. 4) Concern about global climate change is unwarranted.” (2006,
2010, 2012) I grouped the first and second options into “favoring” action on climate
change and the latter two into “opposing” action on climate change.
Government response: Though Democrats in the 110th Congress attempted to pass “a
comprehensive national policy” focused on global warming, the Lieberman-Warner
Climate Security Act of 2008, Senate Republicans prevented the legislation from coming
up for a vote (“Senate Republicans Sink Climate Bill” 2008).
Partial Birth Abortion:
“First, we’d like to ask you about a proposal in Congress to ban a type of late-term
abortion sometimes called “partial-birth abortion.” Some argue that late-term abortion is
a barbaric procedure and should be banned. Others argue that late-term abortions are
extremely uncommon and used only in exceptional circumstances best determined by a
doctor, not the Congress. The proposed legislation could also be the opening to a broader
ban on abortion. How about you? If you were faced with this decision, would you vote
for or against banning late-term abortion?” (2006)
Government response: The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was passed in 2003 (PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act of 2003), and remains in place. Thus, those who are for the ban
were, in fact, in favor of the status quo in 2006. This variable is coded as a “switcher”
variable for that reason, with “switcher” equal to 1, and since “change” would be
removing the ban, and the ban is still in place, the responsiveness variable is 0.
Birth control exemption:
“Birth control exemption. A bill to let employers and insurers refuse to cover birth
control and other health services that violate their religious beliefs.” (2012) Support for
such policy is coded as 1.
Government response:
Rule-making undertaken for the Affordable Care Act allows “religious employers”
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exemption from covering contraceptives in their health insurance plans. Other rules
exempt for-profits with “religious objections” to contraceptives. The latter rules were
created in response to Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (“Fact Sheet: Women’s
Preventive Services Coverage, Non-Profit Religious Organizations, and Closely-Held
For-Profit Entities” 2015). As the rules were created from 2012-2015, this is not a
switcher variable, and government responsiveness is 1.
Social Security:
“A proposal has been made that would allow people to put a portion of their Social
Security payroll taxes into personal retirement accounts that would be invested in private
stocks and bonds. Do you favor or oppose this idea?” (2006, 2008)
Government response: President George W. Bush’s Social Security privatization plan,
and Congress’s lack of action on the plan, is well-documented (“Budget Calls for
Domestic Increase” 2008; “Bush’s Budget: Opening Salvo in Yearlong Struggle Over
Spending” 2007; “Politics and Elections: Political Power Shift Dominates 2006” 2006).
Iraq Withdrawal:
Congress has also debated a proposal that the president begin phased redeployment of
U.S. troops from Iraq starting this year and submit to Congress by the end of 2006 a plan
with estimated dates for continued phased withdrawal. Some politicians argue that
setting out a plan to withdraw would make Iraqis take responsibility for their country and
become more independent of the U.S. Others argue that it is too early to start
withdrawing and that doing so would make terrorists grow bolder. What do you think?
If you were faced with this decision, would you vote for or against a plan to start
withdrawing troops this year? (2006).
“Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the
following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Withdraw
troops from Iraq within 180 days.” (2008).
Government response: Neither of these time-specific thresholds were met; troops were in
Iraq as late as December 2011. Though the language of the question in 2006 is a little
vague in terms of whether respondents were indicating they were in favor of a plan
passed this year that sets a timetable to remove them in the future, or a plan that is passed
this year that sets a timetable to remove them this year. Regardless, the plan was not
passed that year and the troops were not removed within the year. Neither were troops
removed within 180 days of 2008’s survey. Given the time-specific nature of these
questions, responsiveness is 0.
For context, President George W. Bush and the Iraqi Prime Minister signed the
“Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship
Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America” in July 2008. This
paved the way for the “Strategic Framework Agreement for A Relationship of
Friendship and Cooperation Between the United States and the Republic of Iraq” and the
“Agreement Between the United States of America and Republic of Iraq on the
Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities
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During Their Temporary Presence in Iraq,” which followed in November. Combat
forces, according to these agreements, were to be withdrawn by June 30, 2009, and all
forces by December 31, 2011 (Karon 2011; U.S. Congressional Research Service 2009).
This agreement held.
Though troops have since returned due to the concerns about ISIL, the respondents
queried in 2006 and 2008 would not have ben thinking about Iraq in the context of ISIL.
CAFTA:
This year Congress also debated a new free trade agreement that reduces barriers to trade
between the U.S. and countries in Central America. Some politicians argue that the
agreement allows America to better compete in the global economy and would create
more stable democracies in Central America. Other politicians argue that it helps
businesses to move jobs abroad where labor is cheaper and does not protect American
producers. What do you think? If you were faced with this decision, would you vote for
or against the trade agreement? (2006).
Government response: CAFTA passed in 2005, so the respondents here are being asked
their opinion one year later (“Central American Trade Accord Just Squeaks Through”
2005). Thus, this is a switcher variable, and taking action would mean overturning the
agreement since 2005, which did not occur. Responsiveness, therefore, equals 0.
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP):
“Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the
following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Fund a $20
billion program to provide health insurance for children in families earning less than
$43,000.” (2008)
“State Children’s Health Insurance Program insures children in low income households.
Act would renew the program through 2014 and include 4 million additional children.”
(2010)
Government Response: CHIP was set to expire in 2007. A temporary authorization saved
the program through 2009, but did not increase funding or numbers of children assisted
by the program. The Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act finally
passed in 2009, expanding funding to $33 billion and coverage to 4.1 million children
(“The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured” 2009). Thus, those
supporting the expansion in 2008 had their desires met, and responsiveness equals 1. The
2010 question followed up on support for the specific version of the bill passed in 2009.
Since posed in 2010, this is a switcher variable, meaning “action” would be overturning
CHIP, which did not occur (and responsiveness there is equal to 0).
Federal Assistance for Housing:
“Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the
following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Federal
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assistance for homeowners facing foreclosure and large lending institutions at risk.”
(2008)
Government response: The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 gave the
government the ability to assist lending institutions (for example, Frannie Mae and
Freddie Mac); created the Affordable Housing Fund to help low-income families pursue
homeownership; and created a program to assist those struggling to make their mortgage
payments, Hope for Homeowners (“Details of Mortgage Finance Bill” 2008). In a follow
up, the 2009 Preventing Mortgage Foreclosures and Enhancing Mortgage Credit Act
attempted to make the process of refinancing mortgages under the Hope for Homeowners
Program created in 2008 easier, as few people by 2009 had taken advantage of the new
program (“Mortgage Assistance Bill Signed” 2009).
Bank bailout:
“Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the
following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. U.S.
Government’s $700 Billion bank bailout plan.” (2008)
Interviewers asked specifically whether respondents favored the Troubled Asset Relief
Program, or TARP, which provided $700 billion to stabilize the financial industry (2010).
Government response: Though the $700 billion package in TARP passed in 2008
(“Congress Clears $700 Billion Bailout of Financial Services Industry” 2008), the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act lowered the authorization to just
$475 billion (“Historic Financial Overhaul Creates Bureau, Expands Oversight of Banks”
2010). Later, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the amount spent would
actually be $431 billion (Congressional Budget Office 2012). For 2008, passing this act
represents change, and it was passed. Therefore, “switcher” is equal to 0, and
responsiveness to 1. By 2010, wanting “change” regarding TARP would mean
overturning it, so the 2010 TARP variable is a “switcher” variable. Government
responsiveness is 0, however, because though funding for TARP was reduced, it
remained extremely high.
Financial Reform:
“Financial Reform Bill protects consumers against abusive lending. Regulates high risk
investments known as derivatives. Allows government to shut down failing financial
institutions.” (2010)
Government response:
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act became law in 2010.
The law liquidated failing institutions and created a Financial Stability Oversight
Council, which can vote to break up companies that threaten the financial system. It also
set new standards for home loans (“Historic Financial Overhaul Creates Bureau, Expands
Oversight of Banks” 2010).
Comprehensive health care:
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“Do you favor or oppose the U.S. government guaranteeing health insurance for all
citizens, even if it means raising taxes?” (2008)
“Comprehensive Health Reform Act requires all Americans to obtain health insurance.
Allows people to keep current provider. Sets up health insurance option for those
without coverage. Increase taxes on those making more than $280,000 a year.” (2010)
“Affordable Care Act of 2010. Requires all Americans to obtain health insurance.
Allows people to keep current provider. Sets up health insurance option for those
without coverage. Increases taxes on those making more than $280,000 a year.” (2012)
“Repeal Affordable Care Act. Would repeal the Affordable Care Act.” (2012)
Government response: The Affordable Care Act, passed in 2010, remains in place,
despite numerous attempts to repeal or defang it (U.S. Congressional Research Service
2016, “Legislative Actions to Repeal, Defund, or Delay the Affordable Care Act”). The
“switcher” variable is equal to 1 only in 2012, because respondents who favored the act
by that time were now in favor of the status quo. Responsiveness to a desire for
comprehensive health care is equal to 1 in 2008 and 2010. Those in favor of a change in
2012 were against the ACA, so responsiveness there equals 0. For the ACA repeal
variable, responsiveness is also 0, because the ACA has not been overturned.
Carbon tax:
“What do you think of a fuel tax to reduce greenhouse gas emissions? A gasoline tax of
25 cents per gallon and an electricity tax of $25 per month would reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by approximately 40 percent over the next 10 years. Would you support or
oppose such a tax?” (2008)
Government response: Despite some efforts (“Options and Considerations for a Federal
Carbon Tax” 2013), nothing has changed on the carbon tax front for many years (Gale
2016). The current gas tax remains at 18.4 cents per gallon (Plumer 2013).
American Clean Energy and Security Act:
“American Clean Energy and Security Act imposes a cap on carbon emissions and allows
companies to trade allowances for carbon emissions. Funds research on renewable
energy.” (2010)
Government response: The American Clean Energy and Security Act, with its cap and
trade system for reducing emissions (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of
Atmospheric Programs 2009) passed the House in 2009 but did not survive the Senate.
Proposed in 2014, the Clean Power Plan, to be undertaken by the EPA (U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency 2016) under the authority of the Clean Air Act (U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency 2015) has elements of the cap and trade system
(Oremus 2015). However, it is currently halted in its implementation, awaiting judicial
review (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2016). Therefore, responsiveness equals
0.
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Gun control
“In general, do you feel that the laws covering the esale of firearms should be made more
strict, less strict, or kept as they are?” (2010, 2012) I dealt only with those who felt the
laws should be more strict, placing those who wanted “less strict” laws and those who
wanted laws “kept the same” in the same “0” category.
Government response: Gun control efforts undertaken in Congress after the Sandy Hook
shooting were unsuccessful (Liebelson 2013). Though President Obama’s executive
plan, announced in 2016, aims to remove background check loopholes, hire additional
FBI examiners to complete background checks, and research “smart gun” technology
(Lederman 2016) it is unclear yet what the impact of these ideas will be on the sale of
firearms, though it’s predicted to be “relatively small” (Lederman 2016 (2)).
Responsiveness, therefore, equals 0.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
“American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Authorizes $787 billion in federal spending
to stimulate economic growth in the U.S.” (2010)
Government response: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act became law in
2009. As this question was posed in 2010, those who favored change on this are against
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, making it a “switcher” variable. The
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act survived, so response to a desired change to
this policy from 2010 forward is 0.
Ryan Bill
2011 House Budget Plan. The Budget plan would cut Medicare and Medicaid by 42%.
Would reduce debt by 16% by 2020.” (2012)
Government response: Though Ryan’s plan made it through the House (“House Adopts
GOP Budget Plan” 2011), that’s as far as it got.
Simpson-Bowles Budget Plan
“Simpson-Bowles Budget Plan. Plan would make 15% cuts across the board in Social
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and Defense, as well as other programs. Eliminate many
tax breaks for individuals and corporations. Would reduce debt by 215 by 2020.” (2012)
Government response: This plan, the brainchild of President Obama’s executive-ordered
(Executive Order 13531) bipartisan debt commission, did not make headway in Congress
(“Debt Plan Fails to Reach Hill” 2010).
Middle Class Tax Cut
The Middle Class Tax Cut Act would extend Bush era tax cuts for incomes below
$200,000. Would increase the budget deficit by an estimated $250 billion.” (2012)
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Government Response: Though the original Middle Class Tax Cut Act did not survive
the House, in 2013, the American Taxpayer Relief Act passed, and preserved the Bushera tax cuts for those individuals with incomes below $400,000 (Klein 2013).
Tax Hike Prevention Act
“The Tax Hike Prevention Act. Would extend Bush-era tax cuts for all individuals,
regardless of income. Would increase the budget deficit by an estimated $405 billion.”
(2012)
Government Response: As noted above, the American Taxpayer Relief Act ended the
Bush-era tax cuts for those making more than $400,000 (Klein 2013). Therefore,
responsiveness equals 0.
Explicitly racial
Affirmative Action:
“Some people think that if a company has a history of discriminating against blacks when
making hiring decisions, then they should be required to have an affirmative action
program that gives blacks preference in hiring. What do you think? Should companies
that have discriminated against blacks have to have an affirmative action program?”
(2006).
“Affirmative action programs give preference to racial minorities and to women in
employment and college admissions in order to correct for past discrimination. Do you
support or oppose affirmative action?” (2008, 2010, 2012)
Government response:
The status quo is that affirmative action still exists. The Supreme Court has tinkered with
it from time to time, but in its latest session reaffirmed its use (Fisher v. University of
Texas). Congress has been content to leave the issue alone since the mid-1990s
(“Affirmative Action” 2015), but given its continued controversial nature, that alone is
significant. Responsiveness to change in this area is equal to 0.
Immigration:
“Another issue is illegal immigration. One plan considered by the Senate would offer
illegal immigrants who already live in the U.S. more opportunities to become legal
citizens. Some politicians argue that people who have worked hard in jobs that the
economy depends on should be offered the chance to live here legally. Other politicians
argue that the plan is an amnesty that rewards people who have broken the law. What do
you think? If you were faced with this decision, would you vote for or against this
proposal?” (2006)
Respondents indicated their support or opposition for the following:
-Fining businesses that hire illegal immigrants (2010, 2012)
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-Granting legal status to illegal immigrants who have paid taxes and held jobs for three
years and who have no felony convictions (2010, 2012)
-Increasing border patrols on the U.S.-Mexico border (2010, 2012)
-Allowing the police to question anyone they suspect may be in the U.S. illegally (2010,
2012)
-Prohibiting illegal immigrants from using emergency care and public schools (2012)
-Denying citizenship to American-born children of illegal immigrants (2012).
Government response:
The Senate passed immigration reform in 2013 (Kim 2013), but it stalled after that. The
bill dealt with many of the issues CCES respondents were queried about, including
providing a “pathway to citizenship,” a “workplace verification system for employers,”
increased border security, and a new visa program (Kim 2013). Similarly, versions of the
DREAM Act, which would provide citizenship to undocumented immigrants who arrived
in the U.S. as children and went to school here, provided they met certain qualifications
(The DREAM Act”), were debated in both the House and the Senate but have not been
successful. President Obama utilized executive orders to create Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, which would defer deportation for families of U.S.
citizens, provided they had committed no felonies, can pass a background check, and pay
taxes. However, progress on this front is stalled, as the action is under injunction (United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services), and the Supreme Court tied on the issue
this term (United States v. Texas). Responsiveness to the amnesty and “granting
citizenship” questions is thus equal to 0.
In addition, here are efforts on issues raised in specific questions:
Border patrol levels and funding have steadily increased (U.S. Congressional Research
Service 2016). Responsiveness to this desire equals 1.
There are fines for businesses who knowingly hire illegal immigrants (Meyers 2016), but
not much has changed on this front since 1986 (“Employer Sanctions” 2016). Therefore,
this is a switcher variable, where change would indicate ending this policy, and
responsiveness is 0.
Arizona famously passed SB 1070 in 2010, which permitted police to check individuals’
immigration status if they suspected individuals they stopped or arrested were in the U.S.
illegally. Other states created similar laws, though the federal government did not, and in
fact the Obama administration sued Arizona as a result of SB 1070, stating that the law
preempted federal laws on the issue. In Arizona v. U.S. (2012), the Supreme Court struck
down much of SB 1070 but retained the “reasonable suspicion” component. However,
they suggested that further legal challenges regarding the clause may occur (Winograd
2012). Responsiveness as of 2016 equals 1.
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Undocumented immigrants may receive emergency care (Gusmano 2012), and
undocumented children can attend K-12 Public Schools (Olivas 2010; Plyler v. Doe
1982). Responsiveness to changing this status quo is 0.
The current interpretation of the 14th Amendment is that it guarantees birthright
citizenship, though this interpretation continues to be hotly debated (Peralta 2015).
Responsiveness to changing this interpretation equals 0.

Appendix C:
Differences in Median Opinion between Groups by Income Level

Implicitly Racial Explicitly Racial Explicitly Racial
Issues
Issues
Issues
(Affirmative
(Immigration)
Action)
Low-Income African Americans
and Low-Income Whites
High-Income African
Americans and High-Income
Whites
Low-Income Latinos and LowIncome Whites
High-Income Latinos and HighIncome Whites

1

7

3

3

8

3

1

5.5

5

2

3.5

3
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Appendix D: White Opinion by Income

Income Percentile
Year

Policy

2006
2008
2006
2006
2010
2012
2006
2012
2006
2008
2006
2008
2006
2008
2010
2008
2010
2010
2010
2008
2010
2012
2012
2008

Minimum Wage1***
Minimum Wage***
Minimum Wage 2***
Climate Change***
Climate Change***
Climate change***
PartialBirth***
BirthControlEx***
Social Security***
Social Security***
Iraq***
Iraq***
CAFTA***
CHIP***
CHIP***
Housing***
BankBail**
TARP*
Financial Reform***
Comprehensive
Healthcare***
Comprehensive
Healthcare***
ACA***
ACARepeal***
CarbonTax***
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Lowest
4
5
5
3
1
2
1
-3
-1
0
3
3
-3
5
4
2
-4
-3
3

Highest
2
3
3
1
0
1
1
-1
2
1
0
-1
0
1
2
-2
-3
-3
1

Difference
HighestLowest
2
2
2
2
1
1
0
2
3
1
3
4
3
4
2
4
1
0
2

3

0

3

0
1
-1
-4

-1
0
0
-3

1
1
1
1

2010
2010
2012
2010
2012
2012
2012
2012
2006
2008
2010
2012
2006
2010
2012
2010
2012
2010
2012
2010
2012
2012
2012

ACESA***
Gun Control***
Gun Control***
ARRA***
RyanBill***
SimpBowles***
MidTax***
TaxHike
AffrmAct***
AffrmAct***
AffrmAct***
AffrmAct***
Immigration***
FineBusinesses
FineBusinesses***
GrantStatus***
GrantStatus***
BorderPatrols***
BorderPatrols***
PoliceQuestion***
PoliceQuestion***
ER/Schools***
AutoCitizenship***

2
1
1
0
-5
-2
1
-4
-3
-1
-3
-3
-2
3
2
-2
-1
2
1
0
-1
-3
-2

0
2
2
-1
-3
1
2
-3
-4
-3
-3
-3
-2
4
3
-2
0
2
1
0
-1
-3
-1

2
1
1
1
2
3
1
1
1
2
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1

Note:
Table shows differences in opinion among whites, using coding levels for imputed preferences devised by
Gilens.:
Between 45% and 55%=0
Over 55% or under 45%=+1/-1
Over 60% or under 40%=+/-2
Over 65% or under 35%=+/-3
Over 75% or under 25%=+/-4
Over 85% or under 15%=+/-5
P-values indicate where differences in opinion among whites, by income, are significant in logit
regressions, where the dependent variable is support or opposition for a policy among whites, and income
levels among whites are the predictors.
***=p<0.001
**=p<0.01
*=p<0.05
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APPENDIX E
Bills included in sponsorship analysis, divided by section.
Iraq
-To provide for the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Iraq, to authorize
assistance for Iraq, and for other purposes.
-To provide for a timetable for the redeployment of the United States Armed Forces from
Iraq and to seek political and diplomatic solutions for the security and stability of the
Republic of Iraq.
-To require United States military disengagement from Iraq, to provide United States
assistance for reconstruction and reconciliation in Iraq, and for other purposes.
-To limit the length of deployment of members of the Armed Forces for Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
-To limit the use of funds to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of
providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq or to
exercise United States economic control of the oil resources of Iraq.
-To limit the use of funds to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of
providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq or to
exercise United States economic control of the oil resources of Iraq.
-To redeploy United States Armed Forces from the non-Kurdish areas of Iraq if certain
security, political, and economic benchmarks relating to Iraq are not met, and for other
purposes.
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-To safely redeploy United States troops from Iraq.
-To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002
(Public Law 107-243).
-To provide for the redeployment of United States Armed Forces and defense contractors
from Iraq.
-To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002
(Public Law 107-243) and to require the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from
Iraq.
-To redeploy United States Armed Forces from Iraq and to establish a new direction for
United States policy toward Iraq.
-To set forth limitations on the United States military presence in Iraq and on United
States aid to Iraq for security and reconstruction, and for other purposes.
-To require the President to develop a plan containing dates certain for the
commencement and completion of a phased redeployment of United States Armed Forces
from Iraq, and for other purposes.
-To end the United States occupation of Iraq immediately.
-To enhance the national security interests of the United States both at home and abroad
by setting a deliberate timetable for the redeployment of United States Armed Forces
from Iraq by December 31, 2007, and for other purposes.
-To establish a sunset for the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243).
-To prohibit the use of funds for an escalation of United States forces in Iraq above the
numbers existing as of January 9, 2007.
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-To mandate minimum periods of rest and recuperation for units and members of the
regular and reserve components of the Armed Forces between deployments for Operation
Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom.
-A bill to terminate the authority of the President to waive, with regard to Iraq, certain
provisions under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 unless
certain conditions are met.
- To ensure that any agreement with Iraq containing a security commitment or
arrangement is concluded as a treaty or is approved by Congress.
- A bill to require the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress reports on the status of
planning for the redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq and to require the Secretary
of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and appropriate senior officials of
the Department of Defense to meet with Congress to brief Congress on the matters
contained in the reports.
- To require the safe, complete, and fully-funded redeployment of United States Armed
Forces and contractor security forces from Iraq and to prohibit the establishment of any
enduring or permanent United States military bases in Iraq, and for other purposes.
- To provide for the protection of members of the United States Armed Forces and for
their withdrawal from Iraq by December 31, 2007.
- To require the immediate redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq.
- To amend the reporting requirements in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act,
2007 relating to military and political stability in Iraq to require additional information on
the number of combatants and non-combatants killed, and for other purposes.
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- To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002
(Public Law 107-243) and to require the withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces in
Iraq.
- To reassert the constitutional role of Congress in making long-term security
commitments, to defer significant long-term security commitments to Iraq to the next
Administration and Congress, and to maintain international legal authority and immunity
for United States Armed Forces in Iraq by promoting the extension of the United Nations
mandate.
- To require the Secretary of Defense to commence the reduction of the number of United
States Armed Forces in Iraq to a limited presence by April 1, 2008, and for other
purposes.
- To provide for the safe and orderly withdrawal of United States military forces and
Department of Defense contractors from Iraq, and for other purposes.
- To prohibit an escalation in the number of members of the United States Armed Forces
deployed in Iraq.
-To provide for the redeployment of United States Armed Forces and defense contractors
from Iraq.
- To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002
(Public Law 107-243), and for other purposes.
- Expressing the sense of Congress that Iraq should vote to approve or disapprove the
continued deployment of United States Armed Forces to Iraq and, unless Iraq votes to
approve such continued deployment, the President of the United States should commence
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the phased redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq within 60 days of the
Iraqi vote.
- Disagreeing with the plan announced by the President on January 10, 2007, to increase
by more than 20,000 the number of United States combat troops in Iraq, and urging the
President instead to consider options and alternatives for achieving success in Iraq.
- Urging the United States Government to initiate a diplomatic surge to foster security
and stability in the Middle East by engaging international stakeholders and governments
throughout the region to curtail destabilizing influences, help prevent the spread of
violence, address humanitarian concerns, and enhance prospects for security, political,
and economic progress in Iraq.
- Expressing the need for a more comprehensive diplomatic initiative led by the United
States, Republic of Iraq, and international community.
- Expressing the sense of Congress that the Government of Iraq should schedule a
referendum to determine whether or not the people of Iraq want the Armed Forces of the
United States to be withdrawn from Iraq or to remain in Iraq until order is restored to the
country.
- Declaring that it is the policy of the United States not to establish any military
installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United
States Armed Forces in Iraq and not to exercise United States control of the oil resources
of Iraq.
- Expressing the sense of Congress that the Government of Iraq should schedule a
referendum to determine whether or not the people of Iraq want the Armed Forces of the
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United States to be withdrawn from Iraq or to remain in Iraq until order is restored to the
country.
- Disapproving of the decision of the President announced on January 10, 2007, to deploy
more than 20,000 additional United States combat troops to Iraq.
- Recognizing March 19, 2008, as the fifth anniversary of the Iraq war and urging
President George W. Bush to begin an immediate and safe redeployment of United States
Armed Forces from Iraq.
- Expressing the sense of Congress that the Government of the United States should
submit to the Government of Iraq a draft bilateral status-of-forces agreement by not later
than September 1, 2007.
- Expressing the sense of Congress that the President should not order an escalation in the
total number of members of the United States Armed Forces serving in Iraq.
- To redeploy U.S. forces from Iraq.
- Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that an increase in number of
members of the United States Forces deployed in Iraq is the wrong course of action and
that a drastic shift in the political and diplomatic strategy of the United States is needed to
help secure and stabilize Iraq.
- Expressing the sense of the House that the United States should increase United States
forces in Afghanistan and responsibly redeploy forces from Iraq.
- Providing for consideration of the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 63) disapproving
of the decision of the President announced on January 10, 2007, to deploy more than
20,000 additional United States combat troops to Iraq.
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- Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 2956) to require the Secretary of Defense
to commence the reduction of the number of United States Armed Forces in Iraq to a
limited presence by April 1, 2008, and for other purposes.
- Calling on the President of the United States not to commit the United States to any
status of forces agreement or any other bilateral agreement with the Republic of Iraq that
involves the continued presence of the United States Armed Forces in Iraq unless the
agreement includes a provision under which the Republic of Iraq agrees to reimburse the
United States for all costs incurred by the United States related to the presence of United
States Armed Forces in Iraq after the effective date of the agreement.
- Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States should
accept the Iraqi Governments stated goal of setting a timetable for withdrawal of United
States Armed Forces from Iraq.
- Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 2237) to provide for the redeployment of
United States Armed Forces and defense contractors from Iraq, providing for
consideration of the bill (H.R. 2206) making emergency supplemental appropriations for
the fiscal year ending September 30, 2007, and for other purposes, and providing for
consideration of the bill (H.R. 2207) making supplemental appropriations for agricultural
and other emergency assistance for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2007, and for
other purposes.
- Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3159) to mandate minimum periods of rest
and recuperation for units and members of the regular and reserve components of the
Armed Forces between deployments for Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring
Freedom.
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- To prohibit the use of funds to maintain United States Armed Forces and military
contractors in Iraq after December 31, 2011, and for other purposes.
- Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States should
leave no member of the Armed Forces unaccounted for in the withdrawal of forces from
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Openness to immigration
-To authorize any alien who has been issued a valid machine-readable biometric border
crossing identification card to be temporarily admitted into the United States upon
successfully completing a background check.
- To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to permit the admission to the United
States of nonimmigrant students and visitors who are the spouses and children of United
States permanent resident aliens, and for other purposes.
- To provide discretionary authority to an immigration judge to determine that an alien
parent of a United States citizen child should not be ordered removed from the United
States.
-To establish the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Commission.
-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act with respect to temporary admission of
nonimmigrant aliens to the United States for the purpose of receiving medical treatment,
and for other purposes.
-To provide for comprehensive immigration reform, and for other purposes.
-To provide discretionary authority to an immigration judge to determine that an alien
parent of a United States citizen child should not be ordered removed, deported, or
excluded from the United States.
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-To amend the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 to
permit States to determine State residency for higher education purposes and to authorize
the cancellation of removal and adjustment of status of certain alien students who are
long-term United States residents and who entered the United States as children, and for
other purposes.
-To exempt from numerical limitations any alien who has received a Ph.D. from an
institution of higher education within the 3-year period preceding such aliens petition for
special immigrant status.
- To amend part E of title IV of the Social Security Act to require States to help alien
children in the child welfare system apply for all available forms of immigration relief,
and for other purposes.
-To provide the nonimmigrant spouses and children of nonimmigrant aliens who perished
in the September 11 terrorist attacks an opportunity to adjust their status to that of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and for other purposes.
-To amend the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003 to extend Federal reimbursement of emergency health services furnished to
undocumented aliens, and for other purposes.
- To authorize Federal payment to emergency ambulance and medical services providers
for the cost of uncompensated care of aliens aided by the border patrol or other Federal
immigration officials.
-Disapproving the rule submitted to the Congress by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services requiring certain lawful permanent residents to apply for a new Permanent
Resident Card.
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- To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide authority for immigration
judges to terminate proceedings or appoint counsel when necessary for aliens with mental
disabilities, and for other purposes.
-To authorize the cancellation of removal and adjustment of status of certain alien
students who are long-term United States residents and who entered the United States as
children, and for other purposes.
-To provide for enhanced protections for vulnerable unaccompanied alien children and
female detainees.
-To authorize the cancellation of removal and adjustment of status of certain aliens who
are long-term United States residents and who entered the United States as children, and
for other purposes.
- To amend part E of title IV of the Social Security Act to require States to help alien
children in the child welfare system apply for all available forms of immigration relief,
and for other purposes.
-To provide the spouses and children of aliens who perished in the September 11 terrorist
attacks an opportunity to adjust their status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.
-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for nonimmigrant status for
an alien who is the parent or legal guardian of a United States citizen child if the child
was born abroad and is the child of a deceased member of the Armed Forces of the
United States.
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-To provide discretionary authority to an immigration judge to determine that an alien
parent of a United States citizen child should not be ordered removed, deported, or
excluded from the United States.
-To amend section 1011 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-173) to make permanent the program of
Federal reimbursement of emergency health services furnished to undocumented aliens.
-To permit aliens who lawfully enter the United States on valid visas as nonimmigrant
elementary and secondary school students to attend public schools in the United States
for longer than 1 year if such aliens reimburse the local educational agency that
administers the school for the full, unsubsidized per capita cost of providing education at
such school for the period of the aliens attendance.
-To amend section 402(a)(2)(M) of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 to extend by two years the special rule relating to eligibility
for benefits under the supplemental security income program for certain aliens and
victims of trafficking.
-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act with respect to temporary admission of
nonimmigrant aliens to the United States for the purpose of receiving medical treatment,
and for other purposes.
-To authorize the cancellation of removal and adjustment of status of certain aliens who
are long-term United States residents and who entered the United States as children, and
for other purposes.
-To assist aliens who have been lawfully admitted in becoming citizens of the United
States, and for other purposes.
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-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to authorize certain aliens who have
earned a Ph.D. degree from a United States institution of higher education in a field of
science, technology, engineering, or mathematics to be admitted for permanent residence
and to be exempted from the numerical limitations on H-1B nonimmigrants.
-Disapproving the rule submitted to the Congress by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services on June 6, 2007, relating to adjustment of the Immigration and Naturalization
Benefit Application and Petition Fee Schedule.
-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to restore certain provisions relating to
the definition of aggravated felony and other provisions as they were before the
enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.
-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to restore certain provisions relating to
the definition of aggravated felony and other provisions as they were before the
enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.
-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to waive inadmissibility based on a
misrepresentation in the case of an immediate relative of an active duty or reserve
member of the Armed Forces and to extend the V nonimmigrant visa program for
spouses and children of such a member.

Closed to immigration
-To end the cycle of illegal immigration in the United States.
-To require those applying for, and renewing, SCHIP, TAA, and ATAA benefits to
present documentation proving both citizenship and identity in order to receive those
benefits.
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- To impose a mandatory minimum sentence on a deportable alien who fails to depart or
fails to attend a removal proceeding.
-To provide for enhanced Federal, State, and local assistance in the enforcement of the
immigration laws, to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, to authorize
appropriations to carry out the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program, and for other
purposes.
-To deny certain Federal funds to any institution of higher education that admits as
students aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States.
-To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act with respect to meeting the citizenship
documentation requirement for children born in the United States.
-To assist the Secretary of Homeland Security in carrying out surveillance activities
conducted at or near the international land borders of the United States to prevent illegal
immigration, and for other purposes.
-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to deny visas and admission to aliens
who have been unlawfully present in the United States for more than 6 months.
-To strengthen procedures regarding detention and removal of aliens.
-To amend the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 to
provide for two-layered, 14-foot reinforced fencing along the southwest border, and for
other purposes.
-To enhance national security by restricting access of illegal aliens to drivers licenses and
State-issued identification documents.
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-To amend section 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to increase penalties for
unlawfully bringing in and harboring aliens with prior felony convictions under Federal
law.
-To amend various laws imposing criminal penalties to double the maximum penalty for
illegal aliens who commit those crimes, and for other purposes.
-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to include in the definition of the term
aggravated felony a criminal violation committed by an alien who unlawfully entered the
United States.
-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to deny citizenship at birth to children
born in the United States of parents who are not citizens or permanent resident aliens.
-To suspend certain nonessential visas, in order to provide temporary workload relief
critical to the successful reorganization of the immigration and naturalization functions of
the Department of Homeland Security, to ensure that the screening and monitoring of
arriving immigrants and nonimmigrants, and the deterrence of entry and settlement by
illegal or unauthorized aliens, is sufficient to maintain the integrity of the sovereign
borders of the United States, and for other purposes.
-To remove the incentives and loopholes that encourage illegal aliens to come to the
United States to live and work, provide additional resources to local law enforcement and
Federal border and immigration officers, and for other purposes.
-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act and title 18, United States Code, to
combat the crime of alien smuggling and related activities, and for other purposes.
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-To impose a criminal penalty on an alien who fails voluntarily to depart the United
States after securing permission to do so, or who unlawfully returns to the United States
after voluntarily departing.
-To amend the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 to
clarify requirements relating to the construction of a physical fence along the southwest
border, and for other purposes.
-To prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security from paroling into the United States an
alien who falls ill while seeking admission at a port of entry or seeks emergency medical
assistance by approaching an agent or official of the Department of Homeland Security at
or near a border.
-To amend section 276 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to impose mandatory
sentencing ranges with respect to aliens who reenter the United States after having been
removed, and for other purposes.
-To authorize appropriations for the Coast Guard for fiscal year 2008, to amend the
Immigration and Nationality Act and title 18, United States Code, to combat the crime of
alien smuggling and related activities, and for other purposes.
-To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide mandatory imprisonment for certain
kidnapings by illegal aliens.
-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to increase criminal penalties for certain
removed aliens who illegally reenter the United States.
-To deter alien smuggling criminal enterprises.
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-To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to permit States, at their option, to require
certain individuals to present satisfactory documentary evidence of proof of citizenship or
nationality for purposes of eligibility for Medicaid, and for other purposes.
-Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should immediately and
unequivocally call for the enforcement of existing immigration laws in order to reduce
the threat of a terrorist attack and to reduce the massive influx of illegal aliens into the
United States.
-Expressing the sense of the Congress that State and local governments should be
supported for taking actions to discourage illegal immigration and that legislation should
be enacted to ease the burden on State and local governments for taking such actions.
-Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the issuance of State
drivers licenses or other government-issued photo identification to illegal aliens.
-Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Administration should
rigorously enforce the laws of the United States to substantially reduce illegal
immigration and greatly improve border security.
-Commending Federal and local law enforcement for their efforts to crack down on
illegal immigration in the Chicagoland suburbs and calling on the Governor of the State
of Illinois to immediately implement employee verification technology to curb rising
trends in illegal immigration in the State of Illinois.
-To deny certain Federal funds to any institution of higher education that admits as
students aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States.
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-To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to require certain nonresident aliens to
provide valid immigration documents to claim the refundable portion of the child tax
credit.
-To provide that States and local governments may pass laws that identify illegal aliens,
deter illegal aliens from entering the United States, apprehend illegal aliens, or encourage
or otherwise cause illegal aliens to leave the United States, and for other purposes.
-To amend the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 to
authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to construct not less than 350 miles of
reinforced fencing along the United States-Mexico border and to gain operational control
over such border.
-To provide for enhanced Federal, State, and local assistance in the enforcement of the
immigration laws, to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, to authorize
appropriations to carry out the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program, and for other
purposes.
-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for extensions of detention of
certain aliens ordered removed, and for other purposes.
-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act with respect to detention of unlawfully
present aliens who are apprehended for driving while intoxicated, and for other purposes.
-To prohibit appropriated funds from being used in contravention of section 642(a) of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.
-To amend section 276 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to impose mandatory
sentencing ranges with respect to aliens who reenter the United States after having been
removed, and for other purposes.
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-To amend title I of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to provide for
appropriate procedures under such title for verification of citizenship status.
-To provide for expedited removal of certain aliens, and for other purposes.
-Expressing the sense of the Congress that State and local governments should be
supported for taking actions to discourage illegal immigration and that legislation should
be enacted to ease the burden on State and local governments for taking such actions.
-To support the goals and ideals of the National Day of Remembrance of Victims of
Illegal Aliens.
-Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to deny United States
citizenship to individuals born in the United States to parents who are neither United
States citizens nor persons who owe permanent allegiance to the United States.
-To amend section 404 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 to allow public institutions of higher education to use the employment
eligibility confirmation system established under that section to verify immigration status
for purposes of determining eligibility for in-State tuition.
-To provide immigration reform by securing Americas borders, clarifying and enforcing
existing laws, and enabling a practical employer verification program.
-To provide immigration reform by securing Americas borders, clarifying and enforcing
existing laws, and enabling a practical employer verification program.
-To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act with respect to detention of unlawfully
present aliens who are apprehended for driving while intoxicated, to improve State and
local enforcement of immigration laws, and for other purposes.
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Not included in these categories: those relating to terrorism, genocide.
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APPENDIX F
Openness to Immigration Bill Sponsors
Name

Party

Race

State,

Total Sponsored

District
Jeff Flake

R

White

AZ, 6th

1

Pete Stark

D

White

CA, 13th

3

Howard Berman

D

White

CA, 28th

2

Lucille RoybalAllard
Darrell Issa

D

Latina

CA, 34th

1

R

White

CA, 49th

1

Bob Filner

D

White

CA, 51st

4

David Rivera

R

Latino

FL, 25th

2

Carolyn Maloney

D

White

NY, 14th

2

Jose Serrano

D

Latino

NY, 16th

3

William Owens

D

White

NY, 23rd

1

Steve Cohen

D

White

TN, 9th

2

Jim McDermott

D

White

WA, 7th

1

Gabrielle

D

White

AZ, 8th

1

Zoe Lofgren

D

White

CA, 16th

1

Joe Baca

D

Latino

CA, 43rd

1

Luis Gutierrez

D

Latino

IL, 4th

2

Frank Pallone

D

White

NJ, 6th

1

Ed Towns

D

African

NY, 10th

1

Giffords
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American
Patrick Kennedy

D

White

RI, 1st

1

Solomon Ortiz

D

Latino

TX, 27th

1

Henry Cuellar

D

Latino

TX, 28th

1

Closed to Immigration Bill Sponsors
Name

Party

Race

State

Total Sponsored

Mo Brooks

R

White

AL, 5th

1

Paul Gosar

R

White

AZ, 1st

1

Dana Rohrabacher

R

White

CA, 46th

1

Duncan Hunter

R

White

CA, 52nd

3

Steve King

R

White

IA, 5th

1

Charles Boustany

R

White

LA, 7th

1

Sue Myrick

R

White

NC, 9th

4

Heath Shuler

D

White

NC, 11th

2

Marsha Blackburn

R

White

TN, 7th

2

Ted Poe

R

White

TX, 2nd

2

Lamar Smith

R

White

TX, 21st

2

John Shadegg

R

White

AZ, 3rd

1

Elton Gallegly

R

White

CA, 24th

4

Gary Miller

R

White

CA, 42nd

1

Darrell Issa

R

White

CA, 49th

2

Corrine Brown

D

African

FL, 3rd

1
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American
Ginny BrownWaite
Vern Buchanan

R

White

FL, 5th

1

R

White

FL, 13th

1

Tim Mahoney

D

White

FL, 16th

1

Peter Roskam

R

White

IL, 6th

1

Mark Souder

R

White

IN, 3rd

1

Dan Burton

R

White

IN, 5th

1

Baron Hill

D

White

IN, 9th

1

Tom Latham

R

White

IA, 4th

1

A. Dutch
Ruppersberger
James Oberstar

D

White

MD, 2nd

1

D

White

MN, 8th

1

Sam Graves

R

White

MO, 6th

2

Steve Pearce

R

White

NM, 2nd

1

Pete King

R

White

NY, 3rd

1

Nick Lampson

D

White

TX, 22nd

1

Gene Green

D

White

TX, 29th

1

John Carter

R

White

TX, 31st

1

Thelma Drake

R

White

VA, 2nd

1

Virgil Goode

R

White

VA, 5th

2

Ron Paul

R

White

TX, 14th

1
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Iraq Withdrawal Bill Sponsors
Name

Party

Race

State

Total Sponsored

Barbara Lee

D

African

CA, 9th

4

American
Richard Nugent

R

White

FL, 5th

1

Mike Thompson

D

White

CA, 1st

1

Lynn Woolsey

D

White

CA, 6th

2

Ellen Tauscher

D

White

CA, 10th

2

Sam Farr

D

White

CA, 7th

1

Howard Berman

D

White

CA, 28th

1

Maxine Waters

D

African

CA, 35th

1

American
R

White

CA, 46th

3

D

White

CT, 1st

1

Christopher Shays R

White

CT, 4th

3

Robert Wexler

D

White

FL, 19th

1

Jesse Jackson

D

African

IL, 2nd

1

Dana
Rohrabacher
John Larson

American
Bruce Braley

D

White

IA, 1st

1

Wayne Gilchrest

R

White

MD, 1st

1

Jim McGovern

D

White

MA, 3rd

2

Niki Tsongas

D

White

MA, 5th

1
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Martin Meehan

D

White

MA, 5th

1

Ed Markey

D

White

MA, 7th

1

Bill Delahunt

D

White

MA, 10th

1

Mike Rogers

R

White

MI, 8th

1

John Dingell

D

White

MI, 15th

1

Keith Ellison

D

African

MN, 5th

1

American
Ike Skelton

D

White

MO, 4th

2

Jeff Fortenberry

R

White

NE, 1st

1

Steve Israel

D

White

NY, 2nd

1

Jerrold Nadler

D

White

NY, 8th

1

Louise Slaughter

D

White

NY, 28th

4

David Price

D

White

NC, 4th

1

Dennis Kucinich

D

White

OH, 10th

2

Earl Blumenauer

D

White

OR, 3rd

1

Peter DeFazio

D

White

OR, 4th

1

Joe Sestak

D

White

PA, 7th

1

John Murtha

D

White

PA, 12th

1

Jim Langevin

D

White

RI, 2nd

1

John Tanner

D

White

TN, 8th

1

Ron Paul

R

White

TX, 14th

1

Adam Smith

D

White

WA, 9th

1

David Obey

D

White

WI, 7th

1
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APPENDIX H
Impact of at Least One African American or Latino Member on Committees for
Explicitly Racial Oversight, Logit Analysis
Variables

At least 1 African
American on
Committee
At least 1 Latino on
Committee
% Minority
Members in
Congress
African American
Chair
Latino
Chair
Constant

Full Model; 80th110th Congresses

80th-102nd Congress
Model

-0.6047
(0.368)

-0.4351
(0.387)

103rd-110th
Congress
Model
-1.731
(1.612)

0.312
(0.363)
0.1262**
(0.045)

0.2288
(0.398)
0.0889
(0.073)

0.684
(1.257)
0.3301
(0.373)

0.819*
(0.406)
1.3198**
(0.537)
-3.04***
(0.298)
538

0.8176
(0.472)
1.877**
(0.629)
-2.94***
(0.360)
493

0.8578
(0.895)
0.2166
(1.270)
-5.16
(4.909)
45

Number of
observations
Log-Likelihood
-156.40***
-131.76**
-23.18
Note: Democratically-led Houses only. The dependent variables are explicit and implicit
hearings by committees (unit of analysis is the committee-Congress pair), where 0=no
hearings and 1=1 or more hearings. Entries are log odds; standard errors are in
parentheses.
***=p<0.001 **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05
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APPENDIX I
Racially Salient Oversight and Ideology, Logit Analysis
Oversight Type
Variables
Full Model;
80th-102nd
80th-110th
Congress
Congresses
Model
Explicit
0.1460*
0.3088*
# African
(0.070)
(0.139)
Americans on
Committee
0.0610
0.1216
# Latinos on
(0.097)
(0.173)
Committee
-0.05
0.0181
% Minority
(0.038)
(0.085)
Members in
Congress
0.7729^
0.3709
African
(0.398)
(0.5104)
American
Chair
2.0503***
2.4113***
Latino
(0.545)
(0.673)
Chair
7.8918***
15.3127***
Ideology
(2.076)
(3.867)
-0.2684
0.0091
Democratic
(0.264)
(0.411)
President
Implicit
0.2388***
0.0877
# African
(0.057)
(0.092)
Americans on
Committee
-0.054
-0.2224
# Latinos on
(0.077)
(0.134)
Committee
-0.063**
0.0031
% Minority
(0.027)
(0.049)
Members in
Congress
0.2256
0.3368
African
(0.296)
(0.329)
American
Chair
1.3056**
1.107^
Latino Chair
(0.503)
(0.583)
4.122**
4.1725
Ideology
(1.304)
(2.239)
-0.099
0.0989
Democratic
(0.172)
(0.225)
President

103rd-110th
Congress
Model
0.1019
(0.084)
0.0037
(0.122)
0.6380^
(0.338)
0.4098
(0.873)
0.0106
(1.249)
-0.384
(6.083)
0.1809
(0.710)
0.3932***
(0.087)
0.0192
(0.104)
0.3824
(0.285)
-0.6695
(0.907)
0.8382
(1.258)
-2.1347
5.042
-0.5307
(0.557)

Note: The dependent variables are explicit and implicit hearings by committees (unit of
analysis is the committee-Congress pair), where 0=no hearings and 1=1 or more hearings.
Entries are log odds; standard errors are in parentheses.
***=p<0.001 **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05 ^=p<0.06

195

Racially Salient Oversight and Ideology, Negative Binomial Analysis
Oversight Type

Explicit

Implicit

Variables

# African
Americans on
Committee
# Latinos on
Committee
% Minority
Members in
Congress
African
American
Chair
Latino
Chair
Ideology
Democratic
President
# African
Americans on
Committee
# Latinos on
Committee
% Minority
Members in
Congress
African
American
Chair
Latino Chair
Ideology
Democratic
President

Full Model;
80th-110th
Congresses
0.1412
(0.078)

80th-102nd
Congress
Model
0.2205
(0.151)

103rd-110th
Congress
Model
0.1131
(0.088)

-0.0043
(0.106)
-0.0362
(0.039)

0.0466
(0.209)
-0.0025
(0.089)

-0.0947
(0.117)
0.9985**
(0.356)

0.8113
(0.4108)

0.5276
(0.5266)

0.1709
(0.816)

1.6765*
(0.669)
8.2041***
(1.958)
0.0138
(0.278)
0.2486***
(0.058)

2.040**
(0.812)
9.897**
(3.579)
0.5281
(0.401)
0.0578
(0.099)

-0.9626
(1.421)
-0.9333
(5.862)
0.3443
(0.731)
0.4445***
(0.086)

0.0365
(0.088)
-0.0449
(0.028)

-0.0408
(0.156)
0.0381
(0.051)

0.1202
(0.114)
-0.019
(0.246)

0.0482
(0.308)

0.1796
(0.344)

-1.1674
(0.828)

1.7644***
(0.498)
3.6878**
(1.347)
-0.2986
(0.186)

1.4124*
(0.593)
5.4999*
(2.243)
-0.141
(0.247)

1.0005
(0.985)
0.5206
(4.498)
-0.8383
(0.519)

Note: The dependent variables are explicit and implicit hearing counts by committees
(unit of analysis is the committee-Congress pair). Entries are logs of expected counts;
standard errors are in parentheses.
***=p<0.001 **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05
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